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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Matthew Allen Derrick 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Geography 
 
March 2012 
 
Title: Placing Faith in Tatarstan, Russia: Islam and the Negotiation of Homeland 
 
The Republic of Tatarstan, a Muslim-majority region of the Russian Federation, is 
home to a post-Soviet Islamic revival now entering its third decade. Throughout the 
1990s, the Tatars of Tatarstan were recognized as practicing a liberal form of Islam, 
reported more as an attribute of ethno-national culture than as a code of religious 
conduct. In recent years, however, the republic’s reputation as a bastion of religious 
liberalism has been challenged, first, by a counter-revival of conservative Islamic 
traditions considered indigenous to the region and, second, by increasing evidence that 
Islamic fundamentalism, generally attributed in Russia to Wahhabism or Salafism, has 
taken hold and is growing in influence among the region’s Muslims.  
This dissertation explores how changing political-territorial circumstances are 
implicated in this transformation. Drawing on extensive fieldwork in Kazan, the capital 
of Tatarstan, and a variety of qualitative research methods, including textual analysis, 
semi-structured interviews, and ethnographic study, the dissertation demonstrates that the 
transformation in Islamic identity relates to changing understandings of this region as a 
political space. An examination of practices and representations of the Muslim Spiritual 
Board of Tatarstan and conflicting perspectives on landscape elements in the Kazan 
Kremlin shows that the meaning of Islam is being driven by political-geographic change. 
 v 
 
Analysis of these matters reveals that, as part of Tatarstan’s quest for wide-
ranging territorial autonomy in the 1990s, government-supported institutions cultivated a 
preferred understanding of Islam that corresponded to visions of the region as the Tatars’ 
sovereign historic homeland. Over the past decade, amid a rapid recentralization of the 
federation, support has shifted to Islamic practices deemed “traditional to Russia” as part 
of a broader multinational Russian identity crafted to fit visions of the country as a 
powerful, unified state. Thus, the meaning of Islam in this particular place is mediated by 
competing visions of Tatarstan as a homeland. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Presenting the Problem 
In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’s demise, two Muslim-majority 
regions of Russia mounted aggressive sovereignty campaigns that challenged the 
country’s territorial integrity. In Chechnya, the better known of the two, an indigenous 
Islamic revival became radicalized as it articulated justifications for independence that 
eventually resulted in two wars with Moscow. Separatism in Chechnya persists to this 
day, fueling Islamist-inspired violence that spills over into neighboring areas and 
threatens the stability of the entire North Caucasus region – and Russia itself. Many of 
the same conditions were present in Tatarstan after the collapse of the USSR, including 
an indigenous Islamic revival that was a driving force behind claims for sovereignty. 
Unlike Chechnya, however, Tatarstan avoided armed conflict with Moscow even as it 
continued in pressing for an unprecedented degree of autonomy. 
What explains these different outcomes? In the 1990s many observers credited the 
Tatars’ revival of an indigenous liberal form of Islam, known as Jadidism (from Arabic 
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for “renewal”), as important in saving the region from bloodshed, curbing aspirations for 
full-fledged independence, and, in an area home to a sizeable Orthodox Russian minority, 
safeguarding the interfaith peace that has been Tatarstan’s hallmark (e.g. Rorlich 1999; 
Yemelianova 1999). More an ethno-cultural attribute than a strict code of religious 
conduct, Jadidism – in its current form also known as “Euro-Islam” – is said to embrace 
religious reform, keeping the gates of ijtihad (independent interpretation of the Koran and 
Sunnah) wide open, and Westernization in the service of modernizing the Tatar nation. 
As Rorlich observed, writing on the eve of the new millennium,  
Jadid Islam … today unites the political, religious establishment of 
Tatarstan with most of the voices of an emerging umma [community of 
believers] in their rejection of conservative Islam as represented by 
missionaries from the Middle East who have been coming to Tatarstan 
since 1991 (Rorlich 1999, 394). 
This message was repeated by the republic’s political leadership throughout most of the 
1990s and into the new century. Those in power held up Jadidism as a model for other 
Muslim groups, in Russia and beyond, to emulate (e.g. Khakimov 1998; Bukharaev 
1999). Thus, it was widely thought that the Tatars’ indigenous liberal version of Islam 
inoculated the region against the types of religious fundamentalism1 and associated 
extremism that have affected Chechnya and other Muslim regions of the Russian 
Federation. 
                                                          
1 I recognize and acknowledge the contested nature of the term “fundamentalism,” especially when applied 
to Islam in the contemporary milieu. For sake of clarification, I use the term to refer to literalist versions of 
monotheism, affecting Christianity and Judaism as well as Islam, based on “the idea of inerrancy of a 
sacred text” (Lehmann 1998). In no way do I necessarily conflate “fundamentalism” with “extremism” or 
“radicalism.” 
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 Such sanguinity, however, has proved short-lived. Over the past decade, the 
primacy of Jadidism in Tatarstan has been increasingly challenged on two fronts. The 
first is a counter-revival of indigenous conservative Islamic traditions based on fealty to 
the Hanafi madhhab (school of Islamic jurisprudence). With its theologians firmly set 
against religious reform, this so-called “Tatar traditionalism” is today the sole “official” 
Islam in the region (Makarov and Mukhametshin 2003) and is enforced by the state-
associated Muslim Spiritual Board of the Republic of Tatarstan, which is charged with 
monitoring all mosques in the region. The second challenge is posed by increasing 
evidence that religious fundamentalism, generally attributed in Tatarstan and Russia to 
Wahhabism or Salafism2 and claimed to be imported from abroad, has taken hold and 
grows in influence among the region’s Muslims. These decidedly non-liberal forms of 
Islam most generally are expressed in banal ways, such as a growing public presence of 
the hijab (the traditional head covering worn by Muslim women) and other religious 
markers that were rarely seen on the streets of Tatarstan a decade ago. More unsettling, 
though, is that fundamentalist Islam, again attributed to Wahhabism or Salafism, has been 
implicated in sporadic acts of violence and political radicalism, piquing anxieties that 
Tatarstan’s comparative calm could prove ephemeral. 
                                                          
2 Ware et al. describe Wahhabism as “a fundamentalist Sunni Islamic movement founded in Arabia in the 
middle eighteenth century,” a “puritanical” form of Islam that is based on “strict adherence to the Koran” 
and does not recognize state authority (Ware et al. 2003, 287-88). Gammer rightly adds that the term 
“Wahhabi” is often a label used to marginalize opponents, a point that will be developed later in this 
dissertation (Gammer 2005, 845). Identifying Wahhabism with “opposition forces advocating radical 
Islamic ideology,” Malashenko and Yarlykapov say it would be more correct to call adherents of this 
literalist form of Islam “Salafists” because “their ideology goes back to the 8th-9th centuries AD, when those 
who urged believers to adhere to the norms of religious and everyday life followed by the ‘righteous 
ancestors’ (as-Salaf as-Salihun) called themselves Salafists” (Malashenko and Yarlykapov, 2009, 4). Both 
terms, Wahhabism and Salafism, are generally used interchangeably in current discussions of Islam in 
Tatarstan. 
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What accounts for this transformation in Islam in Tatarstan? Previous attempts to 
explain the upswing in religious conservatism and fundamentalism among Russia’s 
Muslims have focused on Islam itself. For instance, in his analysis of territorial conflicts 
involving Muslim groups in the post-Soviet space, Aleksandr Ignatenko, a specialist on 
Islam who also serves as an adviser to the Russian Parliament, contends that “the 
religion’s all-embracing nature rules not only the Muslim’s religious life but also 
politics, economics, etc.” (Ignatenko 2004, 8-9, emphasis added). The “all-embracing 
nation” of Islam, Ignatenko concludes, drives its adherents away from democratic 
principles and, ultimately, toward confrontation and conflict with non-Muslims.3 Thus, in 
the formulation of Ignatenko and others (see also e.g. Bowers et al. 2004; Hahn 2007), 
with the fall of a totalitarian Soviet state that tightly regulated society, it was only a 
matter of time before conservative and fundamentalist versions of Islam made inroads in 
Tatarstan, following in the footsteps of Chechnya and other parts of the North Caucasus. 
Ignatenko’s diagnosis, however, is unsatisfactory. In framing religion as the independent 
variable driving Muslim behavior, culture is reified as having an almost singular 
explanatory power. Such over-determined cultural explanation neglects the spatial and 
temporal contexts within which religion is always embedded and therefore is unable to 
answer the basic questions, Why here? Why now? 
Placing Faith in Its Political-Territorial Context 
If one looks at this and other cases of Islamic revival, a variety of factors are at 
play, including the numerical size of groups involved, socio-economic development, and 
                                                          
3 This focus on Islam’s supposed “all-embracing nature,” of course, is not limited to study of the religion in 
the Russian context, but, as explored further in Chapter II, is characteristic of a much broader tendency in 
the contemporary social scientific study of Islam. 
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a multitude of other variables. Yet one variable all these cases share is that they take 
place within a modern political-territorial order which assumes states represent a defined 
“people,” understood as a nation. Because political borders rarely reflect on-the-ground 
patterns of culture, states are compelled to “nationalize” their populations continually 
through institutions, discourses, symbols, and practices. Conversely, when minority 
cultural groups feel threatened, marginalized, or excluded from dominant understandings 
of national community, the logic of the international system can propel them to seek 
“national self-determination” in the form of sub-state territorial claims, which generally 
lead to conflict. Globalization undoubtedly undermines the power of the nation-state to 
control its economy and even its politics. Nonetheless, the nation-state remains a primary 
source of group identity, and for many sub-state cultural groups the nation-state remains 
the ultimate aspiration. 
The issue of territory and national identity is particularly acute in Russia, which 
remains by far the largest country (in geographic terms) in the world and is home to great 
ethno-cultural diversity. Changing understandings of Russia as a political-territorial entity 
historically have been decisive in shaping the character of Islam within its borders. Two 
decades after the fall of the Soviet Union, this remains the case, as Russia continues to 
struggle to define itself in post-imperial terms and to cultivate an all-Russian multiethnic 
sense of nationhood. Thus, to understand more fully the transformation of Islam in 
Tatarstan – to get at the fundamental questions, Why here? Why now? – it is necessary to 
place the faith in its political-territorial context. Rather than focusing on “Islamic 
fundamentalism” or “political Islam” as first-order problems, as is commonly the case in 
the study of Islam in contemporary Russia (e.g. Lanskoy 2002; Gammer 2005; Hahn 
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2007; Ponarin 2008) and other parts of the world, a more fruitful entry point is to ask: (1) 
Under what set of political-territorial circumstances was liberal-minded, reform-oriented 
Jadidism revived?, and (2) What set of political-territorial circumstances gave rise to the 
more conservative “Tatar traditionalism” of the Hanifi madhhab? 
To start with the first question, following Tatarstan’s sovereignty declaration in 
1990, the political leadership based in Kazan, the capital of the republic, constructed a 
“regime of territorial legitimation”4 based foremost on (1) the Tatars’ centuries-long 
history of statehood in the Middle Volga region, until their defeat by Moscow and 
incorporation into the Russian Empire in the mid-sixteenth century, and (2) concerns for 
culture, particularly language but also religion, both of which had suffered from various 
Russification policies in both the Tsarist and Soviet empires. The Tatars’ survival and 
development as a Muslim nation, it was argued, could only be safeguarded by their own 
state structure (Derrick 2008). There exists no objective reason that Jadidism should have 
risen to prominence in the early 1990s. It was, after all, a religious reform movement that 
appeared in only in the latter part of the nineteenth century and, although gaining in 
influence, remained a minority phenomenon until being extinguished by the Bolsheviks 
(Yemelianova 1997). However, the Tatar political leadership supported, discursively and 
institutionally, the revival of Jadidism because its legacy of religious liberalism fit well 
with its aspirations to define Tatarstan as a nation-state on the European model and 
project its sovereignty to a Western audience (Graney 2009). 
                                                          
4 Murphy defines a “regime of territorial legitimation” as a collection of “institutions, practices, and 
discourses that are designed to legitimate a particular conception of a state” (2005, 291). This concept will 
be explored further in Chapter II. 
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Over the past decade, as Moscow has restored its central authority over Tatarstan, 
the Westernizing vision of Jadidism has been eclipsed by a revival of the Tatars’ pre-
reform conservative Islamic traditions based on the Hanafi madhhab. Again, there are no 
objective reasons why these traditions should be ascendant in the twenty-first century. 
However, theologians associated with the Muslim Spiritual Board of Tatarstan emphasize 
that pre-reform Tatar Islam evolved in dialog with Russian Orthodoxy, the two religions 
having become complementary over the centuries (Malashenko 2007). This message, 
passed down to the mosques of Tatarstan that the Muslim Spiritual Board oversees, 
corresponds to Moscow’s broader support of religions “traditional to Russia” and is in 
line of the Kremlin’s project to construct a trans-confessional Eurasian – a multinational 
Russian – identity. 
Thus, the central argument of my dissertation is that the changing form and 
function of Islam in Tatarstan is not primarily a question of culture, but rather relates to a 
shifting balance of power between Moscow and Kazan in their competition to define the 
region as a political space. In its quest for wide-ranging territorial autonomy, the Kazan-
based political leadership cultivated a preferred understanding of Islam to correspond to 
its vision of Tatarstan as the Tatars’ sovereign historic homeland. Over the past decade, 
amid a rapid recentralization of the federation, support has shifted to Islamic practices 
deemed “traditional to Russia” as part of a broader multinational Russian identity crafted 
to fit visions of the country as a powerful, unified state. Thus, the meaning of Islam in 
this particular place is mediated by competing visions of Tatarstan as a homeland.  
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This dissertation investigates the ways in which shifting political-territorial 
circumstances have influenced Islam in Tatarstan. Specifically, I address the following 
questions: 
• What are the political-territorial ideas and ideologies 
underpinning dominant understandings of Islam in Tatarstan? 
• How are different ideas of Islam and homeland 
institutionalized and communicated? 
• How do these different conceptualizations of Islam and 
homeland come into conflict?  
• How does this negotiation reveal itself, and what are its real-
world implications?  
My examination of these questions draws on a year and a half of fieldwork conducted in 
Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan. I made use of qualitative research methods, including 
textual analysis, semi-structured interviews, and other ethnographic methods (explained 
in greater detail later in this chapter), to illustrate why it is important to place faith in its 
political-territorial context. But placing faith refers not only to the theoretical-
methodological aspects of my dissertation; it also relates to this research’s empirical 
findings. The Islam-impacting competition to define Tatarstan as a political space, as this 
dissertation illustrates, to a significant degree is characterized by compromise between 
Kazan and Moscow. 
Empirical, Trans-Disciplinary, and Disciplinary Relevance 
Whereas Muslims today comprise approximately 14 percent of Russia’s 
population, with most living compactly in their historic homelands, demographic trends 
indicate they could attain relative parity in numbers with ethnic Russians in a matter of 
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decades. Compounding demographic trends is the increasing complexity of Islamic 
expression in Russia today – a complexity that will likely only grow in coming years 
(Malashenko and Yarlykapov 2009). This sea change will challenge the core identity and 
ideological foundations of a transcontinental power traditionally associated with 
Orthodox Christianity or, for much of the twentieth century, atheism, and current 
arrangements intended to accommodate its Muslim segments increasingly will be tested. 
This process is already well underway in the North Caucasus, where Moscow’s policies 
are countered by growing Islamist-inspired violence and entrenched separatism, creating 
a situation Russian President Dmitry Medvedev (2009) has termed his country’s “most 
serious domestic political problem.” However, in attributing the source of the problem to 
“international terrorism,” Medvedev invokes a nebulous global Islamism, he elides the 
political-territorial context whence the conflict originated, and he thereby complicates 
efforts to find sustainable solutions. One of the aims of this dissertation is to provide 
some insight that might contribute to solutions to this problem. 
Although much of the world’s attention has focused on the tragic case of 
Chechnya, an investigation conducted in Tatarstan into the ways shifting political-
territorial circumstances affect Islam may go further in pointing out directions toward 
potential solutions. First, because Tatarstan is populated in roughly even numbers by 
Muslims and Orthodox Christians, it more closely approximates demographic projections 
for Russia as a whole. Second, Tatarstan, alongside Chechnya, formed the vanguard of 
Russia’s post-Soviet “parade of sovereignties” (Kahn 2000), but only the former has 
escaped bloodshed. Additional research could elucidate factors contributing to, or 
endangering, this comparatively positive experience. Third, as a bulwark against what is 
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often viewed as nonnative religious fundamentalism, government authorities in recent 
years have actively supported Islamic traditions deemed indigenous to Tatarstan. Gaining 
an understanding of the ways those religious traditions are institutionalized, along with 
the outcomes of their institutionalization, assumes greater importance as Moscow puts its 
weight behind similar strategies in Chechnya and other Muslim-majority regions of 
Russia (Malashenko 2008). And, fourth, although Tatarstan thus far has avoided, aside 
from a few cases, acts of religious extremism that are a common feature of life in the 
North Caucasus, reports such as the one issued by Gorenburg (2010) indicate that 
“radical Islam … is now spreading into the Volga region” (see also Malashenko and 
Yarlykapov 2009). Thus, Tatarstan today is said to stand at a precipice, giving my 
research added urgency. 
Social scientists (outside of Geography) have produced a growing body of 
literature on Islam in the context of post-Soviet Russia. However, the most frequently 
cited of these works mainly offer broad overviews of countrywide trends (e.g. 
Yemelianova 2002; Pilkington and Yemlianova 2003; Hunter 2004; Malashenko 2008). 
Higher-resolution studies focus almost exclusively on Chechnya and other parts of the 
North Caucasus (e.g. Ware and Kisriev 2000; Akhmadov et al. 2001; Lanskoy 2002; 
Ware et al. 2003; Bowers et al. 2004; Gammer 2005; Giuliano 2005; Swirszcz 2009). 
Islam in contemporary Tatarstan largely has been neglected by Western academic 
researchers, and the few Anglophone works that have addressed the topic are either 
primarily idiographic (Musina 2000; Ponarin 2008), outdated (Rorlich 1999; 
Yemelianova 1999), or simply inaccurate. For example, a recent article by Bilz-
Leonhardt carries the suggestion that Jadidism is almost universally embraced by Tatars 
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and claims that religious conservatism or fundamentalism has “virtually no proponents” 
in the region (Bilz-Leonhardt 2007, 231); no mention is made of the revival of non-
liberal indigenous Islamic traditions that are today recognized as the sole official version 
of Islam in Tatarstan. A recent article by Laruelle (2007) provides a solid overview of the 
main positions and institutions involved in the current “struggle for the soul of Tatar 
Islam,” but her handling is a snapshot of a moment in time, lacking analysis of the 
changes that have taken place in the post-Soviet period and avoiding consideration of the 
broader political (not to mention territorial) circumstances that condition the meaning of 
Islam in Tatarstan. 
In addition to its empirical and trans-disciplinary contributions, my research also 
confronts some gaps within the literature in Geography on religion and territory. 
Although a number of recent forums have called for disciplinary contributions to the 
study of religion (Kong 2001; Agnew 2006; Brace et al. 2006; Proctor 2006; Kong 2010), 
a topic most leading academic geographers in the past have neglected, contemporary 
geographies of Islam and territory in the Russian context are few in number and primarily 
offer broad descriptive overviews that lack empirical richness (e.g. Walker 2005; Helniak 
2006; Matsuzato 2006). A notable exception is Gearóid Ó Tuathail’s (2009) astute 
reading of events leading up to, and the subsequent fallout of, the 2004 Beslan school 
tragedy that claimed the lives of more than 200 children. Ó Tuathail convincingly 
illustrates how what started as a local territorial conflict between ethnic groups claiming 
different confessions became discursively framed as an expression of international 
Islamic terrorism. However, with analysis centered on representations of a single 
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extraordinary event, his engagement provides limited insight into the synergistic 
relationship between religion, group identity, and territory. 
Geography’s shortcomings in dealing with Islam in the post-Soviet Russian 
context in no small part is a result of a subfield that, after more than a decade of 
exploring the functional and ideological aspects of territory (e.g. Murphy 1990; Taylor 
1995; Herb and Kaplan 1999), in the twenty-first century has focused its energies on the 
examination of transnational processes assumed to undermine long-dominant political-
territorial arrangements and corresponding place-based identities (e.g. Amin 2002). 
Theses of globalization-fueled deterritorialization only serve to bolster notions of Muslim 
fealty to a worldwide umma displacing attachments to territorial homelands. However, as 
“hyperbolic claims” (Elden 2005, 9) of an emerging borderless world are critiqued with 
increasing frequency, a stream of geographers is now reexamining “territory’s continuing 
allure” (Murphy, forthcoming; see also Antonisch 2009; Elden 2010). It is this literature 
to which this dissertation aims to contribute by showing how religious identity is shaped 
by the territorial context in which it is embedded. Islam in its totality (as is the case with 
other religions) is just one of multiple bases of identity that form group consciousness in 
the modern era, and these various aspects of identity shift depending on political-
territorial circumstances. 
Research Activities, Design, and Methodologies 
Drawing on 18 months (October 2008 – February 2010) of fieldwork conducted 
mainly in Kazan,5 my work relies on what Crang (2003) identifies as the “three streams” 
                                                          
5 Additionally, this study is informed by six months of previous fieldwork in Kazan in 2004 and 2005. 
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of qualitative research: textual analysis, “oral methods,” and participative approaches. A 
strict positivist might take me to task for this study’s lack of testability, but issues of 
religious identity and homeland are especially complex and sensitive, involving the non-
rational realm of emotions and bringing up questions of power relations. It is unlikely 
that even the most intricate statistical calisthenics could provide satisfactory explanations 
of the questions addressed in this dissertation. In examining these issues, I agree with 
Herbert that “order should emerge from the field rather than be imposed on the field” 
(Herbert 2000, 552, original emphasis). I harbor pretensions about the universality of my 
study – it does take place in a fairly unique context. Nonetheless, my methodological 
approach contributes to a comparative framework that can be useful when examining 
other cases. 
Textual analysis in this study was conducted not merely to represent dominant 
ideas of religion and territory, but rather to examine how those ideas are shaped by the 
active production, reproduction, and contestation of social structures (Crang 2002). With 
Islam occupying a prominent position in current public discussions in Tatarstan, 
researchers have access to a wealth of primary data sources. Most important in my work 
have been books, pamphlets, newspapers, and articles obtained from the archives of the 
Marjani History Institute and the Muslim Spiritual Board of Tatarstan, state-supported 
institutions most active in framing the content and parameters of public debates on Islam 
and its place in the region. Two additional data sources deserve mention. First, I spent 
untold hours in the archives of the Tatarstan National Library, where I perused a range of 
newspapers, magazines, and journals published over the past two decades. These 
periodicals provide critical insight into the shifting public discourse surrounding Islam 
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and the evolution of key institutions in post-Soviet Tatarstan. Second, public places and 
landscapes are also texts (Hay 2005). My research incorporates textual analysis of the 
Kazan Kremlin, Tatarstan’s most symbolically rich landscape, along with other 
“unofficially sacred” sites (Kong 2005). 
“Oral methods” form the second major component of my research methodology. I 
conducted more than 25 semi-structured interviews with intellectual, political, 
bureaucratic, religious, and national elites (my approach to elite interviews was informed 
by Herod 1999). Elite interview subjects were chosen primarily for the keys roles they 
have played in influencing or examining the meaning of Islam in post-Soviet Tatarstan, 
and they were selected to reflect the range of opinions on the religion’s meaning and 
place in contemporary Tatarstan and Russia. Among the elite informants who were most 
integral to this dissertation were Rafael Khakimov, the director of the Marjani History 
Institute, former top political advisor to Tatarstan’s first president, Mintimer Shaimiev, 
and the republic’s best-known propagator of “Euro-Islam”; Valiulla Iakupov, the first 
deputy Mufti of the Muslim Spiritual Board of Tatarstan and most active in publicly 
defining and defending “traditional” Tatar Islam based on the Hanafi madhhab; Rafik 
Mukhametshin, rector of the Russian Islamic University in Kazan and a leading scholar 
on the subject of Islam in contemporary Tatarstan; Damir Iskhakov, a senior researcher at 
the Marjani History Institute and a key player in shaping Tatar national ideology in the 
post-Soviet era, including the place of neo-Jadidism in the Tatars’ national revival; and 
Rinat Nabiev, the director for the Council for Religious Affairs (CRA), a state agency 
charged with monitoring religious activity in the region.  
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Although no single, uniform approach was employed in conducting semi-
structured interviews with elites, interviews tended to last between one and two hours and 
were generally arranged in an inverse pyramid, beginning with an initial focus on general 
issues and gradually progressing to more personal matters and issues specific to the 
informant. The advantages of this “funneling” strategy, as Dunn discusses, is that the 
interview begins in a “relaxed and non-threatening” manner, which allows a rapport to 
develop between the researcher and key informant before more sensitive issues are 
introduced to the conversation (Dunn 2000, 58). In many instances my elite interview 
subjects were the same people producing print texts that have been central to public 
debates surrounding religion in Tatarstan. If these discussions often replicated arguments 
made previously in books, journals, and newspapers, they also presented an opportunity 
to ask for clarification and expansion of those arguments. More importantly, though, elite 
interviews gave me a significant degree of insight into key players and the networks of 
ideology involved in shaping Islamic identity in contemporary Tatarstan. For example, 
interviews with top Muftis at the Muslim Spiritual Board, followed up by interviews with 
imams and mullahs at mosques, showed how ideas of what Islam is in Tatarstan are 
constructed in a networked hierarchy.  
Interviews with approximately 50 non-elites provided insight into how dominant 
understandings of religion and territory are reproduced, or resisted, by “common” 
believers. It should be noted that non-elite interviews included subjects identifying with a 
range of Islamic expression, from the highly liberal and secular to the conservative and 
highly literalist. One-on-one interviews with non-elites generally were conducted in a 
more unstructured manner that allowed informants to expand on personal histories, in the 
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process providing data on concrete events and experiences. This biographical approach 
not only yielded insight into how informants of various faith profiles relate to society, but 
also produced evidence on how notions of what constitutes Islam in Tatarstan have 
changed over time and how individuals interact with institutions that have played an 
important role in shaping the republic’s post-Soviet religious revival. Thus, unstructured 
interviews with non-elites provided data on both individuals and social structures, 
bringing attention to the “interplay between structure and agency” (Dunn 2000, 64). 
Many of the insights in this dissertation are derived from other ethnographic 
methods. While interviews constitute ethnography, it is useful to draw a distinction 
between verbal and participatory ethnographic methods. As Warren states,  
[Participatory] ethnography’s lens is that of lived experience, set in an 
eternal present. The lens of the intensive interview is verbal – what people 
say and mean – but its temporal range is biographical, extending into the 
past and the future (Warren 2002, 85). 
Herbert also distinguishes between the two types of ethnography, arguing that the 
immediacy of participatory observation provides critical insight into how “human agents 
reproduce and challenge macrological structures in the everyday of place-bound action” 
(Herbert 2000, 550; see also e.g. Paterson 2009). Indeed, geographers in recent years 
have become increasingly skeptical of research based solely on interviews or textual 
analysis (e.g. Crang 2002; Lorimer 2005; Davis and Dwyer 2007) – representation which, 
if divorced from the materiality of everyday lived experience, can easily slide into 
misrepresentation. My research avoids this pitfall by pairing textual analysis and 
interviews with a year and a half of active observation, interaction, and participation in 
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events such as public lectures, religious holidays, political protests, and the like. Multiple 
interviews and attendance at public lectures and meetings at the History Institute and the 
Muslim Spiritual Board gave me insight into their separately distinct institutional 
cultures. Two weeks of observation at the Russian Islamic University allowed me to see 
how the training of future imams and mullahs in Tatarstan involves a delicate balancing 
act of global and local, conservative and liberal, Islamic practices. Intimate acquaintance 
with the city of Kazan shed light on the variable urban geography of the public 
performance of religious identity. 
Perhaps most valuable in my ethnographic studies were activities at mosques, 
including my participation in worship and attendance of religious lectures. Considering 
the intimacy and sensitivity of the performance of religion, this brings up important 
questions of ethics and positionality (Hay 2003). As an initial response to potential 
criticism, in my interactions at mosques I was always forthright in identifying myself as a 
non-Muslim researcher who explores issues related to Islam. While in a few cases I 
encountered some suspicion from religious leaders and rank-and-file believers, the clear 
majority were enthusiastic about my presence, seeing my interest – and especially my 
desire to take part in worship – as an opportunity to educate. My position as a researcher 
on multiple occasions was acknowledged as a plus, since it was recognized that the 
intimacy of personal interaction inside the mosque would contribute, to some degree, to 
demystification of Islamic practice, belief, and identity. 
As a final note on my research activities, it should be acknowledged that, 
although I conducted interviews and participatory observation in a number of sites (both 
rural and urban) in places throughout Tatarstan, the bulk of my field research was 
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conducted in Kazan. However, this study is not just an urban geography focusing on a 
single city. As the cultural and intellectual capital of Tatarstan, Kazan is home to the 
region’s most important human and material resources. Moreover, Kazan is the republic’s 
seat of political power and decisions made there have ramifications for the entire region. 
In short, Kazan sets the tone politically, culturally, and intellectually for the entire region, 
and what I learned there pertains not just to the city alone, but to the trajectory of 
Tatarstan as a whole. 
Structure of Dissertation 
Consisting of an introduction, four substantive chapters, and an epilogue, this 
dissertation is a work of political-cultural geography. Though strongly informed by 
historical narrative, it is not simply a history. The need to explore the past when 
addressing the political and cultural geography of the Eurasian heartland is illustrated by 
a lament often heard by scholars in Russia as they consider the explosive nature of their 
country: “How can we predict our future when we cannot even predict our past?” This 
refrain not only reflects the capricious role that centralized ideology traditionally has 
played in the Russian academy; it also underlines the necessity of a multidisciplinary 
reexamination of Russian history, both distant and contemporary. This dissertation aims 
to contribute to that process. 
Following this introductory chapter, the study begins with an examination in 
Chapter II of the role territory plays in shaping group identity. The chapter starts by 
identifying and critiquing a tendency within the social sciences to view the umma as a 
social formation that is innately averse to its territorial division into modern nation-states. 
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Because this tendency arises from the failure to investigate the ideas and ideologies 
underpinning the territorial ordering of modernity, the chapter continues with an analysis 
of the historical coupling of territory and culture, expressed today in the form of the 
nation-state. The chapter then explores examples of the shifting territorial bases of 
Muslim identities in the modern era and the relative significance of the umma ideal to 
those identities in varying geographical and political contexts. 
Chapter III shows how territorial considerations have long influenced the 
development of Islam within the context of a Russian state. The chapter begins with an 
overview of the territoriality of Islam in contemporary Russia, explaining how ethnicity 
and religion are intertwined within the country’s complex federal system. Focus then 
turns to an examination of how the form and function of Islam in the Middle Volga 
region have been conditioned by changing political-geographical circumstances since the 
region was brought into the Russian Empire in the mid-sixteenth century. To prepare the 
reader for analysis of Tatarstan’s post-Soviet Islamic revival, the chapter concludes with 
an overview of the political-territorial developments in post-Soviet Russia, giving special 
attention to Tatarstan’s involvement. 
Chapter IV looks the role of institutions in shaping the form and function of Islam 
in Tatarstan. Specifically, this chapter looks at the creation of the Muslim Spiritual Board 
of the Republic of Tatarstan as an act of territoriality. Since the late eighteenth century a 
single Muslim Spiritual Board had overseen all mosques in Siberia and European Russia. 
In the early 1990s, however, the Kazan-based government created its own Spiritual Board 
as part of its sovereignty campaign. The Spiritual Board, first, gave Tatarstan what its 
leaders viewed as an important attribute of statehood and, second, removed the region’s 
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Muslims from a trans-Russian institution that traditionally had been a mechanism for the 
empire to control its Muslim subjects and instill an “official” (that is, unquestionably 
loyal to the state) Islam. Having created its own Muslim Spiritual Board, the Kazan-
based government sought to encourage a preferred understanding of Islam that 
corresponded to its vision of Tatarstan as nation-state on the European model. However, 
as this chapter shows, with the recentralization of the Russian Federation over the past 
decade, the Muslim Spiritual Board of Tatarstan is also being reintegrated in certain 
important ways into the broader Russian territorial expanse. A consequence of this 
reintegration of religious institutions, coinciding with the political-territorial reintegration 
of Tatarstan, is that the meaning of Islam in the republic has shifted, too. 
Chapter V reveals how Islam in Tatarstan is being driven by political-geographic 
change through an examination of conflicting perspectives on landscape elements in the 
Kazan Kremlin. The Kazan Kremlin is the symbol of the region, containing within its 
fortress walls both the recently constructed Kul-Sharif Mosque, billed as Europe’s largest 
mosque, and the refurbished Orthodox Cathedral of the Annunciation. This chapter 
shows how this space in the early 1990s was discursively framed by Tatar national and 
political leaders as a landscape of tragedy, the place where their ancestors were defeated 
by Muscovy and brought into the Russian Empire in the mid-sixteenth century. The 
construction of the Kul-Sharif Mosque, as it was decreed in 1995, was explicitly intended 
as a symbol of the Tatars’ regained statehood, a symbol of historical injustice being 
rectified. By the time construction on the mosque was finished a decade later, however, 
Moscow had restored central control over Tatarstan, along with the rest of the federation. 
Since its opening in 2005, dominant representations of the Kazan Kremlin have shifted to 
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portray the landscape as a symbol of the friendship between Tatars and Russians, the 
harmony between Tatar Islam and Russian Orthodoxy. 
Changes in the landscape’s meaning, corresponding to shifting political-territorial 
conditions, are contested by Tatar national and religious activists who, maintaining that 
Tatarstan should be their sovereign homeland, conduct an annual march on the Kazan 
Kremlin in memory of their ancestors’ loss of statehood in 1552. Thus, as this chapter 
shows, the shift in the meaning of Islam in Tatarstan, driving by a changing political-
geographic context, is reflected in the landscape of the Kazan Kremlin. This landscape, in 
turn, works to reinforce dominant understandings of territorial identities. The symbolic 
power of this landscape also creates a space for dominant understandings of national-
religious identity and homeland to be contested through performance. 
This dissertation concludes with an epilogue that presents the reader with a review 
of major findings and implications of this study. Implications for Tatarstan, Russia, and 
other parts of the world are discussed, as are implications for the social scientific study of 
Islam in general. The final chapter also provides suggestions for future directions in 
research, including comparative studies of contemporary Islam in regions of Russia and 
other parts of post-Soviet space. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
CONTAINING THE UMMA? ISLAM 
AND THE TERRITORIAL QUESTION 
 
The Social Sciences Approach the Umma 
In his account of Islam’s contemporary resurgence as a social and political force, 
Samuel Huntington claims the Muslim world – identifying monolithically as the umma, 
the transnational community of Islamic believers in its entirety – comprises a civilization 
that is innately averse to the political-territorial ordering of modernity. “The idea of 
sovereign nation-states,” he asserts, “is incompatible with the belief in sovereignty of 
Allah and the primacy of the ummah” (Huntington 1996, 175). In short, Islam is cast as 
an all-embracing religion-as-culture, encompassing Muslims wherever they might be, 
that rejects secular politics and the territorial division of its faithful. It is this centrality of 
religion to politics and identity, Huntington concludes, that explains the global upswing 
in Islamic fundamentalism, “fault line conflicts” between Muslims and non-Muslims 
within states, and “bloody borders” between Muslim and non-Muslim states. Among his 
evidence of the nation-state’s inability to contain the umma is the case of post-Soviet 
23 
 
Russia, where Moscow has been in conflict with Muslim Tatars and Chechens, the latter 
yet embroiled in Islamist-inspired violence that threatens to destabilize the entire country. 
 Such grand theorizing, tinged as it is with an anti-Muslim sentiment, has 
provoked a wave of criticism in the social sciences that continues even 15 years after the 
appearance of The Clash of Civilizations. Not least has been the backlash from 
Huntington’s own academic International Relations community, which has challenged his 
arguments on Islam’s exceptionalism on at least two fronts. First, IR researchers have 
responded with multiple empirical studies purporting to undermine notions of an 
undifferentiated, essentially different Muslim world. For instance, Fox (2004) analyzed 
quantitative data from the Minorities at Risk Phase 3 dataset to show that state borders 
separating Islam from other civilizations are statistically no bloodier than other state 
borders, while a study by Gartzke and Gleditsch (2006) indicated that armed conflict 
within Islam is more prevalent than warfare between Islam and other civilizations (see 
also Fox 2000; 2001; Ellis 2010).6 For his part, Sheikh (2002) offered a qualitative 
examination the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the so-called “United 
Nations of Islam,” to illustrate how international relations among the world’s 50-plus 
Muslim-majority states are arranged and conducted firmly within the modern political-
territorial framework. 
More forceful, however, has been the challenge mounted by a second group of IR 
scholars who assail Huntington’s “moral geography” (Shapiro 1999) for its baseline 
presumption that nation-states universally comprise modernity’s natural order. As 
Mandaville avers, the “fairly crude, essentialising hypotheses of the ‘clash of 
                                                          
6 For quantitative studies presenting evidence claiming to confirm Huntington’s thesis, see Tusicisny 
(2004) and Charron (2010). 
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civilisations’ variety” (Mandaville 2001, 2; see also Mandaville 2007) arise from the 
failure to problematize the nation-state and question its underlying Eurocentric ideas of 
inclusion/exclusion and the secularization of public ethics. For Mandaville and other 
advocates of the cultural turn in IR, the worldwide upsurge in Islam as a socio-political 
force does not signify an unreflective reaction posted by a monolithic, anti-modern 
religion-as-civilization. Rather, it is part of a multi-vocal process of negotiation within 
Islam, and with the West, to unseat the “liberal-modernist framework as the naturalised 
order of things” and, in turn, establish “an alternate vision to Western modernity, an 
alternate ‘Islamic modernity’” (Pasha 2003, 115-116, original emphasis; see also Pasha 
2000) – a more authentic political order that neither delimits the sacred from the public 
nor bounds itself territorially. Displacing Huntington’s “moral geography,” these scholars 
maintain that a new geography of globalization is giving rise to Islamism as an “authentic 
counter-hegemonic movement” (Butko 2004, 41) and an incipient alternative Islamic 
modernity. Spelling the demise of the nation-state, increasingly mobile human 
populations, transnational media, electronic social networking, and other forces 
associated with globalization open spaces for the formation of a deterritorialized 
worldwide umma, which is declared to represent “a new form of postnational, political 
identity which is as profound as any extant nationalism” (Saunders 2008, 303; see also 
Roy 2004). 
This latter group of scholars should be lauded for its affirmation of Muslim 
agency and recognition of Islam’s internal debates. Yet certain aspects of their approach 
bear more than a passing resemblance to those found in Huntington’s neo-realism. First is 
the contention that religion is the primary, if not almost exclusive, basis of Muslim 
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identity and necessarily stands in opposition to national and other foundations of identity 
considered as belonging to the West. As Salih discusses, “the idea of Islam as the most 
‘authentic’ ground for identities of Muslims around the world” (Salih 2004, 996) reifies 
civilizational narratives and hardens dichotomous representations of Islam vs. the West, 
the umma vs. the nation. In turn, this dichotomization indirectly supplies a base of 
justification for Al-Qaeda and others whose violence delineates the world into an 
oversimplified dar al-Islam (“the Land of Peace”) and dar al-harb (“the Land of War”) 
(Aydin and Özen 2010). 
Following this notion of religion as the arbiter of Muslim authenticity, a second 
feature shared by Huntington and his detractors is the failure to examine the ideas and 
ideologies underpinning the modern nation-state. Quantitative empirical studies claiming 
to undermine the “clash of civilizations” proposition generally employ state-level data to 
reach their conclusions and thereby accept, without much reflection, the nation-state as a 
fixed unit of sovereign space. This is the same type of methodological nationalism 
decried by IR scholars who invoke the cultural turn. This latter group, however, falls 
short of its own call to problematize the contemporary political-territorial order. In 
hinging their arguments on the powers of globalization and an imminent “end of the 
nation-state” (Ohmae 1995), they decisively choose a side in the Manichean debate over 
the “persistence or obsolescence of the territorial state” (Agnew 1994, 54) rather than 
consider the ways in which territory actually works as a dialectic with culture in different 
historical settings. 
Burdened with its unexamined understandings of territory – an unproblematic 
array of “power containers” (Giddens 1985) at one extreme, a hapless victim of 
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globalization at the other – scholars in the field of International Relations have trouble 
explaining the uneven geography and temporality, as well as the diverse expressions, of 
Islam’s resurgence. For instance, to return to the Russian context, the post-Soviet Islamic 
revivals in Tatarstan and Chechnya from the very beginning were part and parcel of 
ethno-nationalist movements whose goal was territorial autonomy and/or sovereignty. 
Two decades on, they have assumed starkly different, increasingly complex trajectories – 
with only one case turning bloody – but questions of ethno-national identity and 
homeland remain central to each. Nonetheless, in his book Russia’s Islamic Threat, Hahn 
assumes a distinctly Huntingtonian stance as he discusses both regions as being 
enmeshed in a broader jihadist terror network. “With the collapse of the Soviet Union,” 
he propounds, “Russia’s Muslims again became an inextricable part of the Muslim umma 
(world community), subject to its ideological trends and operatives for the Islamo-fascist 
revolution” (Hahn 2007, ix). His analysis leaves little trace of the national-territorial 
bases of the Tatars’ and Chechens’ post-socialist religious rebirths, replacing them 
instead with the specter of an uncontainable worldwide umma inherently inclined to 
violence against non-Muslims. 
To take a more recent example, in spite of early anxieties that this past year’s 
revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa would go the way of the 1979 Iranian 
Revolution (Kaplan 2011), the popular uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain, among 
other countries, were not carried out under the monochromatic green banner of Islam or 
in the name of the transnational umma. They were conducted under the multicolored 
national flags of each separate state and in the name of “the people,” formulated in 
glaringly national terms. A defining slogan of this year’s revolts came from Bahrain: “We 
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are all Bahrainis; Not Sunnis, Not Shiites” (Damir-Geilsdorf 2011). The Muslim 
Brotherhood’s refrain “Islam is the solution” was mute amid the popular nationalist din. 
However, in an article addressing “transnational Muslim solidarities” that was published 
on the eve of these upheavals, Mandaville contends that although political Islam has 
failed “to establish alternative political orders within the container of the nation-state … 
this does not mean we are seeing a reaffirmation of the nation in Muslim contexts today” 
(Mandaville 2011, 7). It is too early to say how the political revolts of 2011 will turn out, 
but from the current standpoint a repeat of Iran in 1979 seems highly unlikely. A 
replication of 1989 in Europe, as has been suggested (Economist 2011), is also unlikely – 
the relationship between politics, culture, and territory, as this chapter explores, is 
dynamic and historically contingent. 
It would be unfair to single out International Relations scholars for their failure to 
consider territory as a variable influencing Islam today, as this tendency is prevalent 
across the social sciences. A significant body of literature in Sociology, for example, 
interprets the current upswing in Islamic fundamentalism as part of a global shift toward 
more strict forms of faith that is witnessed among all major world religions. According to 
Manuel Castells, for example, the worldwide upsurge in conservative Islam, like the 
growing fundamentalism in Christianity and Judaism, is “always related to the dynamics 
of social exclusion and/or the crisis of the nation-state” that result from globalization: 
An Islamic fundamentalist project [has] emerged in all Muslim societies, 
and among Muslim minorities in non-Muslim societies. A new identity is 
being constructed, not by returning to tradition, but by working on 
traditional materials in the formation of a new godly, communal world, 
where deprived masses and disaffected intellectuals may reconstruct 
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meaning in a global alternative to the exclusionary global order (Castells 
2010, 21-22). 
In focusing primarily on the forces of globalization, neglecting the local and national 
contexts, the comparative fundamentalisms model in Sociology, like the cultural turn in 
IR, stumbles in explaining the highly variable spatiality of “the revenge of God” (Kepel 
1994; see also Stark and Finke 2000; Lehmann 2009). Moreover, this paradigm is 
handicapped by its unwillingness to differentiate among the manifold manifestations of 
Islam’s resurgence, from the innocuous to the radical, as they are all grouped together 
under the single heading: Religious Fundamentalism. 
 If the comparative fundamentalisms paradigm neglects local and national scales, 
historical accounts aiming to shed light on the current state of Islam often presume a 
fixed nature of territory and culture on the temporal scale. Bernard Lewis (1993; 2002), 
as a visible and visibly egregious example, invokes the life of Muhammad, the genealogy 
of the umma and the institution of the caliphate, and medieval Islamic legal traditions, 
among other historical evidence, as ostensible confirmation of the maxim Islam din wa-
dawla (“Islam is religion and state”), i.e. Islam encompasses all domains of the Muslim’s 
life and therefore is incompatible with democracy and modern statehood. In an effort to 
counter such neo-orientalist conceptions of Islam’s essential difference, Ira Lapidus 
(1996; 2001) shows how the umma in various epochs has actually accommodated itself to 
being separated into different state formations, including non-Muslim states, as proof that 
Islam can indeed be contained within the contemporary political-territorial order. But, 
again, both Lewis and Lapidus, in drawing parallels from the era of the prophet and 
subsequent caliphates (although reaching opposite conclusions), operate from an 
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ontology that, first, does not acknowledge territory as a distinctly modern actor and, 
second, does not recognize how its significance and meaning can change over time. 
 The point of this chapter is not to argue against globalization, culture, or history 
as forces shaping Islam. Cross-border flows of currencies and humans, transnational 
media, and other forces associated with globalization undoubtedly undermine the 
functional power of the nation-state. Yet, as Murphy (2010) affirms, territory nonetheless 
retains its ideological appeal, not the least for Muslim groups, as the 2011 revolutions in 
the Middle East and North Africa have made clear. The nation-state as a political-
territorial ideal also retains its allure for sub-state groups such as the Kosovar Albanians, 
Kurds, Uyghurs, Palestinians, and other Muslim groups who aspire to control their own 
historical homelands, as opposed to being included in some post-national, post-territorial 
social formation. The task at hand is to go beyond the perception that Islam is somehow 
incompatible with the nation-state, take seriously the challenge issued by the cultural turn 
in IR, and interrogate the ideas and ideologies underpinning the modern political-
territorial order that condition Islam’s social and political expression. As indicated above, 
this cannot be accomplished by fetishizing globalization or culture, or by historical 
analogy alone. 
 Failing to problematize the geographical assumptions underpinning the 
Huntingons and Lewises of the world, researchers are in a weakened position to 
understand why Islam has emerged as such a potent force. While a variety of factors 
influence the meaning of the religion, an important variable is the political-territorial 
environment in which it is embedded. This relates to the historical development of the 
modern international system that is rooted in the mid-seventeenth century agreements of 
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Westphalia, which formalized the principle of territorial sovereignty. Subsequent 
developments in the way sovereignty has been justified have resulted in a coupling of 
nation and state, and social processes within the framework of the nation-state work to 
reinforce territorial identities. To understand the implications of Islam’s increasing 
profile, in Tatarstan as well as other parts of the world, it is imperative to examine this 
synergistic relationship between territory and culture and to consider how this 
relationship changes in different historical contexts. 
The fundamental purpose of the remainder of this chapter is to show why scholars 
need to analyze religion in relation to the political-territorial context in which it is 
embedded. In light of the shortcomings outlined above, the next section examines the 
historical developments in which territory and culture have become coupled, expressed 
today as the nation-state, and discusses some key social processes that reinforce this 
relationship. The following section explores how the bases of Muslim identities, and the 
relative significance of Islam to those identities, have shifted vis-à-vis changing political-
territorial circumstances. 
Territory and Identity 
Having emerged as the dominant form of social and spatial organization across 
the globe over the past two centuries, the nation-state today is sometimes described as 
“the fundamental basis for defining group and individual identities” (Penrose 2002, 283, 
original emphasis). Yet, while many leading scholars attribute the success of nationalism 
to the conditions of modernity (see e.g. Nairn 1981; B. Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; 
Hobsbawm 1990), few include an explicit consideration of territory and its associated 
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bordering processes as a key factor shaping those identities. Instead, territory is most 
generally framed as just one of the multiple attributes that define nationhood. For 
instance, Anthony Smith identifies several “attachments” upon which nations are built: 
Among these attachments, those deriving from such cultural attributes as 
kinship and descent, language, religion, and customs, as well as historical 
territory, assume a prominent place; they tend to give rise to that sense of 
communal belonging we call ethnicity and ethnic community, and they 
form the basis for subsequent development of nations and nationalism 
(Smith 2000, 5). 
Thus, “historical territory” takes its place alongside “cultural attributes” in a laundry list 
of “attachments” that figure in the development of national community. Territory is seen 
as somehow passive and objective, rather than an actor that actually shapes those cultural 
attributes and, ultimately, a given national community. 
Part of the problem in much of the priorly published work is a certain confusion 
surrounding the concept of territory itself, which is often viewed as a self-evident, even 
primordial, spatial referent (Paasi 2008). But, rooted in legal and technological advances 
coming out of Europe’s late Middle Ages, territory as “bounded space, a container, 
under the control of a group of people, nowadays usually a state … must be conceived as 
a historically and geographically specific form” of political and social organization 
(Elden 2010, 757-758, emphasis added). This section provides a brief historical overview 
of the changing significance and meaning of territory to show how nation – a cultural 
signifier – and state – a political signifier – have become intertwined, used today almost 
interchangeably, in the development of the modern political-territorial order. Critical to 
this development are shifts over time in the way sovereignty has been justified. My 
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attention then turns to key social processes that work to reinforce this synergistic 
relationship between culture and territory. 
Historicizing Territory and the Nation-State 
In medieval Europe all sovereignty was concentrated in the throne of the Holy 
Roman Empire, which, as God’s terrestrial representative, claimed ultimate authority 
over a complex “patchwork of overlapping” (Elshtain 2008, 41) political-geographical 
arrangements that included feudal principalities, increasingly centralized monarchies of 
Western Europe (i.e. England, France, and Spain), Italian city-states, and other forms 
suzerainty. Borders were nonexistent or fuzzy at best. Amid these “geographically 
interwoven and stratified” (Ibid.) political-geographical structures, according to Penrose, 
“societies were characterised by primary identification with small units” of population 
and space: “For some this meant kin groups and/or tribes as well as the village and/or 
lands used to support the community. For others it meant the diocese, manor, guild or 
town” (Penrose 2002, 283). Loyalties were also expressed vertically. Peasants, for 
example, were directly connected to their feudal landlords, whose loyalties in turn were 
tied into a hierarchy leading up to the Holy Roman Emperor. As such, group and 
individual identities in medieval Europe were defined, first, by the borders of immediate 
day-to-day social interactions and relationships and, second, by hierarchical membership 
in universal Christendom. Between these local and universal identities, the concept of 
nation, as it is generally understood today, had no meaning (Knight 1982). 
By the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, this multi-scalar, overlapping political-
geographical arrangement gave rise to power struggles and competing claims to 
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sovereignty among kings, princes, nobles, and clergy that frequently erupted into conflict. 
Both a byproduct and contributor to the “break-up of a single Christian society” (Elshtain 
2008, 55) was England’s separation from the Catholic Church and the Protestant 
Reformation. The centralized mid-sized states of Western Europe proved most effective 
in mobilizing for the resultant religiously inspired warfare, which reached its apogee with 
the Thirty Years’ War. The hostilities were halted in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia, 
a series of treaties that formalized the realist principle of cuius regio, eius religio7 (see 
generally Taylor 1994; 1995; Murphy 1996).  The agreements of Westphalia, cementing 
the legal principle of noninterference, were combined with advances in mathematics and 
surveying that allowed for more precise delineation of state borders. This marriage of the 
new political-legal principle of state sovereignty and the new political-technological feat 
of precise border-drawing marked what Elden calls the “birth of territory” (forthcoming; 
see also Elden 2005; 2007), that is, the nascence of the modern political-territorial order. 
Territory in its infancy was an expression of the state, not national community. 
The centralized states of Western Europe represented the future of political-territorial 
ideology, their victory heralding the march to what Taylor calls “interstateness”: 
At Westphalia the roll-call of members of the interstate system was 
agreed: The Netherlands and Switzerland were finally recognized as 
independent and in Germany the political units were consolidated from 
900 to 300. From this time forth sovereignty has been recognized as a 
mutual recognition of states by states. … Hence we can date interstateness 
                                                          
7 “He who rules decides the faith of his realm.” This principle was first articulated in the Treaty of 
Augsburg in 1555 that halted the violence among the German princes that resulted from the Protestant 
Reformation. 
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and the final defeat of premodern universalism from Westphalia (Taylor 
1995, 5). 
Territorial sovereignty after 1648, as implied by the principle cuis regio, eius religo, 
found its locus of legitimacy in the head of each state, i.e. the sovereign kings. Thus, 
sovereignty, no longer monopolized by a single Holy Roman Emperor, was devolved to 
the various monarchs who, often seen as the God’s divine representatives, claimed 
absolute authority within their bordered realms. This devolution of sovereignty in turn 
influenced the configuration of group identity. While primary identification remained tied 
to local spatialities of immediate social interaction, membership in a universal 
Christendom was increasingly replaced by shorter hierarchies of vertical integration into 
the churches of newly sovereign states, e.g. the Church of England, the Dutch Reformed 
Church, the Church of Sweden, etc. (Kaplan 1999). This was symptomatic of the role 
territory began playing in the geographical organization of politics and society, an early 
incarnation of what Häkli (2001) terms the “state-centered construction of society.” 
If Westphalia gave birth to territory as sovereign statehood, it was only with 
subsequent developments that territorial states came to be seen as representative of 
nations. The era of Enlightenment, with its focus on reason and the individual, led to a 
situation in which royal divinity increasingly was questioned. The American and French 
revolutions and their concomitant romantic nationalism represented a paradigm shift, 
what Taylor calls a change from “interstateness” to “internationality” in the political-
territorial system (Taylor 1995, 6). From that point, sovereignty found a new locus of 
legitimacy – “the people.” As Murphy writes, 
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Before the age of nationalism, sovereignty was vested in the ruler; power 
was circumscribed by whatever territory a ruler controlled as a 
consequence of the vicissitudes of history. With the rise of nationalism, 
however, sovereignty came to be understood as resting with the nation. By 
extension, it became important to see political territories as reflections of 
nations (Murphy 1996, 97, emphasis added). 
Under this new directive, the long-established absolutist states of Western Europe worked 
to mold nations within their already erected boundaries; it can be said that they created 
state-nations. For instance, Claval emphasizes that the French nation resulting from this 
period was formulated in distinctively civic terms: 
France was not conceived of as an ethnic unit. It had been built through 
history from a variety of groups, and the limits which had been reached 
during the eighteenth century were considered well-fitted to the national 
will, since everyone who wished to build a common future as Frenchmen 
lived within the same state (Claval 1994, 41). 
One might take issue with the assertion that “everyone” within France desired a 
common future as Frenchmen. But the larger point is that, because states now were 
assumed to represent self-identifying historical cultural groups, France and other 
centralized states of Western Europe were compelled to encourage stronger national 
feeling among sometimes disparate cultural groups within the spatial extent of their 
territories. This process of territorial nation-building was accomplished through what 
Paasi (1997) calls “the institutionalization of territories,” which includes the 
standardization of language, the cultivation of national symbols with emotional 
resonance, the development of idealized histories, national militaries, as well as other 
institutions. This process is common to the shifting political-territorial order and, as Herb 
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elaborates, “is not linear or universal but a contested discourse that needs to be negotiated 
between different factions within the nation as well as vis-à-vis other nations” (1999, 21). 
Indeed, to return to the case of France, significant portions of the country’s population 
did not feel themselves to be French even up to World War I, as Eugen Weber (1976) has 
shown in his classic account of the construction of the French nation. 
The re-situation of sovereignty’s locus of legitimacy from state to nation had a 
different effect in the lands east of the absolutist states. The cultural groups of Central 
Europe faced the task of creating their own territorial states. The unification nationalisms 
of the Italians, who were ruled by foreigners, and the Germans, who lived in a number of 
fragmented states, resulted in the formation of their nation-states in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. Unlike the French example, these nationalist movements were 
expressed in explicitly ethnic terms. Still the cultural contents within these newly formed 
territories were by no means objective; each would-be nation was riven with disparate 
folk customs and highly uneven levels of economic development, among other cleavages. 
For the Italy of 1870, the decision to locate its capital in Rome, over the new country’s 
more economically dynamic cities, was an effort to co-opt the glorious past of the Roman 
Empire while simultaneously drawing on the institution of the Catholic Church as a key 
source of national identity that would transcend regional differences, particularly the 
sharp cleavages on the north-south axis, and thereby create greater territorial 
cohesiveness (Agnew 2002b). 
The extent of Germany’s external borders in 1871 also presented particular issues 
for the new country’s state leaders and nation builders. Most glaringly, the territory was 
divided by religion, with Protestantism predominant in the north and east and 
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Catholicism dominant in the south and west. Therefore, religion was deemphasized in 
imagining the newly minted ethnic German nation while language was elevated as a 
defining feature. For historical reference, the legacy of Prussia, particularly its recent 
military glories against France, assumed a central place in the early national development 
of Germany (Applegate 1999; Johnson and Coleman, forthcoming). Emblematic of the 
Prussian influence was the decision to locate the capital of the new German nation-state 
in Berlin. If the extent of German state’s external borders affected how the ethnic 
German nation was conceived, the cultural contents in turn influenced the internal 
territorial structuring of the state into numerous federal Länder that reflected the diversity 
of the German nation while ensuring its overall cohesiveness (Sandner 1994; Herb 2004). 
This internal political-territorial arrangement of the ethnically defined German nation 
sharply contrasts with the centralized, civically defined French example. 
With sovereignty’s locus of legitimacy replaced in the nation, logic dictated that 
territorial borders should extend to wherever a defined people dwelled. Such romantic 
nationalism led to a political-territorial system that was characterized by an extreme 
anarchy from the middle of the nineteenth century and into the first two decades of the 
twentieth century (Murphy 1996). Following the German and Italian national movements, 
the peoples of the moribund empires east of them posted their individual claims to 
territory under the slogan of national self-determination. These forces reached an 
apotheosis with the First World War, which laid rest those empires and contributed to the 
subsequent appearance of many new territories on the political map of the world. These 
states were ostensibly created as sovereign nation-states, the political-territorial ideal of 
the young twentieth century. At this point, sovereignty was believed to have found its 
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ultimate locus of legitimacy in the various entities that constituted the political-territorial 
order; the overlapping, vertical political geography of pre-modern Europe had been 
displaced by the discrete horizontality of modernity.  
In sum, during this period three main principles of the modern political-territorial 
order were established: (1) exclusivity, i.e. the surface of the Earth should be divided up 
into an array of discretely delimited territorial units; (2) sovereignty, i.e. states have 
ultimate control over their territories and are free from external interference; and (3) the 
nation-state ideal, i.e. territories should be reflections of historically self-identifying 
cultural groups (Murphy 2005; Agnew 2009). 
The ascent of the sovereign nation-state as the political-territorial ideal after 
World War I had contradictory effects. First, the Wilsonian ideal of national self-
determination, understood as the right of peoples, i.e. nations, to control their own 
homelands, discredited European rule over territorial holdings in Asia and Africa, leading 
to successive waves of decolonization, including that of much of the Muslim world, and 
consequently resulting in a proliferation of new sovereign territories on the political map 
of the world (Barnsley and Bleiker 2008). This same ideal, however, contributed to the 
outbreak of Europe’s second great conflagration of the twentieth century. With the close 
of World War II, the charter of the newly created United Nations expressed its 
commitment to support the national self-determination of peoples; yet it also purported to 
uphold the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its member states. These two principles 
are at clear odds, considering that the UN today incorporates approximately 200 members 
and there exist, according to one estimate, more than 800 ethnic groups who could assert 
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their rights to national self-determination (Falk 1992, 202).8 When these two principles 
come into conflict, most often in the form of sub-state minority claims, the international 
community generally has remained committed to the territorial status quo. Only in 
extreme cases, beyond decolonization, has it recognized sub-state ethno-national 
territorial claims. 
In spite of the international system’s commitment to the status quo, sub-state 
groups persist in pursuing territory as the ultimate expression of their national self-
determination. An overview of conflicts around the globe provides an illustration of this 
issue. For the latter half of the 1990s, only two of the world’s highly violent conflicts 
were waged between states. In that same period, between 26 and 28 internal conflicts – 
mainly on secessionist grounds, i.e. ethno-national groups seeking control of territory – 
were registered each year (Christopher 1999). A more recent report shows that, of the 
world’s 28 highly violent conflicts in 2010, none was between states. Again, the main 
reason for these conflicts was sub-state nationalist movements seeking self-determination 
(Heidelberg 2011). Notable to this discussion is the fact that a great deal of these 
secessionist conflicts involve Muslim groups, for reasons that will be addressed later in 
this chapter. 
Reinforcing Territorial Identities 
As the persistence of sub-state territorial claims attests, the nation-state as the 
modern political-territorial ideal in many ways is unattainable – with the exception of 
only a few cases, mainly found in Europe, a “myth” (Mikesell 1983). However, because 
                                                          
8 By other estimates, this figure is conservative. White cites a figure of 5,000 nations (White 2000, 2), but 
according to Minahan, “Estimates of stateless nations in the world run as high as 9,000” (Minahan 1996, 
xvi). 
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the modern international system assumes that state leaders represent a defined “people,” 
states are impelled to nationalize their populace, to cultivate state nationalism that 
corresponds to a “sense of territory” (Murphy 202, 197). But how is this accomplished? 
To address this question, three conceptual approaches liberally are drawn on in this 
dissertation. 
The most foundational of the three conceptual approaches, territoriality is “a 
primary geographical expression of power,” according to Robert Sack (1986, 3), who 
defines the term more fully as “the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, 
or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control 
over a geographic area” (Ibid. 19, original italics). Sack emphasizes that territoriality is 
not an essential part of human behavior, unlike with animals, but rather a learned 
“strategy” in which power relations are reified through a threefold process of (1) 
classification of space, e.g. “homeland” vs. “foreign land,” “ours” vs. “not ours”; (2) 
communication of a sense of place, e.g. the erection of boundaries; and (3) enforcement 
of control, e.g. policing, surveillance (Sack 1986, 32-33; see also Sack 1983). Following 
from this dynamic, the usefulness of territoriality as a control-oriented strategy lies in its 
efficiency – power relations are depersonalized by moving attention away from 
individuals and to the entire extent of bounded space. Hence, territoriality shapes identity 
in its role of defining group membership, literally who is considered “in” and who is 
“out” of place. In the context of the territorial state, as Herb has shown in his case study 
of pre-unification Germany, territoriality and its accompanying bordering processes are 
employed in the construction of the nation to “identify who is included and excluded” by 
accentuating “external difference or internal unity” (Herb 2004, 144). 
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Building on Sack’s concept of human territoriality, Anssi Paasi provides a second 
useful conceptual approach with his idea of spatial socialization, which he defines as a 
constant “process” in which individuals and groups 
are socialized as members of specific territorially bounded spatial entities, 
participate in their reproduction and “learn” collective territorial identities, 
narratives of shared traditions and inherent spatial images (e.g. visions 
regarding boundaries, regional divisions, regional identities, etc.), which 
may be, and often are, contested (Paasi 2009, 226). 
Territories and identities, according to Paasi, are co-constructed through boundaries 
separating “us” from “them” via the process of Othering. These borders are not just the 
physical borders located at the edge of states.  Rather, the borders of Paasi’s spatial 
socialization, both discursive and material, are “spread” – however unevenly – 
throughout territories and permeate everyday life (Paasi 2008, 113; see also Paasi 1998). 
These lines of inclusion and exclusion, in their ubiquity, represent hidden power relations 
that are communicated foremost through institutions, including national school systems, 
politics, popular culture, government, media outlets, and multiple others via practices and 
discourses that serve to “nationalize everyday life” (Paasi 1999). Consequently, Paasi 
urges researchers to analyze textbooks, art, newspapers, and other common materials that 
aid in reinforcing the institutional shape of territory and group identity. 
 In tandem with the institutional shape of territory and national identities, 
according to Paasi, is the symbolic shape: “Territorial symbols are abstract expressions of 
group solidarity and serve to evoke strong emotions of identification with territorial 
groups” (Paasi 1997, 43). Symbols, too, are border-producing agents. As is the case with 
institutions, borders produced by symbols are “simultaneously territorial (exclusive) and 
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emphasise internal integration” (Ibid.). The symbolic shape of territories and national 
identities includes three aspects:  
(a) dynamic, discursively constructed elements (like the process of 
naming), (b) fixed symbols such as flags, coats of arms and statues, and 
(c) social practices in which these elements come together, such as 
military parades, flag days, and education (Paasi 2008, 113).  
Places, such as capital cities, national parks, etc., are symbols that are also important to 
the social integration of national groups. Landscape is a specific type of place that 
commonly is important to national iconography.9 For example, Paasi (1996) discusses 
how nineteenth-century paintings and literature played an important role in representing 
Finnish landscapes populated by lakes as representative of the Finnish national character. 
Whereas Sack looks at territoriality as a foundational control-oriented strategy 
and Paasi examines internal bordering processes that give shape to territories and group 
identities, a third conceptual approach is developed by Murphy, who is concerned with 
the “territorial logic of the modern state system” (Murphy 2005, 280). Because, as 
discussed above, the nation-state is a political-territorial ideal that, with the exception of 
rare cases, is never met, nationalists and state leaders are compelled to develop what 
Murphy terms regimes of territorial legitimation (RTLs), defined as “the institutions, 
practices, and discourses that are designed to legitimate particular conception of the 
state” (Murphy 2005, 281). The aim of these regimes is to cultivate and inculcate a 
“particular sense of territory” (Murphy 2002, 197) that would contribute to a heightened 
sense of nationhood. In the face of the sovereign nation-state ideal, however, RTLs are 
                                                          
9 The work landscape does in shaping territorial identities will be discussed in more depth in Chapter V. 
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constrained by the geographical circumstances of states as they entered the modern 
system of nation-states. In light of this, Murphy identifies three historical-geographical 
understandings of the state that are often evoked in RTLs:  
1. That the state is the historic homeland of a distinctive ethnocultural 
group (e.g. France, Poland)  
2. That the state is a distinctive physical-environmental unit (e.g. 
Hungary, Australia)  
3. That the state is the modern incarnation of a long-standing political-
territorial entity (e.g. Egypt, Mongolia) (Murphy 2005, 283).  
These arguments, he points out, are idealized notions of history and territory – not 
necessarily reflections of reality – employed to instill state nationalism. They are not 
exhaustive and can change over time. 
 Taken together, these three conceptual approaches show how territory and 
identity are deeply coupled. Territoriality is a primary power strategy used, among other 
actors, by states to classify, communicate, and enforce who is considered “in” and who is 
considered “out” of the national community. Spatial socialization shows how borders 
separating “us” from “them” are produced and reproduced within the territorial extent of 
states through institutions, symbols, and practices. And the concept of regimes of 
territorial legitimation helps us understand how state and national leaders attempt to 
cultivate a “sense of territory” among their populaces that would conform to the norms of 
the international political-territorial system.  
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The Territorial Bases of Muslim Identities 
Theses positing Islam’s incompatibility with the modern political-territorial order 
invariably point out that the nation-state is a European import, a product of the colonial 
experience for most of the Muslim world. While unquestionably true, this assertion 
carries with it the implication that the Islamic world was free of European influence until 
the age of colonialism. But, as historian Reinhard Schulze stresses in the introduction to 
his A Modern History of the Islamic World, Muslims and Europeans share a history of 
interaction, characterized both by antagonism and mutual enrichment, dating back several 
centuries (Schulze 2000). European encroachments in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, though qualitatively different from previous encounters, did not signal the 
arrival of an alien civilization to a previously separate Muslim world. Additionally, as 
addressed in the previous section and underscored by Sami Zubaida, ideas and practices 
associated with the nation-state, although originating in Western Europe, “have proved 
highly diffusible to all regions of the world, first to the rest of Europe and the white 
colonies, then to the rest of the world, colonised or not” (Zubaida 1989, 121). To argue 
that the nation-state is incompatible with Muslim societies, but not with Buddhist, Hindu, 
or Christian societies, is to advocate cultural exceptionalism. 
In recognition of these dynamics, Fred Halliday argues that “it is fruitless to begin 
by posing the question of how far Islam, as a transnational religion, is compatible with 
the modern state or modern nation. The answer is self-evidently that it is” (Halliday 2002, 
25). He points out that Islam in its totality is just one of multiple bases of identity – along 
with sectarian, ethno-linguistic, and other affiliations – that form group consciousness in 
the Muslim world in the modern era, and these various aspects of identity “shift in 
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balance as between one and the other depending on the circumstances” (Ibid., 24-25, 
emphasis added). Whereas Halliday and other modernist researchers (e.g. Al-Azmeh 
1996; Eickelman and Piscatori 1996; Zubaida 2004) are specifically interested in the 
political circumstance that have conditioned Muslim identities in the age of the nation-
state, their work highlights the importance of exploring how territorial circumstances 
have influenced Muslim group identities in the modern era. An exhaustive handling of 
this issue is far beyond the scope of this section. The primary aim here is simply to 
identify and discuss important examples of shifting territorial bases of Muslim identities, 
and the relative salience of Islam to those identities, in a variety of contexts as illustrative 
of the synergistic, historically contingent relationship between territory and identity. 
The Modernity of the Umma and Pre-Colonial Muslim Territorial Identities 
Because of its importance to current debates on Islam, a proper place to begin is 
with a discussion of the umma. The term entered modern political discourse only in the 
latter part of the nineteenth century in the context of two interrelated phenomena: 
European colonization of what by then was the majority of the world’s Muslims and the 
decline of the Ottoman Empire. Most active in propagating the umma was Jamal al-Din 
al-Afghani (1839-1897),10 an early champion of Pan-Islamism whose primary objective 
was liberating Muslims from the European yoke. He argued that Muslims had come 
under direct foreign control because they had retreated from Islam’s essential unity, as 
expressed in the umma, and had allowed themselves to become divided by competing 
loyalties of sect, school, kin, and territory. To restore Islamic solidarity and thereby rid 
                                                          
10 See Keddie (1983, 3-36) for a concise biography of al-Afghani and his political-intellectual development. 
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Muslims of foreign rule, al-Afghani advocated aggressive religious reform based on a 
return to the “pure” Islam that was practiced in the time of the prophet and the virtuous 
forefathers (Schulze 2000, 18).11 
His ideas of returning to a pristine past, however, were firmly tied to modernist 
ideologies. The umma, in al-Afghani’s conceptualization, was a “nation” in the modern 
European sense (Halliday 2002, 26).12 He considered the German nation, having recently 
come together across lines of religious schism, a model for the umma’s unification.13 
Consolidating the Islamic nation, as al-Afghani recognized from the German example, 
could only be accomplished through a state, or a confederation of states, prompting him 
to seek collaboration with Sultan Abdulhamid in his campaign to unify the umma under 
the authority of a single caliphal ruler (Hourani 1970, 103-129). Hence, although the 
umma is said to be incompatible with the political-territorial ordering of modernity, the 
                                                          
11 This movement for the return to “pure” Islam was the early embodiment of the current Salafist 
movement. As Schulze explains of this movement in al-Afghani’s time, “Corruption, it was argued, had 
invaded the Oriental world because Muslims had given up Islam and turned to obscure varieties of 
religiosity such as popular mysticism, magic and witchcraft. The return to the ‘pure’ Islam of the 
forefathers (al-salaf al-salih) became the target of a new intellectual movement, which was accordingly 
given the programmatic name Salafiya. The Salafiya movement was an Islamic variant of late 19th-century 
classicism. … Like classicism, the Salafiya sought a timeless aesthetic and intellectual ideal, derived from 
an origin that was pure of all temporal circumstances. In the Islamic context this could only be the early 
Islamic period” (Schulze 2000, 18). 
12 His singular definition of the umma as “nation” is representative of the nationalist habit of, if not all-out 
“inventing traditions” (Hobsbawn 1983), then at least reviving and radically reinterpreting traditions. In 
fact, the term for centuries had been used in several different meanings. Umma appears in the Koran more 
than 60 times, with at least a dozen separate meanings, and is used often in the hadith (sayings and acts of 
the prophet), again, with multiple meanings (Dallal 1995, 267). While the most important usage of the term 
in these foundational texts appears to address the community of believers who were ruled by the prophet 
while in Medina, the umma is also used in reference to other faith communities, state formations, kin 
groups, and even all living creatures. To shift analysis from text to practice, the umma was used in these 
multiple ways in pronouncements made by khulafa (Muslim rulers, literally “successors”) until the 
caliphate was abolished in 1924 (Halliday 2002, 23). 
13 It should be remembered that the ideology of Pan-Germanism was an early political-intellectual 
movement that contributed to the Germans’ ultimate unification. Indeed, as Landau discusses, Pan-
Islamism should be seen as part of a broader milieu of nineteenth-century unification movements, related 
intellectually and politically to Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism, and Pan-Hellenism (Landau 1990, 2). 
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term itself, as it is commonly understood today,14 was developed and defined within the 
framework of modernist territorial ideas and ideologies. 
Pan-Islamism arose in various places, including Egypt, the Ottoman Empire, 
British India, Iran, and Tsarist Russia. A considerable exchange of ideas, literature, and 
transnational activism took place among these various movements. But in the final 
account, as Mandaville attests, Pan-Islamism “failed miserably” in its goal of creating a 
united umma. He attributes the failure to the fact that the “umma, simply put, was too 
abstract” and instead Muslim groups “opt[ed] for nationalism over Islam” as resistance to 
European colonialism (Mandaville 2011, 9). Mandaville is correct is his assessment of 
Pan-Islamism’s record, but his analysis suffers two mistakes, one ontological and the 
other factual. To start with the former, his focus on civilization/culture as driving politics, 
not the other way around, forces Muslims to make a zero-sum choice between 
nationalism and Islam, when the two are in fact not mutually exclusive. As for the latter, 
it is clear that several Muslim groups identified themselves in modern national terms 
before they were brought under European colonial rule. This can be illustrated by looking 
at two stops in the career of al-Afghani. 
First, the Pan-Islamist ideas of al-Afghani were developed in the 1870s, while he 
was active as an Islamic reformer/modernizer in Cairo. By that point Egyptians already 
had a strong national feeling separate of other Arabs. As Lapidus explains, 
Even before nationalism became a self-conscious doctrine, Egyptian 
writers spontaneously identified Egypt as the watan, motherland. The 
                                                          
14 As an example, Muhittin Ataman asserts that “all Muslim ethnic (linguistic, cultural, territorial and 
racial) groups are considered one nation or one political entity. The ummah is the name given to this 
political, cultural and religious entity” (Ataman 2003, 90). 
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homogeneity and isolation of the country, its long history of central 
government, and its distinctive cultural past encouraged a consciousness 
of Egyptian identity (Lapidus 1988, 622). 
With the country only nominally associated with the Ottoman Empire, Egyptian 
nationalism was on par with Islamic reformism as the country’s dominant ideology. 
Nationalists recognized Egypt as a modernist Islamic country, but, according to Hourani, 
al-Afghani and other Islamic reformers could not accept “the idea of an Egyptian nation, 
entitled to a separate political existence” because it “involved not only the denial of a 
single Islamic political community, but also the assertion that there could be a virtuous 
community based on something other than a common religion and a revealed law” 
(Hourani 2008, 193). This milieu of Egypt in the 1870s indicates, first, that modernist 
ideas underpinning the nation-state were well established among a significant portion of 
the population prior to British occupation beginning 1882 – they were not simply grafted 
on or developed as a reaction to Europe – and, second, that al-Afghani’s 
conceptualization of the umma was worked out not just as a reaction to European 
colonialism, but also came as a response to nationalism among Muslims he encountered 
while in Egypt. 
On the eve of British occupation, after al-Afghani had moved on to other lands to 
spread his Pan-Islamism, patriotism was on the upswing in Egypt, seen in the popularity 
of Al-Watan (“Motherland”), one of the first important unofficial newspapers (Hourani 
2008, 194). The all-subsuming Pan-Islamist definition of umma proffered by al-Afghani 
was rejected by the Sheikh of Al-Azhar University in Cairo, who, in his Risalat al-kalim 
al-thaman (“Essay on Eight Words”), defined the term to mean a community defined not 
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only by religion, but also a community that can be defined by territory and/or language. 
Notably, among his few examples of a territorially defined umma was Egypt (Ayalon 
1987, 27-28). British occupation did not create nationalism in Egypt. Instead, as Hourani 
writes, British rule “fused Islamic modernism with Egyptian nationalism” (Hourani 2008, 
194) in a united nationalist front. By the close of the century, under the conditions of 
external occupation, modernist Islam was eclipsed by a secular nationalist definition of 
Egyptian identity and politics. This understanding of national community grew in 
strength until the country emerged as an independent nation-state in 1922. Thus, in the 
case of Egypt we see how preexisting territorial conditions, i.e. centralized institutions, a 
modernizing state, and a sense of distinctive culture, gave rise to a national identity that 
was only strengthened, not created, under foreign rule. 
By the time al-Afghani arrived in Istanbul in the 1890s, his Pan-Islamism could 
do little to stem the Arabism that had arisen in the core of the Ottoman Empire. Various 
Arab nationalisms were shaped by a specific set of changing political-territorial 
circumstances that began with the territorial modernization of the empire, launched in the 
mid-1800s, which replaced the traditional Ottoman system of decentralized governance 
with modern institutions of centralized administration. Carried out in tandem with the 
standardization of laws and education, as Selim Deringil (1998) explains in his book The 
Well-Protected Domains, one goal of the empire’s centralization was the construction of 
a unified Ottoman identity. This process of territorial modernization and nation-building 
had unintended consequences, sharpening local and regional identities under the umbrella 
of a vaster imperial identity. By the latter part of the century, a new generation of 
educated Arabs in the Fertile Crescent began expressing grievances that were driven 
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primarily as a reaction to the Porte’s recognition of Ottoman Turkish as the sole official 
language within the core of the empire. Muslim and Christian Arabs together sought 
territorial autonomy – something akin to the Ottoman sub-states of Egypt, Tunisia, or 
Algeria – within which Arabic would be the official language (Lapidus 1988, 644). 
Hence, we see territorial modernization giving rise to a proto-national group defining 
itself ethno-linguistically and seeking territorial expression of its culture. 
It was at this point that Sultan Abdulhamid began incorporating ideas of Pan-
Islamism, aimed not at territorial expansion as envisioned by al-Afghani, but in an effort 
to curtail Arab nationalism within his domains (Peters 2010, 84). A second set of 
political-territorial changes further fuelled the embers of Arab national feeling. The 
increasing losses of the Porte’s Christian possession in the Balkans in early part of the 
twentieth century left the empire with the pronounced character of a Turko-Arab state. By 
this point, writes Choureiri, “it was becoming increasingly obvious that the Arab 
educated elite, along with the local constituencies, had developed a sense of national 
identity that could no longer be ignored” (Choureiri 2002, 654). As their demands for 
territorial autonomy and language rights intensified, Ottoman officials refused any 
concessions as they leaned more heavily on Islamism – a common religious identity that 
would unite the Arabs with the Turks in the territorially diminished empire – as a source 
of legitimacy while implementing de facto Turkification policies. This approach further 
inflamed Arab nationalist sentiment. Haarmann claims that this point in history signaled 
the arrival of a “new idea of an Arab political nationality” that was defined by a common 
language (Haarmann 1988, 186), but it would be difficult to discuss a single, unified 
Arab national front. If Arab Christians were generally in favor of secession, particularly 
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with the recent rise in Islamism, Muslim Arabs were more ambivalent about departing 
from the caliphate (Lapidus 1988, 640-641). Nonetheless, it can be concluded that, by the 
start of World War I – prior to European colonization – Arabs of the Ottoman Empire had 
developed a distinctly modern sense of nationality, if in different forms, and the desire to 
express it territorially. 
Territory and Muslim Identities in the Post-World War I Context 
After the First World War, with the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire and the 
abolition of the caliphate, Turkey was refashioned as a nation-state under the leadership 
of Atatürk, as was un-colonized Iran under the Pahlavi regime. Each of these countries, in 
building its regime of territorial legitimation in the interwar years, drew on pre-Islamic 
histories and the legacy of past statehood, each billed in glorious terms, to help mold new 
secular national identities (Zubaida 2004, 413-416). Most of the rest of world’s Muslims 
remained under European colonization, but, as Peters writes, 
Almost nowhere, though, did Islam play a crucial role as an ideology of 
anticolonial resistance. … The new political forces fighting for 
independence were grounded ideologically in secular nationalism and 
liberal European democracy and constitutional government (Peters 2010, 
102). 
The relative absence of the umma ideal in resistance to European colonization in the post-
World War I context is reflective of both the internal and external normative powers of 
the nation-state, which had become the political-territorial ideal worldwide (as discussed 
earlier in this chapter). National identities were shaped internally, within the spatial 
extent of each colonized territory, by the institutions of colonial administration. Demands 
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for independence, conditioned externally by the norms of the international sovereignty 
regime, were framed within the borders of each colonized territory in terms that invoked 
the Wilsonian ideal of national self-determination. The European colonialist, in the 
various independence campaigns, served as the Other against which the nascent territorial 
nations were defined. 
For instance, to continue with the example of the Arab Fertile Crescent, the 
Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 divided the Arab Near East into an array of new territorial 
states. While these states might have been “artificial” (Halliday 2002, 29), the power of 
modern territory in shaping identity is seen in how anti-colonialism was expressed. In the 
mandate period, leaders of the older generation, holding to the Pan-Arabism that took 
form under Ottoman rule, still dreamed of a single Arab nation into the 1920s and 1930s. 
By the 1940s, however, a new generation had been spatially socialized within the new 
national school systems, militaries, and multiple other institutions of each Arab state. 
Consequently, separate Arab nationalisms within each territorial state, Lapidus writes, 
became the “principle expression of the demand of independence” (Lapidus 1988, 644). 
Even within Lebanon by the 1940s, a common “Arab character” united Muslim and 
Christians in a Lebanese nationalism that was gelled in opposition to foreign occupation 
(Havemann 2010, 512). 
A similar pattern is evident in preexisting colonies. For instance, the Dutch East 
Indies remained politically divided until the Dutch colonists centralized their control over 
Indonesia in 1914 with a new territorially defined system of administration. Only at this 
point did the colonizers begin differentiating between “natives” – a category that, 
although Muslim-majority, also comprised other religions and a multiplicity of ethnicities 
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– and “foreigners,” i.e. the colonialists themselves. In institutionalizing these distinctions, 
the Dutch thereby “confirm[ed] the nationalist view that Indonesia had its own nationality 
and hence the right to independence” (Schulze 2000, 43). Although Islamist groups were 
part of the anti-colonial drive, it was secular Indonesian nationalism under the leadership 
of Sukarno that secured the country’s independence in the wake of the World War II. 
At the same time in British India, with the Indian National Conference beginning 
its campaign for home rule and independence in 1919, it seemed a common Indian 
nationalism might similarly evolve to unite Muslims and Hindus in the face of foreign 
rule. The Muslim-nationalist Pakistani movement, however, eventually became ascendant 
– but not, as current reading might suggest, out of some innate religious aversion to 
political coexistence with Hindus. Rather, the rise of Muslim nationalism was primarily 
due to the British colonial administration’s earlier institutionalization of communal 
difference via the Indian Councils Act of 1909, which, as Lapidus contends, 
reinforced the collective identity of religious groups by giving them the 
right to petition for relief of grievances and to elect their own 
representatives. The British identified the Muslims as a religious 
community; then they provided the political machinery to translate that 
identity into concerted group action. By the Indian Councils Act of 1909 
they confirmed the existence of two separate communal electorates, Hindu 
and Muslim, and thus gave legal and political substance to the underlying 
differences of religion (Lapidus 1988, 733). 
While the idea of a mass Muslim society in India before that time “had only the most 
tenuous basis [and] was perhaps stronger in the minds of the British than in the minds of 
the Muslims” (Ibid.), the institutionalization of religious difference conditioned the 
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subsequent trajectory of independence on the Indian subcontinent. This led to the 
territorial separation of Pakistan from India in 1947, with attendant widespread inter-
communal violence. 
The case of Algeria after World War I illustrates how group identity can change 
as aspirations for opt-in solutions of greater representation, integration, and participation 
within the broader French/French Algerian society shift to the opt-out territorial solution 
of Algerian independence (Mikesell and Murphy 1991). Although the French had 
maintained a presence in Algeria since 1830, it was only after 1914 that the colonial 
administration created a special “Muslim” nationality to separate the indigenous Arabs 
and Berbers from the Christian European colons (Schulze 2000, 43). In institutionalizing 
a common indigenous Muslim identity, the French in turn created, quite unintentionally, 
national movements, at first expressing various opt-in aspirations. The Young Algerians, 
for instance, sought full integration into French society, while other groups sought 
equality in the army, education, and other civil institutions. By the 1930s, denied these 
rights and institutionalized as a common “Muslim” nationality, Arabs and Berbers began 
speaking in more strident nationalist terms and resisting French assimilation as native 
Algerians. By the late 1930s, they also began resisting the French colonizers’ efforts to 
divide their “Muslim” designation into separate Arab and Berber nationalities, a 
campaign aimed at weakening an increasingly radicalized indigenous nationalist 
movement (Lapidus 1988, 690). 
Demands shifted to opt-out territorial solutions after World War II. With this 
change, French offers to enfranchise all Algerian males was, as Perkins phrases it, “too 
little, too late” (Perkins 2010, 428) – once group demands have switched over to the opt-
55 
 
out territorial solution of independence, as Mikesell and Murphy (1991) have shown, it is 
unlikely they will revisit opt-in solutions of greater representation, integration, or 
participation. The Algerian revolution, beginning in 1954, was conducted by various 
nationalist groups, but the leading, most decisive Front Libération Nationale (FLN), 
although not officially Islamic, “held strong Islamic sentiments and puritanical attitudes” 
(Lapidus 1988, 693) that were amplified in the course of fighting for Algeria’s liberation, 
ultimately gained in 1962. Thus, the case of Algeria in this period shows (1) how modern 
institutions mold territorial identities, (2) how group identities can change in tandem with 
shifts from opt-in to opt-out territorial aspirations, and (3) how Islam can mix with 
nationalism in the course of intensified territorial demands. 
Territory and the Contemporary Contours of Muslim Identities 
 If secular nationalism was the main basis of Muslim territorial identity in the face 
of the colonizing European Other, the postcolonial era has exhibited a far greater 
variability in the ideas and ideologies underpinning territorial identities. Two poles of 
ideology that surfaced in the Arab Near East provide illustration. The first was the 
“radical nationalism” (Halliday 2002, 28) of Pan-Arabism, which, after being muted in 
the in the mandate period, resurged in the late 1950s and early 1960s with attempted 
unions between, first, Egypt and Syria (1958-1961) and then between Egypt, Syria, and 
Iraq (1963). Later ventures in unifying Arab territories included efforts between Egypt 
and Libya (1973) and Syria and Iraq (1979) (see generally Farah 1987; Jamkowski and 
Gershoni 1997). All of these attempts were unqualified failures.15 Rather than forging 
                                                          
15 With North and South Yemen merging in 1990, Yemen is the one exception. The two parts of the 
country, according to Halliday (1997; see also Halliday 2000, Chapter III), were united on Yemeni 
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new, enlarged Arab territories, the ethno-nationalist ideologies – explicitly secular, 
generally socialist – informing Pan-Arabism were employed within the borders of the 
newly independent states. Baathism, for instance, was enforced by Saddam Hussein to 
unite Shiite and Sunni Arabs within the borders of Iraq (Simon 1997, 88). More 
concerned with bridging potential sectarian cleavages between Arabs of Iraq, Hussein, in 
effect, never considered Kurds part of the Iraqi national community,16  which in turn 
contributed to Kurdish sub-state nationalism in the country’s north. 
The second pole, Islamism, initially came to prominence in the postcolonial age 
as a reaction to the era’s virulent Arab nationalism. The Muslim Brotherhood, for 
example, became a force in Egypt as a response to Nasserism, witnessed in the group’s 
most famous ideologue, Sayyid Qutb, who denounced Arab and Egyptian nationalism 
before a Cairo courtroom in the early 1960s as follows: 
The ties of faith are stronger than the ties of fervent patriotic feeling that 
relate to a region or territory … the homeland is not the land but the group 
of believers or the whole Islamic umma (quoted in Castells 2010, 15).17 
                                                                                                                                                                             
nationalist terms, not under the banner of Arabism or Islamism. However, considering how the country’s 
continuing political struggles and division along the north-south axis, the case of Yemen is a very qualified 
“success,” an exception that, for most intents and purposes, proves the rule. 
16 Hussein tried to justify his 1991 invasion of Kuwait by adding Islamism to his Pan-Arabism. Neither, of 
course, worked. As Halliday attests, “In Kuwait, in contrast to almost all other modern occupations, no 
collaborator puppet regime could be established as there was simply no support for the Iraqi move” 
(Halliday 2002, 30). This response by the Kuwaiti people, Arabs who share a religion with Hussein, is 
illustrative of attachments to territory trumping common ethnicity or religion. The near unanimity of the 
international community in censuring Hussein’s invasion is reflective of its commitment to upholding the 
territorial status quo. 
17 This quote by Qutb, called the “godfather of contemporary radical Islamism” (e.g. Musallam 2005) is 
commonly cited in building the case that Islam is incompatible with the modern political-territorial order. 
In my readings, I have encountered this same quotation (in slightly differing translations) in Castells 
(2010), Zubaida (2004), and Mortimer (1982). 
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As indicated in this quote, the Muslim Brothers and other Islamists of this period, 
however at odds with Arab nationalists, shared with them a declared desire to rearrange 
the region’s territorial configuration. But, much like the ideologies underpinning Pan-
Arabism, Islamist ideologies became organized within the borders of individual states. 
Their relative salience likewise was conditioned by the political-territorial circumstances 
in each state. For instance, Hamas, an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, was formed 
in Palestine as a response to political-territorial circumstances affecting Muslim 
Palestinians, as was Hezbollah formed in Lebanon as a response to issues related to 
Lebanese Muslims. Their ideologies speak of the umma in its entirety, but these and other 
Islamists “are in fact localized in the national state contexts” (Lapidus 2001, 38). 
 The fate of Pan-Arabism and the Pan-Islamist sentiments expressed by the likes of 
Qutb and others in this era is, on the one hand, a reflection of the international 
sovereignty regime’s commitment to maintaining the status quo; on the other hand, it is a 
testament to the degree to which the institutions of territory had taken hold in the internal 
organization of society and politics among Muslims in the postcolonial era. The changing 
balance in the relative weight of these two poles – ethnicity and Islam – to territorial 
identities in the postcolonial era is not limited to the Arabs of the Fertile Crescent. As a 
start, the case of post-1947 Pakistan, exceptional in that its subsequent partition ran 
counter to the international community’s dedication to the status quo, provides 
illustration of the diverging fortunes in the balance among the territorial bases of Muslim 
identities. 
Muslims of British India, influenced by the institutionalization of communal 
difference by the colonial administration, justified their independence separate from India 
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on religious grounds. But Islam proved insufficient in keeping the western and eastern 
parts of the newly formed Pakistan together, as Sufia Uddin explains in her book 
Constructing Bangladesh: Religion, Ethnicity, and Language in an Islamic Nation 
(Uddin 2006, see especially Chapter IV). Although Muslim Bengalis were instrumental 
in the formation of the Muslim League and its campaign for a united, independent 
Pakistan leading up to 1947, the issue of language became a central grievance compelling 
East Bengali to separate from the four provinces of West Pakistan. Urdu was the lingua 
franca, and was seen as the language of Islam in the highly ethnically (and intra-
religiously) diverse West Pakistan. Soon after gaining independence, politicians in 
Islamabad sought to make Urdu the sole official language for the entire country, the goal 
being to unite the new Muslim Pakistani nation by language and religion and thereby 
bring it in line with the nation-state ideal, as established in the European context. 
However, Muslims of East Bengali, forced to learn Urdu, “saw their ethnicity as coming 
under attack by West Pakistanis” (Uddin 2006, 120), which led to “East Pakistanis, 
regardless of religion, establish[ing] more of a common bond based on ethnicity” (Ibid., 
121). Two decades of resistance to what was seen as ethno-linguistic assimilation by an 
overbearing West Pakistan led to war and, not long after, an independent Bangladeshi 
nation-state in 1971. Thus, in the course of a few of decades, ethnicity, defined primarily 
in linguistic terms, came to outweigh religion in defining what was to become the 
Bangladeshi nation.  
A country in which 90 percent of the population is Muslim (mostly Sunni) and 
almost everybody natively speaks Bengali, Bangladesh perhaps comes closest among the 
world’s Muslim-majority states to approaching the nation-state ideal in which 
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linguistically and religiously defined ethno-cultural borders are assumed to match 
political borders (Azerbaijan, where ethnicity outweighs Islam in the balance of territorial 
identity, is another example that approaches this ideal). This contrasts with the extreme 
diversity, both ethno-linguistically and intra-religiously, of Pakistan, where, explicitly 
defined as an Islamic state, religion remains a primary basis of its territorial identity. 
Neighboring Afghanistan is similar in these dynamics. The umma ideal also tends to hold 
greater sway in the balance of Muslim group identities in territories that play host to high 
ethnic diversity and high inter-religious diversity, as seen in the postcolonial contexts of 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Sudan. 
Changes in the balance of territorial identities in the post-World War II context 
are not limited to the formerly colonized Muslim lands, as seen in the cases of Iran and 
Turkey. Neither formally colonized, both defined themselves in the early decades of the 
twentieth century as nation-states that were the modern embodiments of historical 
political-territorial units, the former drawing on the legacy of the pre-Islamic Persian 
Empire, the latter as the rump of the Turkish-dominated Ottoman Empire. It is notable 
that, while both early on were overtly nationalistic in a strict ethnic sense, reflective of 
the post-1914 milieu, neither approached the ideal of ethnic homogeneity. In recent 
decades, however, Islam has been become a stronger basis of national identity in each 
country, first, of course, with the 1979 Iranian Revolution. This momentous event, 
coming soon after most of the Muslim world had been decolonized, has been interpreted 
by many as proof of Islam’s innate incompatibility with the nation-state and has colored 
much subsequent analysis. 
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The shift away from Persian ethnic nationalism toward a more Islamic definition 
of Iranian nationhood should not come as a surprise when looking at the cultural contents 
of the territory. Persians account for only about half of the population,18 but about 90 
percent of the country’s citizenry are Shiite Muslims. Although the revolution’s leader, 
the Ayatollah Khomeini, spoke in Pan-Islamist terms, his language was “full of 
nationalist appeals” and allusions to Iran as a “Great Nation,” as Halliday attests. He 
concludes that, “in effect, the Iranian revolution was a Shiite revolution” (Halliday 2002, 
32-33; see also Halliday 2000, 155-169). The sectarianism of Iranian nationalism is 
evident in the post-revolutionary constitution of the ostensibly Islamic republic, which 
specifies that its president must be an Iranian by birth and possess a “convinced belief in 
the … official school of thought in the country,” that is, the president of Iran must be a 
Shiite (quoted in Zubaida 2004, 416). One clearly should not exaggerate sectarian 
difference as a source of division and/or conflict among Muslims (Keshavarzian 2007), 
but, as seen in the case of post-1979 Iran, sectarian commonality can become emphasized 
as a salient basis of territorial identity.19 
A similar dynamic colors the increasing profile of Islam as a social and political 
force in Turkey in the post-Cold War era. In a territory where almost everybody is a 
Muslim,20 but only three-fourths of the citizenry is an ethnic Turk, a major concern of 
Islamists has been the rise, beginning in the mid-1980s, of rebellions and separatist 
                                                          
18 Shiite Azeris account for about a quarter of the population, the rest made up of various other ethnic 
groups. All population statistics, unless otherwise noted, are from the CIA World Factbook 
(https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/aj.html).  
19 Ahmadi (2005) makes the argument that religion has been the primary basis of a multiethnic Iranian 
national identity long before the 1979 revolution. However, this analysis, going back as far as 2,500 years, 
does not take into account the modernity of both nation and territory. 
20 There were, of course, large Armenian and Greek populations in Turkey until state-sponsored ethnic 
cleansing and population transfers in the early decades of the twentieth century. 
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sentiment among the Kurdish population concentrated in the country’s southeast.21 As a 
study by Sakallioğlu (1998) indicates, Turkey’s Islamists are not so much concerned with 
Kurdish nationalism per se as they are with what they see as its catalyst, namely, the 
Kemalist legacy of defining the national community as a strictly secular, culturally 
Turkish entity (in the Kemalist tradition, Kurds were defined as “Mountain Turks,” 
thereby officially negating their ethno-linguistic difference). Kurdish rebellions, Turkish 
Islamists contend, would cease with the return of Islam as central in defining the 
“territorial identity [and] collective unity” of the Turkish state (Sakallioğlu 1998, 79). As 
such, the country’s Islamists, anxious about the territorial integrity of their vatan 
(“homeland”), position themselves as patriots in their promotion of religion as the basis 
of national identity, the glue that holds Turkey together. Their primary concern is the 
territorial nation, not the worldwide umma. 
If ethnic diversity is a factor contributing to the increasing salience of religion in 
the balance of group identities in Iran and Turkey, this situation points to another set of 
political-territorial circumstances faced by Muslim groups, namely, that of being a 
national minority. While the Shiite Azeris of Iran, as Borhani (2003) points out, were 
indeed at the “forefront of the broad anti-monarchial coalition that led to the 1979 
Revolution,” their participation should necessarily be seen an endorsement of the 
subsequent Islamization of Iranian society. Their grievances at that time centered on 
Persian-nationalist policies of the Pahlavi regime that marginalized their Turkic language 
and other aspects of ethnic Azeri culture. A recent article by Riaux provides evidence 
that, since the late 1990s, there has been an upswing in ethno-nationalism in Iran’s north 
                                                          
21 Ethnic Kurds, by far the country’s largest minority, account for almost one-fifth of Turkey’s population, 
or about 80 percent of its non-Turkish citizenry. 
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in which Iranian Azeris demand greater “recognition of cultural rights” (Riaux 2008, 
45).22 Similarly, Sakallioğlu suggests that the increasing salience of Islam in Turkey has 
done little to stem Kurdish separatism in that country. “Kurdishness today is being made 
not by referring to Islam,” he says, but rather by reference to a set of other “cultural 
artifacts,” i.e. an ethnic identity that has already been largely defined against the Turkish 
Other (Sakallioğlu 2010, 87; see also Hastings et al. 2006). 
The Azeris of Iran and the Kurds of Turkey (and Iraq and Iran) are minorities in 
Muslim-majority countries, providing some explanation as to why Islam has not factored 
into the expression of their territorial aspirations. The situation is more complicated for 
Muslim minority groups within non-Muslim territories – a type of political-territorial 
context central to this dissertation. Palestine is a glaring example, where the Arab 
nationalism of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) has been challenged by the 
Islamism of Hamas as a response to the political-territorial circumstances faced by 
Palestinians. Among the Uyghurs of the Xinjiang province of western China, evidence 
suggests that religion may be becoming more important in the balance of group identity 
in the expression of their territorial aspirations (e.g. Davis 2008; Reny 2009). The 
situation in Chechnya is also illustrative of the shift toward Islam amid conditions of war 
over territory. 
  
                                                          
22 Ahmedi (2010) reports that leaders of Iran’s Azeri community, along with leaders of other ethnic 
minorities in other regions of Iran, have expressed their desire for territorial autonomy within the 
framework of a countrywide federal system. But Tehran, fearful of ethnic separatism, is unwilling to 
consider to such an arrangement. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 Territory and identity have become coupled as the result of historical 
developments in which sovereignty has been devolved from God-like rulers to “the 
people,” understood in contemporary terms as a “nation.” While the nation-state as the 
modern political-territorial ideal first took shape in Western Europe, it has been diffused 
throughout the world. Opponents of the Huntingtons and Lewises of the world are correct 
in criticizing their failure to problematize the modern political-territorial order. The 
nation-state in no way is the natural order of things, but rather is a historically contingent 
entity. However, it is this very historical contingency that requires an examination of the 
role of territory in shaping identities, including those of Muslim groups. While 
globalization undoubtedly makes the nation-state an increasingly “leaky container” 
(Taylor 1994, 157), it nonetheless remains an important source of group identity, not 
excluding people in the Middle East and North Africa, as recent events in those regions 
have shown. Thus, an important task for researchers is to take the nation-state seriously 
and interrogate the ideas and ideologies underpinning the modern political-territorial 
order that condition Islam’s social and political expression. 
 The question of territory has been at the heart of historical developments, both 
distant and near, that have influenced the form and function of Islam and Muslim 
identities within the Russian context. This topic is examined in the following chapter. I 
begin with an overview of the territoriality of Islam in contemporary Russia and then 
provide a historical overview of how territorial conditions have affected Islam in the 
Middle Volga region. The chapter concludes with an overview of the dramatic political-
territorial changes in the post-Soviet Russian Federation to help prepare the reader for the 
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analysis that follows in Chapters IV and V centered on an examination of the changing 
shape of Tatarstan’s post-Soviet Islamic revival. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
SETTING THE STAGE: THE POLITICAL-TERRITORIAL 
INFLUENCE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF TATAR ISLAM 
 
Introduction 
In November 2003, then-President of Russia Vladimir Putin traveled to Kuala 
Lumpur to attend the summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). He 
cited the fact that Russia is home to 20 million Muslims23 in his successful bid to secure 
his country’s membership, albeit initially only with observer status, in this important club 
of Muslim states.24 While some observers questioned Putin’s appeal for OIC 
membership, seeing his request as driven by geopolitical or economic motives, his 
acknowledgement on a world stage that Russia in fact is part of the Muslim world is 
better understood as part of a nation-building process. His primary audience was not 
                                                          
23 This figure cited by Putin has been disputed, some people claiming it is inflated, others claiming it is 
deflated. Much of the debate is polemical, politicized. Alexei Malashenko, a respected and moderate 
observer of Islam in Russia, provides as overview of the range of estimates and agrees with Putin on the 
most generally cited figure of 20 million (Malashenko 2009, 321). See also Hunter (2004), Walker (2005), 
Helniak (2006) for similar discussions. 
24 As noted at the time, Russia was home to more Muslims than a most of the world’s Muslim-majority 
states, including Malaysia, which was hosting the summit (Lamborschini 2003). 
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Malaysians or citizens of other Muslim-majority countries. Putin was speaking directly to 
Muslims of Russia as part of what he called konsolidatsiia (“consolidation”) of the 
“multinational Russian people” (mnogonatsional’nii rossiiskii narod) (Putin 2003), a 
nation that, in Kuala Lumpur, he made clear was also multi-religious. 
Putin’s konsolidatsiia of the all-Russian nation was matched by his political-
territorial konsolidatsiia of the Russian Federation. The complex federal system he 
inherited upon becoming president in 2000 was in terrible disarray and threatened by the 
specter of separatism. He made the restoration of political-territorial order his number-
one priority. By the time Putin appeared in Kuala Lumpur in late 2003, his program to 
recentralize the federation had reached its pitch, most notably affecting Muslim-majority 
regions such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan (not to forget Chechnya), ethnic republics 
which previously had considered themselves sovereign states. His message of 
konsolidatsiia was that Russia will become a united country, territorially and nationally. 
This political-territorial transformation, from decentralization to recentralization, 
lies at the heart of Tatarstan’s post-Soviet Islamic revival, as will be discussed in 
Chapters IV and V. Yet as this chapter shows, political-territorial conditions have long 
influenced the development of Islam in this part of the world. This chapter consists of 
three parts. Part one presents an overview of the territoriality of Islam in contemporary 
Russia, explaining how ethnicity and religion are intertwined and territorialized within 
the country’s complex federal system. Part two focuses on how both the form and 
function of Islam in the Middle Volga have been influenced by changing political-
territorial circumstances since the region was brought into the Russian Empire in the mid-
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sixteenth century. Part three looks as the political-territorial developments of post-Soviet 
Russia, with a special focus on Tatarstan. 
The Territoriality of Islam in Russia 
The increasing recognition of Russia as a Muslim country is part of a long-term 
demographic trend that will continue in the decades ahead. The ratio between Russia’s 
Orthodox Christian and Muslim populations in 1926 was 16 to 1; by the close of the 
twentieth century it was 10 to 1 (Kurbatova et al. 2002, 155). Projections for the 
foreseeable future indicate significant growth in favor of the latter, with Paul Goble, a 
specialist on ethnic and religious issues in Eurasia, going so far as to predict a Muslim-
majority Russia “in our lifetime” (RFERL 2006). Most observers reject Goble’s 
prognosis as alarmist, but Warhola and Lehning echo the consensus viewpoint in 
asserting that for the foreseeable future “the proportion of Muslims in the Russian 
Federation is almost certain to continue increasing” (Warhola and Lehning 2007, 937). 
Yet the challenge Russia faces in accommodating its Muslim community lies not 
in its numerical size. The real challenge relates to the manner in which religion and 
ethnicity are intertwined and territorialized within the county’s complex federal structure. 
First, it is important to recognize that, in the context of Russia, who is considered a 
Muslim – or an Orthodox Christian, for that matter – is not defined by rigorous adherence 
to religious rules, but instead is a question of self-identification that highly correlates to 
ethno-nationality, as it is understood in the context of Russia. Just as most ethnic 
Russians consider themselves to be Orthodox Christians, regardless of active religious 
observance or conviction, Tatars, Bashkirs, Chechens, and other cultural groups in Russia  
68 
 
 
 
consider themselves to be Muslims by fate of belonging to a nationality traditionally 
associated with Islam (see Table 1). As indicated in a recent poll, 90 percent of Russia’s 
citizenry who consider themselves to be Muslims do not attend mosques (cited 
Malashenko 2009, 321). 
Second, it is important to understand how ethno-national identity is territorialized 
within Russia’s federal structure. The Russian Federation is a hierarchy of 83 
administrative units that includes 21 republics, four autonomous okrugs, one autonomous 
Ethnic Group Population, 2002
Tatars 5,554,601
Bashkirs 1,673,389
Chechens 1,360,253
Avars 814,473
Kazakhs 653,962
Azeri 621,840
Kabards 519,958
Dargins 510,156
Kumyks 422,409
Ingush 413,016
Lezghins 411,535
Karachay 192,182
Laks 156,545
Adygey 128,528
Uzbeks 122,916
Tajks 120,136
Balkars 108,426
Table 1: Ethno-national groups traditionally 
associated with Islam in Russia with a population 
greater than 100,000 (source: Goskomstat 2002). 
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oblast, 46 oblasts, and nine krais (see Figure 1). Additionally, Moscow and St. 
Petersburg, as large cities with populations greater than most of the other constituent 
parts, form administrative units of their own. These units can be separated into two basic 
categories: (1) the ethnically defined republics and autonomous okrugs and (2) the non- 
ethnic oblasts and krais. The former, designated as the historic homelands of titular (i.e. 
non-Russian) populations, traditionally have enjoyed certain cultural privileges, such as 
native language rights and some attributes of quasi-statehood, including in the post- 
 
Figure 1: The Russian Federation is a hierarchy of 83 administrative units that 
includes republics, autonomous okrugs, oblasts, and krais (map by author). 
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Soviet era their own presidents, parliaments, constitutions, and flags. The latter, 
presumably inhabited almost exclusively by ethnic Russians, enjoy no special status.25 
The federal structure in Russia today, aptly called “ethnofederalism” by at least 
one observer (Leff 1999, 208), is a Soviet legacy. The Bolsheviks granted the country’s 
most important national minorities autonomous republics, which, while distinguishing 
them from the 15 union republics, were “designed to give Russia’s minorities a 
semblance of statehood” (Teague 1994, 26). The hierarchy of constituent units that was 
created after the 1917 revolution loosely mirrored the Marxist-Leninist conception of 
nationhood, which made a distinction between a “nation” (natsiia)26 and a “nationality” 
(natsional’nost’ or narodnost’). A nation was viewed by Bolshevik theoreticians as a 
more developed cultural entity than a nationality. Therefore nations warranted more self-
government (Stoliarov 2003, 62). 
The most important of the autonomous republics are those located in two areas, 
the Middle Volga Basin and the North Caucasus, which are designated as the historic 
homelands of Muslim national groups (see Figure 2). Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, 
combining to make the Middle Volga region Russia’s largest Muslim area, are  
                                                          
25 Although nationality is the deciding factor in establishing a unit’s status within the Russian 
Federation, it must be pointed out that ethnic Russians, who account for nearly 80 percent of the 
country’s total population, also form majorities in most of the republics. In fact, titular populations 
form majorities only in the Muslim republics of Ingushetia, Chechnya, and Tatarstan. Other non-
Muslim republics in which titular populations form majorities include Chuvashia, Tuva, and North 
Ossetia (Goskomstat 2002). In the republics of Karelia and Khakassia, for instance, the titular 
populations account for only about 10 percent of the total; the remaining inhabitants are 
overwhelmingly Russian. “Titular minorities,” as they have been called (Balzer, et al. 2001, 227), 
represent between one- and two-fifths of the total residents of eight other republics. In response to 
these glaring discrepancies, one observer has called the concern for ethnicity and culture on which 
these units were formed “sufficiently artificial as to be rendered meaningless” (Koehn, et al. 2001, 10). 
26 In 1913, Lenin charged Stalin with articulating the Bolsheviks’ conception of a nation, a formula 
that endured throughout the Soviet era and continues to influence policymakers and academicians in 
contemporary Russia. Stalin defined a nation as “a historically constituted, stable community of 
people, formed on a basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up 
manifested by a common culture” (Stalin 1953, 307). 
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recognized as the homelands of the Tatars and Bashkirs, closely related ethnic groups of 
Turkic heritage. The first Muslims to be brought into the Russian Empire in the mid-
sixteenth century, they traditionally are Sunni Muslims who follow the Hanafi madhhab 
(juridical school of Islamic thought). In the North Caucasus, which Russia began 
colonizing only in the late eighteenth century, six autonomous republics are recognized 
as the historic homelands of Muslim nationalities: Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, 
Figure 2: Russia’s autonomous republics historically associated 
with Muslim groups (map by author). 
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Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachai-Cherkessia, and Adygeia. While this bloc of republics 
claims fewer total Muslims than the Middle Volga area, the North Caucasus is host to far 
greater ethno-religious complexity. Dagestan alone is home to dozens of Muslim 
nationalities, none forming an outright majority, speaking an array of languages. Sunni 
Islam officially is most widespread in the North Caucasus, yet its ulema (Islamic juridical 
scholars) are divided between the Shafi and Hanafi madhhabs. There are also pockets of 
Shiites in the region, and Sufism is widely practiced throughout the North Caucasus, 
historically associated with the mountain peoples’ resistance to the Russian Empire 
(Makarov and Mukhametshin 2003, 134). But, again, Sufism in the North Caucasus is 
split into numerous tariqats (“brotherhoods”) that often correspond to clan or tribal 
loyalties. Islamic fundamentalism, generally ascribed to “Wahhabism” by Russian 
authorities and the press, has made far greater inroads, much more quickly, in the North 
Caucasus than in the Middle Volga region (Akhmadov et al. 2001; Ware et al. 2003). 
Edward Walker identifies a number of problems brought about by maps of Russia 
“highlighting the ethnic republics with titular nationalities that have traditionally 
embraced Islam,” saying “most obvious is the implication that Russia’s Muslims are 
relatively compactly settled” in their own ethnic republics (Walker 2005, 249-250). He 
points to the example of the Tatars. Although they form Russia’s second-largest ethnic 
group, with a total population of 5.6 million, less than half of all Tatars actually live in 
Tatarstan. Such cartography, Walker continues, also ignores the fact that several of the 
Muslim republics are inhabited by large numbers of non-Muslims. For example, almost 
three-fourths of the population of Adygeia, which is officially recognized as the 
homeland of its titular Muslim nationality, are non-Muslims. Additionally, an exclusive 
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focus on Russia’s Muslim homelands elides the fact that the federation is home to some 
two million representatives of ethnic groups traditionally associated with Islam who are 
not afforded their own titular republics (e.g. Azeris, Kazakhs, and other peoples of 
Central Asian heritage) and that major cities such as Moscow also play host to large 
Muslim populations. Instead, Walker suggests that a graduated system of mapping in 
which the proportion of Muslims is displayed for each of the country’s 83 territorial 
units, regardless of its status within the hierarchy of regions, provides a more accurate 
picture of Russia’s Muslim community (see Figure 3). 
 
 
Walker is factually correct in each of his assertions, which, taken together, give 
the impression that Russia’s Muslim republics were created ad hoc with little 
consideration for actual on-the-ground cultural patterns. His analysis, however, does not 
address their original raison d'être and continuing effects of their creation, a brief 
Figure 3: Map of Russia showing percentage of Muslims for each territorial unit (map 
by author; source: Goskomstat 2002). 
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discussion of which provides insight into the dynamic relationship between territory, 
nationality, and Islam in Russian history. Although the Bolsheviks cloaked their 
construction of the USSR’s ethno-federal territorial system in Wilsonian ideals of 
national self-determination, as Wixman and others (e.g. Pipes 1997; Bennigsen and 
Lemercier-Quelquejay 1967; Zenkovsky 1967) have argued, they created the ethnic 
republics within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) in no small 
part as a response to Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkic overtures that had surfaced among 
Russia’s Muslims with the fall of the Russian Empire. Nationalism and territory were 
used as part of the Soviet policy of razmezhevanie (“division”) “aimed at dividing the 
Moslems of the Russian Empire into smaller ethnic (national) groups, that would not pose 
a threat to the state, or regime” (Wixman 1986, 450). Territorial homelands, with a host 
of attendant institutions, were created to encourage national consciousness and in some 
cases even create nations that would weaken Islam as a unifying factor among the Soviet 
Muslims. This policy was used to divide what would have been much larger multiethnic, 
Muslim-dominated autonomous states within the Soviet Union in both the Volga-Ural 
and North Caucasus regions.27 
The policy of razmezhivanie further explains what appear as poorly drawn 
borders between the resultant ethnic territories. For example, the border between the 
Tatar and Bashkir autonomous republics left about one-quarter of all Tatars in the latter 
ethnic territory. This border divided and thereby reduced the numbers of Tatars, who 
                                                          
27 See Pipes (1997, 155-192) for an account of the formation of separate Tatar, Bashkir, and other 
autonomous ethnic republics in place of a previously envisioned single, much larger Volga-Ural 
autonomous state within the Soviet Union. See Wixman (1984, 135-169) for an account of how, beginning 
in 1921, national territories were created and institutionalized in the North Caucasus after the Bolsheviks 
dismantled the Muslim-dominated United Mountaineer Republic, formed in 1918, that unified most of the 
region. 
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were traditionally dominant in the region, in their own republic. In turn, the border 
diluted the proportion of Bashkirs in what was designated as their own homeland. Similar 
border-drawing strategies were employed in North Caucasus, for example, to break a 
larger Circassian people into three different nationalities in three separate territories: the 
Adygei of Adygeia, the Cherkess of Karachai-Cherkessia, and the Kabardin of 
Kabardino-Balkaria. 
 The institutionalization of nationality within these ethnic homelands was a 
temporary strategy that, amid official Soviet atheism, was eventually paired with de facto 
Russification policies. These policies were intended to contribute to a sblizhenie 
(“coming together”) and ultimately sliyanie (“merging”) of all national groups into a 
monolithic “Soviet people”(sovetskii narod) within a unitary Soviet polity (Hodnett 1967; 
Wixman 1986; see also Martin 2001b; Suny and Martin 2001). While this strategy 
contributed to a significant degree of Russification, mainly linguistic, and even 
Sovietization of targeted Muslim groups, the most salient effect has proved to be the 
strengthening and/or creation of national feeling – although uneven in intensity among 
the different republics, depending on a host of factors – concomitant with what Murphy 
terms a “sense of territory” (Murphy 2002, 197). The fall of the Soviet Union left 
Russia’s main Muslim groups with many of the accoutrements of statehood, within 
defined borders, providing a base of justification to launch nationalist movements in 
search of greater territorial autonomy, sovereignty, and, in the case of Chechnya, outright 
separatism in the newly formed Russian Federation. 
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 The Changing Shape of Tatar Islam in Tsarist and Soviet Russia 
“When, in 1552, Kazan was conquered and destroyed by the 
armies of Ivan IV, the very existence of its people as a different 
national, cultural, and religious entity was in danger. This danger 
was nowhere better illustrated than by Ivan IV’s own statement: 
‘Let the unbelievers receive the True God, the new subjects of 
Russia, and let them with us praise the Holy Trinity for ages unto 
ages’” (Rorlich 1986, 37). 
 Much research on Islam in the Middle Volga region reflects a nationalist 
predisposition that simplistically reduces religious politics to a struggle between empire 
and a minority ethno-confessional “nation” (Crews 2003, 54). For example, Rorlich 
contends that Muscovy’s conquest of Kazan was foremost driven by missionary zealotry 
that posed an existential threat to Tatar “national” culture. The empire’s goal of 
converting the Tatars to Orthodox Christianity, she contends, “remained unchanged until 
the Revolution” (Rorlich 1986, 38). Likewise, Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay 
frame the Tatars’ nineteenth-century religious reform movement as a response to Russian 
Orthodox hegemony, saying that “for centuries the Muslim community had been 
struggling for survival under the direct rule of the ‘infidels’” (Bennigsen and Lemercier-
Quelquejay 1967, 33). These and other theses (e.g. Devlet 1991; Zverev 2002) positing 
the empire’s perennial aim of converting its Muslim subjects (or, conversely, a colonized 
Muslim nation unified against infidel rule) too often rest upon an undo focus on isolated 
statements of ideology, as seen in Rorlich’s citation of Ivan IV (“the Terrible”) as 
evidence of the Russian Empire’s anti-Islamic, anti-Tatar policies. 
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Closer examination of actual state practice, as presented in more recent histories, 
reveals a more nuanced picture. Kappeler, for instance, argues that Moscow inherited the 
Golden Horde’s traditions of religious tolerance, a legacy that contributed to what he 
terms “pragmatic flexibility” vis-à-vis Muslims of the Middle Volga in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries (Kappeler 1994, 146). The Kremlin’s traditional tolerance, 
Kappeler contends, was vanquished with the top-down Westernization of Peter I (“the 
Great”), leading thenceforth to “early absolutism and Western intolerance of the non-
Christian world serving as models” (Ibid.). On the other hand, Werth argues that the 
empire’s confessional politics fluctuated throughout its history between periods of 
missionary activity of varying intensities and periods of varying levels of tolerance. 
These fluctuations, he says, “corresponded to changes of rulers and the overall 
imperatives facing the imperial government at the time” (Werth 2002, 18). Crews (2006) 
concurs and points to the nineteenth century as an especially auspicious period for the 
Tatars, when their religious leaders sought and received the active support of state 
officials in efforts to uphold preferred notions of Islamic piety in the region. This spirit of 
cooperation, Crews says, resulted from policies enacted by enlightened rulers and attests 
to “an imperial consciousness” having emerged among the Tatars (Crews 2003, 54). 
The attention to actual state practice by Kappeler, Werth, Crews, and other 
historians of religious politics in Russia and the Middle Volga region (see e.g. Geraci 
2001; Geraci and Khodarkovsky 2001) is a welcome counterweight to the nationalist 
teleology of previous efforts. Still one should be somewhat skeptical of the focus of this 
body of work on the influence of individual rulers in determining the shape of Islam in 
the region. Kappeler and Crews both discuss the Westernization set forth by Peter I, but 
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they draw different conclusions about its effects on Russia’s Muslims. Their diverging 
conclusions, at least in part, result from their ignoring territory and its relationship to 
identity as part of the modernization initiated in Petrine Russia. If one considers the form 
and function of Islam in the Middle Volga in relationship to the question of territory, a 
certain logic is added to the analysis of Kappeler and Crews without resorting to 
qualifiers such as “enlightened” or “autocratic” in providing explanation based on a 
single monarch’s relative impact. 
Islam in Pre-Territorial Middle Volga 
The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the period Kappeler identifies with 
Moscow’s policy of “pragmatic flexibility” vis-à-vis Islam, were part of a pre-territorial 
age. The Kazan Khanate, like Muscovy, had no defined borders. However, the Kazan 
citadel was similar to a Russian kremlin in that it formed the seat of state power, 
protected the realm’s most important temples, and was the area’s central site of religious 
learning – a guarantor of a certain “high Islam.” The official clergy of the Kazan Khanate 
adhered to the Hanifi madhhab of Sunni Islam, which was introduced to the region in 922 
in connection with trade and diplomatic relations with Baghdad (Garaeva 2006). 
Muscovy’s 1552 conquest of Kazan, resulting in all Muslims being forced from the city, 
most immediately affected the form and function of Islam in the region by relegating it to 
a rural faith lacking an educated clergy. Suddenly inhabitants of an Orthodox state, 
Muslims became classified as inorodsty (“aliens” or “others,” i.e. non-Orthodox). 
However, since most of the region’s Muslims were already rural (as was the case 
with rural Russians and Europeans at the time), they identified primarily with local 
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spatialities of social interaction. Also, much like Russian peasants who called themselves 
krestiane – “Christians” – Tatars self-identified as musul’mane – “Muslims.” It was not 
until the start of the twentieth century that Tatars actually began calling themselves 
“Tatars” (Khabutdinov 2008, 4).28 Muslim villages were, for all intents and purposes, 
self-ruled and independent of state institutions. At the head of villages were abyzes 
(“elders”), who were liaisons with Russian officials and, in the absence of a formal 
clergy, often served as clerics. Inshans, respected Sufi leaders, also played an important 
role in the social and spiritual life of Muslim villages (Yemelianova 2002, 40). In this 
period, following the loss of urban centers of religious learning, Islam in the region 
became an exclusively “folk” religion that with a mixture of local and ethnic traditions 
(Mukhametshin 2006a, 134).  
Periodic missionary activity of low intensity was carried out in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, but Orthodox conversions were only successful among the animist 
Finnic peoples in the region. Forced conversions of Tatars, creating the 
starokreshchennye (“old converts”), were largely failures. 29 They produced either revolts 
or quick apostasy, not surprising for a people who self-identified primarily as “Muslims” 
and were in no way institutionally integrated into society outside of their villages. 
Islam in the Middle Volga and the Empire’s March Toward Territory 
By the end of the seventeenth century, Moscow was the capital of by far the 
largest contiguous state in Europe. Yet, even a half century after Westphalia gave birth to 
                                                          
28 It is interesting to note that Russians and other non-Muslims referred to the Tatars, and non-Tatar 
Muslims as well, as “Tatars” in the imperial age. “Tatar” and “Muslim” were often synonyms. 
29 Muslim nobles, however, often voluntarily converted to Orthodoxy in order to maintain their privileges 
and enter the ranks of state service (Khakim 1998, 40). 
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the modern conception of territory in Western Europe (Elden 2010; forthcoming), Russia 
had no coherent territorial ordering of its vast lands and its leaders lacked any real 
knowledge of its shape, terrain, or resources. In short, Russians had no sense of territory. 
The Westernizing Tsar Peter I changed this situation. He attached imperiia to his state’s 
name, making it explicit that Russia was a now European power, and then started the 
process of transforming his empire into a Westphalian-like territory through the Cartesian 
arts of surveying, mapping, etc. Indicative of his new sense of territory and the 
importance Peter gave it as an expression of Russian power, he expanded the traditional 
demarcation of Europe and Asia from the Don River far out to the Ural Mountains 
(Sunderland 2007, 43). Orthodoxy was understood as European and Islam was seen as 
Asian in the Petrine weltanschauung. This reconfigured meta-geography, following the 
logic of the Westphalian principle cuis regio, eius religo, would have significant 
consequences for Muslims of the Middle Volga. 
In the drive to standardize territory and its inhabitants – to fulfill the rearranged 
meta-geography of European Russia – renewed missionary activity started under Peter’s 
watch. It greatly intensified in 1740 with the creation in Kazan of the Office for the 
Affairs of the New Converts (Kontora novokreshchenykh del). Over the next quarter 
century, this office converted more than 400,000 non-Christians in the Middle Volga 
(Werth 2002, 22).30 These converts to Orthodoxy became known as novokreshchennye 
(“newly baptized”). The office was also responsible for the physical destruction of 
                                                          
30 Werth explains that this was accomplished through a combination of force and incentives, such as 
exemption from military service and direct cash payments. This last incentive was added via a 1740 decree 
promising the non-Orthodox who became baptized “bronze crosses, shirts, caftans, footwear, and cash 
payments that varied on the convert’s age and sex” (Werth 2003, 552). Perhaps not surprisingly, Werth 
says, cash “was the single most important factor in drawing non-Russians to the baptismal font” (Ibid.).  
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hundreds of mosques in the region, thereby clearing the landscape of Islamic traces.31 
Many Muslims, in response to this pitched missionary spirit, revolted or fled into dense 
forests. Others migrated to freer Bashkir lands and even into Central Asian 
(Khodarkovsky 2001). 
Catherine II (“the Great”) pushed Russia into the age of what Sunderland terms 
“high territoriality” (Sunderland 2007, 45), taking particular interest in the concepts of 
province (guberniia) and population (which she ordered to be located and inventoried 
through surveys and questionnaires). To rationalize the two, she had the provincial 
borders drawn to match population distributions; each province was to contain 
approximately the same number of people (Ibid., 49). A critical step Catherine took in 
rationalizing the use of population was the enfranchisement of her non-Orthodox 
subjects. She forbid the Orthodox Church from engaging in conversion and then issued a 
1773 edict granting Muslims religious tolerance (Geraci and Khodarkovsky 2001, 6). 
This law permitted local authorities to make decisions on the construction of mosques, 
along with the mektebs (primary Islamic schools) and medresses (secondary Islamic 
schools) usually attached to them. The Empress followed this edict by creating the 
institution of the Muslim Spiritual Board in the city of Ufa in 1788. Roughly replicating 
the hierarchical administrative structure of the Orthodox Church, the Muslim Spiritual 
Board was established to register state-approved clergy and monitor all mosque activity 
in Middle Volga. The Hanifi madhhab was recognized as the region’s sole official form 
of Islam (Yemelianova 2002, 40). Medresses and mektebs, where Tatars traditionally 
received their education, were also placed under the Spiritual Board’s purview. 
                                                          
31 A 1744 government report informs that 418 of 536 mosques in the region were destroyed under the 
office’s watch (cited in Khodarkovsky 2001, 133). 
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The creation of the Muslim Spiritual Board enfranchised Muslims, but it also kept 
them institutionally segregated from non-Muslims. Muslims were spatially socialized, in 
worship, education, and many other social activities, within the institutional context of 
the Muslim Spiritual Board. This cultivated a group identity associated with and loyal to 
the state (worship included blessing the Tsar as a recognition of his sovereignty) and with 
other Muslims, but it encouraged no idea of nationhood outside of one’s confession. No 
institutions existed to socialize a people across religious lines. Crews is correct is 
asserting that the Tsarist state’s “commitment to ruling through religious practices and 
institutions and the policing of orthodoxy – the confessionalization of the population and 
empire – allowed the state to govern with less violence, and with a greater degree of 
consensus” (Crews 2006, 8). But this confessionalization of society, continuing more or 
less until the fall of the empire, maintained long-standing traditions of exclusion that, as 
we will see soon, certain Muslims would battle to overcome as they sought greater 
representation and participation within the institutions of the empire. 
The Empress’s religious politics were not driven by her devotion to 
Enlightenment ideals of human dignity, as some have suggested in discussing her edict 
on religious tolerance. Rather, her “legalization” of Islam was informed by a similar 
territorial logic that underpinned the mass conversions of non-Orthodox Christians earlier 
in the century. Her formulation of religion and territory was configured differently, 
though. Whereas the Petrine definition of European was Orthodox Christianity, Catherine 
equated European with Orthodoxy, be it Christian or Islamic. The Muslim Spiritual 
Board, a mechanism of state control over territory, institutionalized a preferred 
understanding of Islam in the Middle Volga. Although billed as the Hanafi madhhab, the 
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Islam that was governed by the Muslim Spiritual Board – and by extension the state – 
was in fact Orthodox Islam, meaning Russian in the territorial sense, above all loyal to 
the state. Catherine and her successors, as Crews (2003) explains, made an “Orthodoxy” 
of all religions in the empire and thereby built Russia into a confessional state. Because 
of the numbers of its faithful and its historical claims to the region, Islam commanded 
most intervention to ensure it remain Orthodox. 
 Catherine’s decree on religious tolerance, coupled with the creation of the Muslim 
Spiritual Board, was therefore what Russians call “a stick with two ends” for the Tatars. 
One end of the stick allowed them to build mosques and practice their religion. The other 
end determined, to a significant degree, the shape of their religion. Unofficial – 
“unorthodox” – Islamic practices were viewed with suspicion and often seen as a threat to 
the state. The new territoriality of Islam, the first example of the “state-centered 
construction of society” (Häkli 2001) for the Volga Muslims, severely disrupted the 
social and spiritual structures of local self-rule that had taken hold after 1552. Denied 
state sanctification, abyzes and inshans were sidelined as the guardians of Muslim 
tradition (Mukhametshin 2006a, 136). “Folk” Islam, mixed as it was with local and ethnic 
traditions, was decried by the state-approved clergy as being riddled with bid’ah (illicit 
innovation). The state became the ultimate arbiter in disputes among Muslims over the 
meaning of Islamic tradition in the empire, and the state ensured a significant degree of 
standardization of Islam in the Middle Volga. 
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Tatar Islam Meets Tatar Nationalism 
The religious freedoms implemented by Catherine opened the door to several 
waves of apostasy among the kreshchennye (“baptized”) Tatars, beginning in the early 
years of the nineteenth century and continuing until the mid-1860s. Non-Tatars in the 
region were also being drawn to Islam and, consequently, to the Tatar language that was 
the region’s lingua franca. Imperial officials responded by implementing new education 
policies that taught local populations in both Russian and their native languages. This 
bilingual education policy, known as the Il’minskii system (after its founder N.I. 
Il’minskii), simultaneously aimed to Christianize local populations and weaken Tatar 
influence in the region (Werth 2000). As Lazzerini informs, “Crucial to all of this was an 
appropriate representation of Islam … a critique of magometanstvo in its mid-nineteenth 
century circumstances” (Lazzerini 1994, 38), meaning the faith’s comparative 
“backwardness” vis-à-vis Christianity. Il’minskii was challenged by other state officials, 
who were anxious his program would promote nationalism among non-Russians. He 
responded to his detractors: 
If from fear of separate nationalities, we do not allow the non-Russians to 
use their language in schools and churches, on a sufficient scale to ensure 
a solid, complete, convinced adoption of the Christian faith, then all non-
Russians will be fused into a single race by language and faith – the Tatar 
and Mohammedan. But if we allow the non-Russian languages, then, even 
if their individual nationalities are thus maintained, these will be diverse, 
small, ill-disposed to the Tatars, and united with the Russian people by the 
unity of their faith. Choose! But I believe that such diverse nationalities 
cannot have any solid existence, and in the end the very historical 
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movement of life will cause them to fuse with the Russian people (quoted 
in Rorlich 1986, 46). 
The Il’minskii system that was implemented in the 1870s, influenced by Western 
European ideas of nationalism that were at that time the force behind the creation of 
Germany and Italy, introduced ideas related to nation and nationality to the Middle 
Volga, where religion previously was the primary foundation of group identity. The 
Il’minskii system led to the development and/or promotion of the Chuvash, Mari, 
Udmurt, and Komi literary languages.32 The simultaneous Russification (religious) and 
nationalization (linguistic) of local populations, combined with the increasing presence of 
Russians in the Middle Volga,33 in turn forged a Tatar national consciousness. Tatarism 
found its earliest articulation in a religious reform movement known as Jadidism (from 
Arabic for “new way”). Although Jadidism at first was a critique of the outdated teaching 
methods and curriculums of the area’s traditional mektebs, the Kazan-based intellectuals 
who formed the movement’s core in the Middle Volga were at the forefront of defining 
the Tatar nation and its place in the Russian Empire.  
An early Jadidist was a cleric named Marjani (1818-1889), who developed what 
is perhaps the first modern history of the Tatar nation. He traced the Tatar nation back to 
the Hunnic Bolgar Kingdom of the Middle Volga that arose in the eighth century, 
accepting Islam as the realm’s official religion in 922. His version of Tatar national 
history also claimed the legacies of both the Golden Horde and the Kazan Khanate. This 
                                                          
32 Lallukka (2003, 144-151) offers an informative analysis of the Il’minskii education program and its 
effects on the Mari, a Finnic people endemic to the Middle Volga region. 
33 According to Russia’s 1857 census, Russians accounted for 42 percent of Kazan’s population. In other 
provinces in the region, they formed majorities: 81 percent in Viatka, 72 percent in Simbirsk, and 53 
percent in Orenburg (cited in Werth 2002, 18). 
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interpretation of Tatar national history is dominant among Tatars even today. He was first 
and most forceful in urging his people to call themselves “Tatars” instead of “Muslims,” 
asking them, “If you are not a Tatar, an Arab, Tajik, Nogay, Chinese, Russian, French, … 
then, who are you?” (quoted in Rorlich 1994, 63). Although a member of clergy himself, 
Marjani, like European nationalist historians of the nineteenth century, emphasized the 
role of language in shaping and preserving the nation. Islam remained vital to the nation, 
but, because the religion was shared with other nations throughout the world, language 
became the basis of Tatarism. Islam beyond the Middle Volga, the worldwide umma, was 
of only a peripheral concern to the Tatar Jadidists. 
Jadidists were active in many parts of the empire, among many different Muslim 
groups. Their ideas of nationhood and political goals, often at odds, were shaped by their 
local contexts. Some espoused Pan-Turkic ideas, while other talked of Pan-Islamism. 
Most saw their future within Russia. The Kazan-based Jadidists, however, generally 
rejected ideas of Pan-Turkism or Pan-Islamism (Kappeler 2001, 236). Their focus was 
the development and modernization of the Tatar nation within Middle Volga. Most of the 
prominent Volga Jadidists, Yemelianova informs, were united in the “belief in the 
political integrity of the Russian state as the precondition for the national prosperity of 
Russia’s Muslims” (Yemelianova 2002, 80). For them, Russia was Europe and therefore 
a transmitter of modernity. Appreciative of the historically tolerant interaction between 
the Tatars and Russians, they saw knowledge of the Russian language as critical to their 
social and economic development. Their goal was greater participation and representation 
for the Tatar nation in the social and institutional life of the empire (Crews 2003, 50). 
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Limiting the Tatars’ national development, the Jadidists claimed, were the 
outdated Islamic doctrines and practices enforced by the conservative Kadimists who 
filled the ranks of the Muslim Spiritual Board. Specifically, they opposed the rote 
memorization of Arabic and Persian texts and blind fealty to the Hanafi madhhab (see 
generally Khakim 2010). The Jadidists insisted the gates of ijtihad (independent 
interpretation of the Koran and Sunnah) remain open and that Muslims should return to 
the Koran and reinterpret the text with a consideration of their geographical context and 
place in time. The Tatar Jadidists called for religious texts to be translated into Tatar, 
which they had made into a standardized literary language, and advocated the 
introduction of secular subjects, especially Russian, to the curriculum of mektebs and 
medresses. The Kadimists rejected all these ideas. They saw their political future firmly 
within Russia, acknowledged the mutual tolerance between Russians and Tatars, and 
were grateful to the Tsar. They nonetheless feared that the study of Russian, greater 
societal integration with non-Muslims, and religious reform would lead to their cultural 
Russification and destruction of their Islamic way of life (Dyudyan’on 1997; 
Yemelianova 1997). The Kadimists appreciated the semi-detached existence that was 
safeguarded by the state-supported Muslim Spiritual Board based in Ufa. 
Jadidism in many ways might seem similar to the salafiya movement in which 
Islamic reformers/modernizers such as al-Afghani were involved at about the same time, 
as some have pointed out (e.g. Yemelianova 2002, 76). The movements are similar in the 
rejection of madhhabs and returning to the primary text for independent interpretation. 
But the Tatar Jadidists were conditioned by a different political-territorial context and 
therefore part ways with the likes of al-Afghani. Jadidism arose not as a reaction against 
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the empire, but as a movement for greater participation and representation within the 
empire. Their drive to modernize Islam was foremost a program to develop the Tatar 
nation, not an effort to adapt modernity to Islam. For the Jadidists, modernity was a 
universal phenomenon coming from Europe – and for them Russia was European – not a 
phenomenon to be resisted, but rather a phenomenon to be integrated. A comparison 
more apt than al-Afghani might be Martin Luther (and Marjani has often been compared 
to Luther), whose demand the Bible be printed in the language of the people undermined 
the power of the backward-looking guardians of faith and society. 
Collapse and Reconstruction 
In the aftermath of the Tsarist Empire’s collapse in 1917, the Kadimists 
straightaway dismissed the Bolsheviks’ enticements of territorial autonomy. They 
advocated a return of the monarchy and even fought on the side of the Whites, seeing the 
Tsar as the only guarantor of stability and peace between the religions (Yemelianova 
2002, 99). There appears to have been no overwhelming desire among a significant 
amount of Tatars for territorial autonomy, not to mention independence. While a real 
national sense had developed among some groups of the Tatars, notably those like the 
Jadidists, there had been no institutions within the Tsarist Empire set up to reinforce a 
sense of territory at the sub-state level. Up until the collapse, most of the Jadidists sought 
greater access within the empire, not opt-out solutions (Mikesell and Murphy 1991). For 
instance, a primary goal of Ittafak (“Alliance”), a Jadidist-led Muslim political party that 
formed after the 1905 revolution, was securing “democracy and civil and equal religious 
rights for Muslims” within the empire (Kappeler 2001, 337). Even after the collapse, the 
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majority moderate wing of the Jadidists only sought cultural autonomy within a unitary 
Russia. In light of this ambivalence, it seems reasonable to agree with Crews’ assertion 
that a “realm of an imperial consciousness” (Crews 2003, 54) – a sense of imperial 
territory – had developed among the Muslims of the Middle Volga. In short, after the fall 
of the monarchy, nobody was invoking the injustices of 1552 to rally people around the 
idea of reconstructing the Kazan Khanate; that would happen much later in the twentieth 
century for reasons related to the territorial reconfiguration of empire. 
In the fight to reconfigure a post-Tsarist Russia, some Muslims discussed a Pan-
Turkic state, while others discussed a Pan-Islamic formation. Proponents of these 
approaches, however, were marginal voices. Accusations (usually false or exaggerated) 
of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism in the Russian context, with its historical Orthodoxy of 
confessions, have long been ploys to discredit an opponent or mobilize authorities against 
any enemy (Crews 2006, 300-316). A territorial project with real potential took force 
when groups of Tatar and Bashkir nationalists joined ranks and campaigned for the 
formation of an Idel34-Ural state that would have united the Middle Volga’s various 
Turkic peoples inside an ethno-federal Soviet Russia and within which the Tatar tongue 
would have been the lingua franca. The Tatar-Bashkir national leaders formed a 
government and in January 1918 drafted and adopted a constitution. While initially 
indicating support for the Idel-Ural state, Lenin and Stalin ultimately changed course and 
carved the Middle Volga region into several ethnic homelands (see Figure 4), including  
                                                          
34 Idel is Tatar for Volga. 
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those for the Mari, Mordovians, Chuvash, and the Udmurt – peoples who previously 
expressed no territorial aspirations.35 
                                                          
35 The creation of the various ethnic homelands in many ways appears to be an updated version of the 
Il’minskii system that had Christianized people through their linguistic nationalization, with the main goals 
being to undermine Islam and Tatarism in the Middle Volga and reconstruct the Russian Empire (only this 
time, the Bolsheviks added territory to nationalism with similar goals). Indeed, for much of the Soviet era, 
variations of the divide-and-conquer argument were put forth and formed a dominant stream of thought in 
the study of Soviet nationalities policies (see e.g. Pipes 1997 [1954]; Bennigson and Lemercier-Quelquejay 
1967; Bennigson and Wimbush 1986; Rorlich 1986; Wixman 1986). However, some basic assumptions of 
the divide-and-conquer thesis have been challenged in more recent investigations that draw on archival 
documents and other primary-source data previously unavailable to researchers (see especially Martin 
2001b; Suny and Martin 2001; Suny 2001). While more recent studies generally recognize that the baseline 
goal behind the creation of the ethnic homelands in the Middle Volga, and other parts of the USSR, was 
“preserv[ing] the territorial integrity of the old Russian Empire and enabl[ing] the construction of a new 
centralized, socialist state” (Martin 2001b, 67), newer research complicates notions that the Bolsheviks’ 
division of the Tatar-Bashkir lands was motivated foremost by the same concerns held by the Tsarist-era 
officials (such as Il’minskskii) who feared Tatar assimilation and Islamization of neighboring peoples. 
Shafer, for instance, draws on extensive archival work to show that the birth of the Republic of 
Figure 4: Ethnic homelands of the Middle Volga region created by the 
Bolsheviks (map by author). 
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In creating the Tatar, Bashkir, and other Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics 
(ASSRs) within Russia, Lenin and Stalin intended to harness the mobilization force of 
nationalism by giving various non-Russian peoples certain “forms of nationhood” 
(Martin 2001b, 3). With the formation of the ASSRs, the Bolsheviks implemented the 
policy of korenizatsiia (“indigenization”), giving unprecedented support to new 
educational and cultural institutions that promoted the ethno-national development of the 
titular groups of the ethnic autonomies. For instance, in the 1920s the Tatars were 
permitted to convert their language from its original Arabic script into a Latin-based 
script, a move that echoed the modernizing vision of the Young Turks in Istanbul.  
Moreover, the Tatar language was given preference over Russian in schools and 
governmental environs of the Tatar ASSR. The policy of korenizatsiia also led to the 
development of national elites who were trained and promoted into leadership positions 
in the government, communist party, educational centers, and industry of each ASSR 
(Brubaker 1996, 23-54). The overriding goal of korenizatsiia was to cultivate Soviet 
national cultures that, in Stalin’s famous formulation, were “national in form, socialist in 
content” (Stalin 1934, 158). The fact that Stalin never sufficiently elaborated on this 
formulation, according to the historian Terry Martin, was intentional, since “Bolshevik 
plans for the social transformation of the country did not allow for any fundamentally 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Bashkortostan in 1919-20 likely did not result from careful, long-term planning intended to stem Tatar 
hegemony in the region, but instead appears to be a case of “improvisation” amid the chaos of the civil war 
(Shafer 2001, 171). The declarations of the Idel-Ural state and then separate ethnic homelands, he argues, 
did indeed represent a policy of divide et impera; however, the enemy that Lenin and Stalin sought to 
divide was not a Tatar-dominated Turko-Islamic nation-in-becoming, but rather the enemy was the more 
immediate threat of the anti-Bolshevik movement as a whole. While Shafer and other researchers in the 
post-Soviet era have challenged some basic assumptions of the previously held divide-and-conquer thesis, 
they have not satisfactorily considered the logic of territory. Notably, none has, in my reading, addressed 
the issue of the “poorly” drawn borders that weakened Tatar influence in the region and diluted Bashkir 
influence within their own autonomous republic. 
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distinctive religious, legal, ideological, or customary features” (Martin 2001a, 74). 
Although the ASSRs were created as part of a de jure multinational federation, de facto 
all decision-making powers were concentrated in Moscow. The “national form” of the 
ethnic autonomies above all was intended to avoid the impression that Soviet Russia was 
an empire and thereby contribute to USSR’s political-territorial integration and 
centralization (Brubaker 1996; Martin 2001b). 
By the 1930s it was becoming apparent to Stalin that the policy of korenizatsiia 
was “leading to the nationalization of Bolshevism, rather than the Bolshevization of 
nationals” (Suny 2001, 12). In a bid to counteract this trend, Russian was made a 
compulsory subject in all non-Russian schools in 1938,36 and the following year Stalin 
forced upon the Tatars a Cyrillic script in the name of “internationalism.” The Tatars 
were also promised religious freedoms after the creation of their namesake ASSR, but 
those rights, too, were revoked in the 1930s as the Soviet authorities instituted and 
executed a policy of “militant atheism.” For much of the existence of the Soviet Union, 
Islam once again became, for the most part, something akin to the “folk” religion that 
took hold after 1552, practiced in secret or led by untrained, semiliterate clergy who 
could only carry out basic rituals (Usmanova 2010, 46-47). Thus, the Tatars, along with 
                                                          
36 The historian Peter Blitstein contends that the “intent” of the 1938 law decreeing mandatory study of 
Russian was not linguistic or cultural Russification, but rather was aimed at strengthening Russian as the 
lingua franca of the USSR (Blitstein 2001). He points out that the law did not eliminate native-language 
education. Indeed, the requirement that titular nationals attend native-language schools remain in place 
until 1958,when, he points out, non-Russians were given the “choice” to educate their children in Russian 
rather than in their native languages. Whereas the Stalin-era native-language requirement acted as a brake 
against linguistic Russification, he continues, the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras witnessed great numbers 
of non-Russian parents “choosing” to send their children to Russian schools. On the face of it, the explicit 
“intent” of Russian-language education indeed may not have been linguistic and cultural Russification, and 
non-Russians may have “chosen” to send their children to Russian schools. However, this line of 
argumentation ignores the fact that the ASSRs enjoyed no real territorial autonomy. The national elites had 
no power to create conditions conducive to the development of non-Russian languages. The shift toward 
greater de facto Russification in the USSR, Blitstein’s analysis fails to consider, follows the territorial logic 
of the modern nation-state. 
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other titular nationals of ASSRs, were subject to what Kappeler aptly terms “the 
simultaneity and interdependence of nation building and nation destroying” for the 
duration of the USSR (Kappeler 2004, 245). Territorialized institutions that were 
previously employed to nationalize the Tatars, such as schools and government, became 
vessels through which de facto Russification took place. Yet the ASSRs de jure remained 
nationally defined territorial entitities, contributing to what Suny calls an “indigenization 
from below” (Suny 2001, 16) – nation-building that continued out of inertia within the 
territorially defined institutions – which became apparent in the 1970s and grew in 
strength up until the fall of the USSR.  
With the fall of the Soviet Union, the previously existing institutions of the Tatar 
ASSR were reimpowered to counter the previous decades of Russification. In essence, a 
new policy of korenizatsiia – this time controlled by the Kazan-based Tatar political elite 
itself – was implemented. Many prerevolutionary institutions were given renewed 
powers. One of them is the Muslim Spiritual Board. The dispute between Jadidists and 
Kadimists has also resurfaced, playing out through new institutions and in a different 
political-territorial context. Before examining these revived institutions and disputes, it is 
useful to look at the territorial-political context that has unfolded since the demise of the 
Soviet Union. 
The Changing Political-Territorial Context of Post-Soviet Russia 
Russia has undergone a dramatic political-territorial transformation over the past 
two decades. Considering the examination provided above, it is not surprising that these 
changing political-geographical circumstances have continued to influence the form and 
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function of Islam in Tatarstan (as well as other places in post-Soviet Russia), as I will 
make the case in Chapters IV and V. Before turning to analysis of Tatarstan’s post-Soviet 
Islamic revival, however, it is necessary to provide a general overview of the shifting 
political-territorial conditions in Russia over the past two decades. A special emphasis 
will be given to how Tatarstan has factored into changing political geography of the post-
Soviet Russian Federation. 
In the 1990s, many observers anticipated that the multiethnic Russian Federation 
in its democratic transition would go the way of the multiethnic Soviet Union. Even 
before the official demise of the USSR in December 1991, all 20 of Russia’s ethnic 
republics had declared their sovereignty and for the remainder of the decade they pushed 
for varying degrees of territorial autonomy, including, in the case of Chechnya, all-out 
independence. Yet, with the start of the new millennium, the federal center managed to 
reverse these centrifugal forces and has subsequently restored a high degree of 
centralization over the federation. The purpose of this section is to provide an overview 
and examination of this changing political-territorial context with a particular focus on 
interactions in Tatarstan, which has been a central player in events and processes 
affecting post-Soviet Russia’s political-territorial transition. 
Russia’s Parade of Sovereignties 
In June 1990, with the “parade of sovereignties” marching through the union 
republics, Boris Yeltsin declared Russia’s independence from the Soviet Union. Two 
months later, to gain support in his political battle against Mikhail Gorbachev, Yeltsin 
traveled to Kazan where he urged the political leadership of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet 
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Socialist Republic (TASSR) to “take all the sovereignty you can possibly swallow.” He 
followed this command with a pledge to “welcome whatever independence the Tatar 
ASSR chooses … If you want to govern yourself completely, go ahead” (quoted in 
Bukharaev 1999, 97). Accepting the challenge, the Tatar ASSR parliament proclaimed 
the territory a “sovereign, democratic state” on August 30, 1990, renaming it the 
Republic of Tatarstan. With this, Tatarstan set off a cascade of sovereignty declarations 
in all of the other 19 ethnic republics of what was still officially the Russian Soviet 
Federative Socialist Republic. 
Yeltsin was strategic in issuing his famous challenge in Kazan. For months prior 
to his arrival, the parliament of the Tatar ASSR had been seeking an elevation in status 
within the USSR, from that of an autonomous republic to that of a union republic 
(Slocum 1999, 54). Aspirations included greater recognition and access within the Soviet 
polity itself. As I have argued elsewhere (Derrick 2008), the republic most likely did not 
seek sovereignty as it is understood in international law, i.e. independence. It strove for 
greater territorial autonomy within an accommodating federal structure. The republic 
already possessed a de jure autonomous status in the USSR, which should have allowed 
its citizens certain privileges, such as native language rights, but autonomy proved to be a 
legal phantom as Moscow managed a de facto unitary state. Aiming to assume a 
meaningful degree of control over the territory designated as their historic homeland, the 
Tatars were compelled to pursue the next category in the spectrum of autonomy: 
sovereignty. Once sovereignty was introduced into the political discourse and spread to 
the other republics, the legal definition of the concept became obfuscated by the symbolic 
power it obtained in the context of an autocratic state that was quickly crumbling. 
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When Yeltsin assumed the Russian presidency in June 1991, he was forced to 
deal with the specter of separatism that, with his urging, had emerged as the Soviet Union 
was in deep crisis. The 20 self-declared sovereign republics, however, did not necessarily 
seek independence (Chuman 2011, 134). Rather, as was the case with Tatarstan earlier, 
their primary goals included expanded powers within the territories designated as their 
historic homelands. The first step Yeltsin took in his negotiations with the ethnic 
republics was to issue a March 1993 Federation Treaty that recognized them as 
“sovereign governments.” As such, the treaty granted the ethnic republics greater power 
than the non-republics (i.e. oblasts, krais, autonomous okrugs, and autonomous oblasts) 
in their relations with the federal center. However, the December 1993 Federal 
Constitution excluded this power prioritization – all regions would be equal in their 
power vis-à-vis the center, although the ethnic republics maintained privileges originally 
promised in the 1993 Federation Treaty, such as the right to their own constitution, 
national language, and president. For the most part, this territorial arrangement replicated 
the Soviet model, giving the ethnic republics some outward attributes of statehood, but 
maintaining the legal equality of all regions in their relations with Moscow. 
All but two of the ethnic republics signed the 1993 Federation Treaty. In signing 
the treaty, they thereby forfeited claims to sovereignty. Tatarstan and Chechnya were the 
two republics that refused to sign the Federation Treaty. Their rejection of the treaty, 
according to geographer Robert Kaiser, signaled “intent to secede from Russia” (Kaiser 
1994, 356). Chechnya in no uncertain terms was intent on seceding, going to war with 
Moscow a year after opting out from the treaty. Tatarstan took a more pragmatic course. 
An important step was holding a republic-wide referendum in 1992 in which a clear 
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majority of the population agreed that Tatarstan should be sovereign.37 This status was 
subsequently codified in the republic’s constitution, which stated that Tatarstan “shall be 
a Sovereign State, subject to international law, associated with the Russian Federation.” 
Constitutionally sovereign, yet still “associated” with Russia, the Tatars left enough 
ambiguity not to be accused of all-out separatism (see generally Graney 2001). 
In refusing to sign the 1993 Federation Treaty, Tatarstan presented a twofold 
justification. First, the republic’s political leadership framed its refusal to sign the treaty 
in legal terms, saying it was constitutionally prohibited for Tatarstan as a sovereign state 
to enter a treaty on unequal terms. And, second, the Tatar leadership cited democratic 
reasons for opting out of the treaty, claiming Tatarstan’s sovereignty reflected the will of 
the people. At this point, considering the case made by republic’s political leadership, it 
is important to see how sovereignty was justified by Tatarstan.  
Legitimating Territorial Claims 
In constructing its regime of territorial legitimation, the political leadership of 
Tatarstan interwove two justification discourses. The first was based on the Tatars’ 
historical claims to territory38 and concerns for national culture. The political leadership 
drew on the national history first developed by Marjani and claimed the legacy of Volga 
Bolgaria, the Golden Horde, and the Kazan Khanate. Muscovy’s 1552 defeat of Kazan, 
                                                          
37 The full question they were asked was, “Do you consider that the Republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign 
state, a subject of international law, entitled to develop relations with the Russian Federation and other 
states on the basis of treaties among equal partners?” With a voter turnout of 82 percent, 61.4 percent 
answered “yes,” while 37.2 percent said “no” (Slocum 1999, 55). This margin indicates that a significant 
number of ethnic Russians in Tatarstan were in favor of sovereignty. 
38 Such historical arguments, as Murphy (1990; 2002) discusses, are the most commonly cited 
justifications for territorial claims. For example, the Greeks invoke ancient mythology and Homer’s 
writing to justify their claim to Cyprus. Iran, Turkey, China, Egypt, and several other countries 
employ similar discourses in support of their various territorial claims. 
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signaling the beginning of Russia as a multiethnic empire (Kappeler 2001, 14), was 
framed as a historical injustice that led to centuries of forced assimilation. Linguistic 
Russification, not religious, was the Tatars’ primary concern. Russification policies had 
nearly decimated the Tatar language as an urban tongue. By the perestroika era Tatar was 
abandoned in governmental environs and virtually untaught in city schools.39 With their 
native language disappearing, national leaders voiced fears of “ethnic disappearance” 
(Khasanov 2000, 14) without the protection of their own state.40 
 The ethno-nationalist discourse, however, was constrained by demographics. 
First, less than one-third of all Tatars live in Tatarstan (although about two-thirds of all 
Tatars live within the Middle Volga region). Second, Russians account for about 40 
percent of the republic’s population (Tatars make up just over half of the population) 
(Goskomstat 2002). These demographic constraints informed a secondary justification 
discourse that accentuated Tatarstan’s dedication to civic multiculturalism. The republic’s 
1992 constitution justified sovereignty in the name “of the entire multiethnic people of 
the republic.” Prominent politicians invariably addressed the “multinational Tatarstani 
people” (mnogonatsional’nyi tatarstanskii narod) in an effort to cultivate a unified 
supranational identity and state nationalism (see generally Graney 2007). The republic’s 
stated devotion to civic multiculturalism was reflected in a constitution promising equal 
                                                          
39 As Musina writes, by the late 1980s, “just one Tatar school was functioning in the capital of 
Tatarstan. Tatars’ level of knowledge of their native language declined. The use of two (Tatar and 
Russian) languages became dominant in the domestic sphere of urban Tatars. Bilingualism, the 
declared objective and achievement of state policy, turned out to be a one-sided practice” (Musina 
2004, 81). 
40 According to Gorenburg, “The fear of continuing language shift [i.e. Russification – MD] was one of the 
main mobilizing factors in the nationalist movements that developed in virtually all ethnic regions of the 
Soviet Union in the late 1980s” (Gorenburg 2003, 1). This was particularly true in Tatarstan. 
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protection of all national cultures and establishing both Tatar and Russian as official state 
languages.  
However, there existed “an in-built contradiction in the idea of Tatarstan as both a 
Tatar republic and a multiethnic one” (Davis, et al. 2000, 219). The question was posed, 
how can the state claim first and foremost to represent the Tatar nation (tatarskaia 
natsiia), defend and develop its culture, while ensuring the equal rights of all the 
Tatarstani people (tatarstanskii narod)? 
Economic enticements smoothed over this apparent contradiction. During the 
Soviet era 2.5 billion tons of oil were extracted from Tatarstan, which Moscow sold 
abroad for an estimated $257 billion. Yet out of that sum only 2 percent of the wealth was 
returned to the republic (Iakupova 2001, 8). Leading Tatar politicians promised that a 
sovereign Tatarstan would retain its oil dollars, reconstruct the republic’s infrastructure, 
and maintain maximum employment. Thus, the “classical … accusation that the centre is 
responsible for socioeconomic problems” was a strong incentive to persuade Tatarstan’s 
Russians to join the Tatars in supporting sovereignty (Stepanov 2000, 323). These 
material considerations are commonly cited as the deciding factor in the 1992 referendum 
in which more than 60 percent of the voting republic – indicating support from both 
ethnic groups – agreed that Tatatarstan should be sovereign. 
Just as important, the political leadership emphasized that they did not equate 
sovereignty with separatism. The 1992 referendum promised that a sovereign Tatarstan 
would remain part of the Russian Federation. After the referendum’s passage Tatarstan’s 
President Mintimer Shaimiev repeated his commitment to remaining part of the country:  
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We do not intend to split up with Russia … Let’s remember the 
geopolitical place of Tatarstan and the economic ties with Russia. And 
because we have lived together for centuries, we are connected by spiritual 
bonds (quoted in Mukhmetshin and Ageeva 2000, 337). 
Addressing pragmatic concerns of geographic location and important questions of 
identity, such statements had a reassuring effect on the republic’s Russians and Tatars, 
both of whom feared being cut off from Russia. Shaimiev’s statement also indicates the 
confused understanding of sovereignty that was part of the political discourse of Russia 
in the 1990s. However, Tatarstan’s “sovereignty project” (see generally Graney 2009) 
allowed it to approach Moscow on equal terms. 
The Era of Power-Sharing Agreements 
Tatarstan insisted that it was a sovereign state. Having refused to sign the 
Federation Treaty, Kazan was able to leverage its position vis-à-vis a severely weakened 
center to negotiate a 1994 bilateral treaty in which Moscow tacitly acknowledged the 
republic’s sovereignty, recognizing Tatarstan as a “state united with the Russian 
Federation.” According to the terms of the treaty, the republic assumed most powers 
normally afforded to independent states, including the right to control its borders (which 
Tatarstan never showed an interest in doing) and broad rights in developing its own 
foreign policy and foreign trade relations independent of Moscow (Sharafutdinova 2003). 
The treaty stipulated that, when inconsistent, the republic’s laws take precedence over 
federal laws, and thenceforth legal and other relations would be conducted on a treaty 
basis, as equals. The treaty also gave Tatarstan exclusive rights over its gas and oil, 100 
percent of taxes from vodka and other spirits, and 50 percent of sales and income taxes. 
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This arrangement allowed Kazan to keep about three-fourths of its tax revenues and send 
the remainder to Moscow – the inverse what it had been in the Soviet era (Derrick 2009a, 
53). 
Kazan considered the 1994 treaty its coup de grace in its aspirations to establish 
state-to-state relations with Russia. Shaimiev called the treaty “the ideology of our 
republic” (quoted in Derrick 2008, 76). The clause “united with” ultimately left the 
nature of the relationship unresolved. Moscow interpreted that clause to mean the 
republic had given up its sovereignty claim, and some of the more vociferous nationalists 
in Tatarstan, according to Slocum, accused Shaimiev of “betraying the cause of 
independence” (Slocum 1999, 56). But nowhere in the treaty or the republic’s 
constitution was Tatarstan referred to a as a member of the Russian Federation. The 
strategic ambiguity of the pact brought to a close an extremely tense period of 
confrontation between Kazan and Moscow. As one observer noted, “the bilateral treaty 
between Tatarstan and Russia … saved Tatarstan from eventual bloodshed and all-out 
civil war” (Bukharaev 1999, 100). 
In signing the 1994 bilateral treaty with Moscow, Tatarstan set off another 
cascade. By the close of 1998, Moscow would sign power-sharing agreements with 46 
regions of the Russian Federation. Each pact devolved different powers of varying 
degrees. The bilateral treaties can be split into two eras. In the first set of power-sharing 
agreements, beginning with Tatarstan and then with six other strong ethnic republics in 
the years 1994-96, Moscow sacrificed most power, conferring these units with 
unprecedented freedoms. Tatarstan, having attained the greatest degree of autonomy, 
became a “quasi-independent nation state” (Stepanov 2000, 315). The treaties signed 
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after 1996 devolved much less power, but the overall effect of the power-sharing 
agreements was to create differences in power between the regions and force Moscow to 
work with the regions on broadly diverging sets of terms (see generally Chuman 2011). 
From the original sovereignty declarations of 1990 to the time the final treaties 
were signed in 1998, Russia was transformed from a highly centralized, hierarchical 
empire to a highly decentralized and, moreover, highly asymmetrical federation. The 
bilateral treaties constrained and complicated central coordination of an already 
hierarchical federation of 89 territorial subjects. However, in giving the regions 
unprecedented degrees of power, the Kremlin managed to mute the threat of separatism 
(except, of course, in Chechnya) and maintain, if somewhat tenuously, the territorial 
integrity of Russia; this was a temporary strategy that ultimately worked. 
Russia’s political-territorial transformation in the 1990s was accompanied by a 
transformation in identity. The Soviet identity, however ephemeral, provided a 
supranational identity that helped transcend traditional ethnic ones. Deprived of this 
supranational category, cultural groups formerly calling themselves “Soviet people” 
(sovetskie liudi), were impelled to “define themselves anew in largely ethnic-national 
terms, because there was little else upon which to rebuild political identity” (Agnew 
2002a, 93). This was the result of the ways in which ethno-national identity had been 
institutionalized within the sub-state territorial homelands created by the Bolsheviks. 
Soviet authorities in turn never encouraged an all-Russian (rossiiskii) identity aside from 
an ethnic Russian (russkii) identity, i.e. Russification (Hosking 1998). 
Yeltsin made an attempt, though, to construct a post-Soviet political identity. In 
1996, he commissioned a group to develop and to define an “all-Russian, common-
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national idea” (rossiiskaia, obshchenatsional’naia ideia) upon which to build a new all-
Russian identity. The group conducted a large survey questionnaire to measure society’s 
values and aspirations. The results revealed the difficulty Russia confronted in cultivating 
a post-Soviet supranational identity. About half of the respondents sought a democratic 
future defined by individual responsibility, while the other half called for authoritarian 
rule (“the firm hands of a strong leader,” “strong and strict power,” “a leader who can 
make people follow him”) (quoted in Billington 2004, 98). Yeltsin soon abandoned the 
project, emblematic of what Suny, writing in the late 1990s, termed post-Soviet Russia’s 
“chronic failure to construct an identity” (Suny 1999, 141). As the decade wore on, 
increasing numbers of Russians welcomed “the firm hands of a strong leader.” 
The Consolidation of a Unified Legal Space 
Vladimir Putin’s program of konsolidatsiia (“consolidation”) began in the fall of 
1999, when, as a then-unknown prime minister appointed by Yeltsin, he launched the 
second post-Soviet military campaign against Chechnya. This blitzkrieg proved hugely 
popular, propelling him to the country’s top post on January 1, 2000. President Putin 
promised to bring order – what he called a “unified legal space” (Putin 2000) – to the rest 
of Russia’s asymmetrical federal system, bringing the self-proclaimed sovereigns to heel 
and leveling out the legal status of all the federal territories. What this has meant, in 
practice, is rapid political-territorial recentralization, the return to vertical authority. The 
legal space Putin inherited constituted what he called a “patchwork territory” (quoted in 
Mitin 2008, 49) – fragmented, divided, and quarrelsome. Constitutional acts contradicting 
federal law had been enacted in 19 of Russia’s 21 ethnic republics – perhaps most 
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egregiously in Tatarstan – four of the ten autonomous okrugs, and 29 of the 49 oblasts. 
Up to 30 percent of all laws adopted in Russia’s ethnic republics contradicted norms 
established in the federal constitution (Ross 2003). 
The first steps Putin took toward establishing control over Tatarstan, and other 
ethnic republics, was to take control of key institutions formerly under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of Kazan. These included the regional constitutional courts, intelligence 
agencies, tax police, and customs officials (Derrick 2009a, 52). With control of these 
institutions, the federal Constitutional Court announced in April 2000 that all regional 
legislation must be brought into line with the federal constitution and followed with a 
second ruling establishing that the republics’ sovereignty declarations were incompatible 
with the sovereignty of the Russian Federation.  
In May 2000, to facilitate the harmonization of regional and federal law, Putin 
divided the country into seven federal districts. In creating these “super regions,” he 
redrew the map of Russia to contain a dozen or more territorial units, an intentionally 
mixed bag of ethnic republics, autonomous okrugs, oblasts, and krais (see Figure 5). 
Notably, the new map was drawn to match the military districts of Imperial Russia 
(Petrov 2002, 74), and none of the capitals of the new federal districts was located in an 
ethnic republic. Each federal district was to be headed by a Moscow appointee – a cadre 
drawn almost exclusively from military and intelligence agencies – specifically charged 
with overseeing the prompt harmonization of regional and federal constitutions. Sergei 
Kirienko, sent to Nizhny Novgorod to head the Volga federal district, and the other 
appointees were given until the end of the year to make sure no regional laws 
contradicted central legislation (Teague 2002). 
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Containing five ethnic republics – all with power-sharing agreements – the Volga 
regional district presented the most difficulty in harmonizing federal and regional legal 
norms. Tatarstan was especially resistant, claiming that its relations with the center, as 
stipulated in the 1994 bilateral treaty, must be conducted on a treaty basis. However, 
following a variety of threats from Moscow, Tatarstan’s courts began making the legal 
changes. By April 2002, more than 120 changes had been made to Tatarstan’s 
constitution; many more would follow. On the question of sovereignty, Tatarstan would 
prevaricate. Rafael Khakimov, then Shaimiev’s top political advisor, pointed out that few 
in Tatarstan equated “sovereignty” with “independence” (Nelson and Kuzes 2002, 10), 
trying to retain the concept for its symbolic value. Nonetheless, the republic eventually 
relinquished its hold on the word. The court also demanded that Tatarstan’s constitution 
be stricken of the law requiring its president to speak both Tatar and Russian. Again, after 
Figure 5: The seven federal districts created in May 2000 (map by author). 
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much resistance, this clause was eliminated from the constitution (Derrick 2009a, 53). 
The Kremlin also created a new tax code that required all federal subjects, including 
Tatarstsan, send 70 percent of its taxes to the center – a return to the Soviet model.41 
The creation of the federal districts was a territorial strategy that proved effective 
in restoring a unified political-territorial expanse. Although the republics maintained their 
de jure status, along with some of the symbols of statehood, all of the subjects were made 
more-or-less equal in their relations with the center, just as Yeltsin laid out in the 1993 
Russian Constitution. The federal districts have performed a secondary, and perhaps 
more important, function. The creation of seven large regions has also brought into being 
an alternative, simplified map of Russia, which previously could only be displayed as a 
complicated array of 89 units of varying status. Literally laid over the ethnic republics, 
autonomous okrugs, oblasts, and krais, the new cartography of “super regions” has 
blurred the boundaries of the federal hierarchy. This new visualization of Russia, 
broadcast on television, which now is almost exclusively controlled by the central state, 
may be fostering a new sense of territory. This appears to be Moscow’s intention. The 
State Statistics Committee now structures its reports according to the seven federal 
districts, textbooks have been written in a similar format, and, according to Petrov, 
“presidential envoys are speaking about the need to cultivate a ‘district identity’” (Petrov 
2002, 79). 
  
                                                          
41 In Tatarstan, Moscow also assumed partial control of the republic’s oil and gas industry and revoked its 
exclusive right to license vodka and other spirits. 
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The Consolidation of Territory 
Well before the end of his first term, Putin had restored central authority over 
Tatarstan and the other ethnic republics. His creation of the federal districts was a top-
down territorial strategy that has been followed by a new ground-level policy of 
ukrupnenie (“merging”), which consolidates multiple territorial subjects into unified, 
enlarged political-territorial units. Since late 2005, a series of five mergers has reduced 
the number of federal subjects from 89 to 83 (see Figure 6), quite short of the ultimate  
 
 
Figure 6: The merging of Russia’s regions, accomplished and projected 
(map by author). 
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goal of 40 or 50 that has been mentioned by Kremlin associates (Kuznir 2008, 8). Putin 
insists that the purpose of ukrupnenie is to “solve social-economic problems” in 
impoverished regions by linking them to wealthier neighbors, in the process slashing 
resource-draining regional bureaucracies (Putin 2008). If the main goal is in fact to 
improve the socio-economic status of the country’s neediest areas, at the head of the line 
for merging should be the oblasts of the central and northwest federal districts suffering 
from the effects of prolonged deindustrialization, the poverty-stricken Muslim republics 
of the North Caucasus, and the poorest ethnic enclaves of the Middle Volga Basin, such 
as Mari El and Mordovia.42 However, to date none of these regions has been merged, and 
none is slated for merging in the immediate future. 
The policy of ukrupnenie, as I have argued elsewhere (Derrick 2009c), is not 
based on socio-economic concerns, but rather is guided by a rationale based on ethnicity. 
So far, the policy of “merging” has eliminated six ethnically defined autonomous okrugs, 
and the remaining autonomous okrugs are next in line for abolition.43 These small 
Siberian ethnic homelands were “relatively easier targets,” according to Mitin, because 
they lacked “large populations and vociferous ethnic minorities” (Mitin 2008, 52). 
Among the mergers already in discussion include the elimination of the weakest ethnic 
republics, first of all the impoverished republics of Buryatia, Altai, Adygea, and 
Ingushetia. A reduction in the number of territories to 40 or 50 will eventually target the 
                                                          
42 These are the regions identified as the most impoverished by the United Nations Development Program 
and also by Rosstat, the Russian federal statistics agency. See UNDP (2007), Rosstat (2006). 
43 That autonomous okrugs are slated for disappearance first should come as no surprise. Most were created 
as historic homelands for small-numbered shamanist-animist peoples of the Siberian north. They first 
appeared on the map in the 1920s and ‘30s as “matryoshka” subjects, i.e. a small political-territorial units 
contained within larger oblasts or krais, apparently intended to recognize the areas as historic homelands of 
indigenous peoples without affording them the full administrative rights of ethnic republics. It was only in 
the 1990s that the autonomous okrugs, like the republics, took significant control of their territories. 
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stronger ethnic republics. Territorial consolidation of this magnitude would, as Oversloot 
contends, “entail a transfer to a non-territorial model of support for nationalities, but, 
more likely, such a reduction in numbers would imply (or would be part of) a policy of 
outright Russification” (Oversloot 2009, 135). Either way, any significant political-
territorial rearrangement of the Russian Federation is likely to meet resistance from the 
ethnic republics, where national identity is closely intertwined with the bordered space 
designated as their historic homelands. 44 
The Consolidation of Identity 
 One should not give Putin undo credit (or blame) for the overhaul of the Russian 
Federation. There existed an objective need to restore a degree of legal standardization 
common to all the territories. The consolidation and reduction of the federal units might 
also have been necessary to streamline administration. Such an overhaul was discussed in 
the 1990s under the Yeltsin presidency (Sakwa 1993, 199; Kolobov and Skliarov 2001, 
32), but central weakness and division prohibited any change in the political-territorial 
status quo at the time. The question, though, is whether Putin has taken recentralization 
too far. Following the September 2004 Beslan school hostage crisis, a tragedy resulting in 
the deaths of some 300 people, mostly children, Putin canceled popular elections of 
                                                          
44 For instance, serious attempts have already been made to merge the Republic of Adygea with Krasnodar 
krai. As discussed earlier in this chapter, Adygea is one of the three ethnic republics created by Stalin to 
divide the Circassian people; its titular group accounts for only one-quarter of the republic’s population. 
Furthermore, Adygea is an enclave within the significantly wealthier Krasnodar. Nonetheless, there has 
been strong resistance in Adygea to being swallowed by Krasnodar. Circassian activists have protested 
talks of even conducting a referendum on the issue. The republic’s president has also been vocal in his 
opposition to the merger, saying an “infusion” of Russians will further marginalize Circassian culture and 
language (quoted in Oversloot 2009, 127). Following sizeable demonstrations mobilized by the Adygean 
president, Moscow seems to have backed off, at least temporarily, from plans to merge Adygea. 
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regional governors and republic presidents, decreeing that thenceforth all regional heads 
must be approved by the Kremlin. In doing so, the Kremlin restored a form of central 
autocracy. As Mitin contends, “Formally federal, Russia now functions as a unitary state” 
in which all regions are “rigidly embedded in the state hierarchy” (Mitin 2008, 59). 
The consolidation of Russia as a highly centralized political-territorial entity is 
reflective of Putin’s understanding of the “primordial Russian values that have stood the 
test of time” (Putin 1999). Central to those values, he says, are collectivism and 
paternalism, the innate desire for a strong state: “From the beginning, Russia was created 
as a super-centralized state. That’s practically laid down in its genetic code, its traditions, 
and the mentality of its people” (Putin 2000, 86). The decentralization and asymmetry of 
the 1990s, a time when society was “splintered into small groups,” each pursuing its own 
interests, was unnatural for a collectivistic people, Putin contends. Russia cannot move 
forward, he continues, “in a condition of division, internally disintegrated, a society in 
which social strata and political forces adhere to different basic values and fundamental 
ideological orientations” (Putin 1999). For Putin, as Evans argues in an article titled 
“Putin’s Legacy and Russia’s Identity” (2008), the Yeltsin-era chaos, in society in 
general but especially witnessed in its territorial disorder, was a function of uncritical 
acceptance of Western norms and ideas of democracy and civil society. Consolidation 
and recentralization, of territory and society, is the restoration of soglasie (“consensus”). 
For Russia to progress as a nation, Putin asserts, it must return to its own traditions – this 
is the “all-Russian, common-national idea” (rossiiskaia, obshchenatsional’naia ideia) 
that Yeltsin could not develop. 
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For Tatarstan, the Putin-era consolidation of territory and his concomitant nation-
building – his restoration of soglasie – have produced effects that transcend questions of 
legal jurisdiction and control of its oil and gas industry. The political-territorial 
restructuration has also affected the Tatars’ own nation-building. By the end of the 1990s, 
when Tatarstan acted as a de facto sovereign state, the Tatar language was taught in every 
school and the government employees were given incentives to know both state 
language, Tatar and Russian. The Tatars also had planned to convert the alphabet of their 
language from the Cyrillic forced on them by Stalin in 1939 to a Latin-based script, 
following the example of other Turkic peoples (Suleymanova 2010). With the Putin-era 
recentralization, Moscow’s demand that Tatarstan remove the constitutional clause that 
its president speak both Tatar and Russian has been accompanied by attacks on other 
aspects of the Tatars’ language revival.45 The center has forced Kazan to stop the 
conversion of its alphabet and, in the fall of 2009, the federal Ministry of Education 
removed the “national component,” i.e. the right of ethnic republics to require the study 
of native languages, from the national curriculum. For many in Tatarstan, Moscow’s 
language policies show that Putin’s idea of a “multinational Russian nation” is largely 
coterminous with the ethnic Russian nation. 
What does this political-territorial transformation, along with Putin-era nation-
building, mean for the Tatars’ religious revival? That question is the subject of 
examination in the following two chapters of this dissertation. 
  
                                                          
45 For an account of Tatarstan’s post-Soviet language policy, see Cashaback (2008). 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE MUSLIM SPIRITUAL BOARD OF TATARSTAN,  
POLITICAL-TERRITORIAL TRANSFORMATION,  
AND THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF TATAR ISLAM 
 
Introduction 
The central goal of this chapter is to illustrate how the dramatic political-territorial 
restructuring of the Russian Federation in recent decades has conditioned Islamic identity 
in post-Soviet Tatarstan. To show how this dynamic has played out, I examine 
representations and practices of the Muslim Spiritual Board of the Republic of Tatarstan 
(DUMRT), a centralized ecclesiastical institution that, since its formation in 1992, has 
reflected and, to a significant degree, driven the character of Islam in the republic. 
Specifically, I show how the establishment of DUMRT, achieved by seceding from a 
previously unified all-Russian Muslim Spiritual Board, was spearheaded by the then-
influential Tatar national movement as a response to Tatarstan’s sovereignty declaration 
of August 30, 1990. The various organizations making up the Tatar national movement, 
broadly united in their vision of Tatarstan as the Tatars’ independent homeland and 
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working in alliance with the official Tatar political leadership to bolster the republic’s 
sovereignty claim, viewed the institution foremost as an important attribute of 
independent statehood and, correspondingly, understood the redevelopment of Islam as 
one component of a broader revival of national culture – not necessarily a return of a 
strict set of religious rules. Consequently, for much of the 1990s, while Tatarstan enjoyed 
an unprecedented degree of territorial autonomy and the redevelopment of Tatar national 
culture proceeded primarily through secular institutions, DUMRT did not play a central 
role in shaping the nature and practice of Islam in the republic. However, as the decade 
progressed the varying factions of the Tatar national movement became internally riven 
over the nature of Islam and its relationship to Tatar national identity; these internal 
divisions related to diverging understandings of Tatarstan as a political space that 
emerged as the decade progressed. 
Over the past decade, however, as the aggressive recentralization of the Russian 
Federation has disabused Tatarstan of its pretensions to sovereignty, DUMRT is no 
longer seen as just another attribute of Tatar statehood. Rather, with the republic’s secular 
institutions no longer viewed as representative of the Tatar nation, the Spiritual Board 
occupies an increasingly prominent place in society and politics, and Islam has assumed 
greater weight in balance of group identity. The Kazan-based government, deprived of 
most of its formal territorial autonomy, relies on DUMRT to communicate and reinforce 
an “official” Tatar Islam that is understood as apolitical and, above all, loyal to the state 
(Mukhametshin 2006b, 39); DUMRT’s cultivation and maintenance of a loyal umma 
contributes to the republic preserving a degree of informal autonomy in its relations with 
Moscow. Simultaneously, Islam has eclipsed nationalism as the primary register through 
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which the territorial demands are expressed by certain sectors of the population who 
retain their vision of Tatarstan as the Tatars’ independent homeland. Thus, as examined 
in this chapter, the story of the DUMRT shows how the changing political-territorial 
restructuration of Russia has influenced the character of the Islamic revival in the context 
of post-Soviet Tatarstan. 
The remainder of this chapter is comprised of five parts. First, a historical 
background of the Muslim Spiritual Board, from its creation in the late eighteenth century 
up to the fall of the Soviet Union, is provided. Part two consists of an overview of the 
trajectory of the Islamic revival in post-Soviet Tatarstan, showing how the secular 
character of Tatar Islam in the 1990s has been eclipsed in recent years by more 
conservative expressions of religion. To provide an explanation of the changing face of 
the Tatars’ post-Soviet Islamic revival, the following two sections examine how changing 
representations and practices of DUMRT have been influenced by the dramatic political-
territorial restructuring of post-Soviet Russia. Part three analyzes how the creation of 
DUMRT in 1992 and its subsequent development for the remainder of the decade was 
conditioned by Tatarstan’s sovereignty campaign that took place amid a broader 
decentralization of the Russian Federation. Part four investigates how this past decade’s 
counter process of recentralization has affected DUMRT and, by extension, the 
increasingly complex character of Islamic identity in Tatarstan. This chapter concludes 
with a discussion of the implications of the current state of the Islamic identity in 
Tatarstan as it is influenced by Russia’s continuing territorial transformation.  
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Background of the Muslim Spiritual Board 
Catherine II (“the Great”) established Russia’s first Muslim Spiritual Board in the 
city of Ufa (currently the capital of Bashkortostan) in 178846 to monitor and police the 
affairs of Muslims in the empire. The creation of the Spiritual Board, following the 
Empress’ earlier decrees on religious tolerance, came as a response to Muslim revolts that 
resulted from previous waves of forced Christianization; it was also formed in 
anticipation of the empire’s continued eastward expansion, a process in which Moscow 
would employ the Tatars as a “civilising force” to promote Russia’s interests among the 
“culturally less-developed” Muslims of Central Asia (Yemelianova 2003a, 25). Modeled 
after the Russian Orthodox ecclesiastical hierarchy and headed by a Mufti who was 
appointed by the state, the Muslim Spiritual Board (also known as the Muftiate) managed 
cadres of imams and mullahs, oversaw the operation of mektebs and medresses, and 
formed a bridge between Muslims and the government (Zagidullin 2007).47  
The Mufiate ensured that the empire’s umma would remain loyal to the Tsars and 
Tsarinas, but it also kept Muslims of Russia institutionally segregated from Orthodox 
Russians and other non-Muslims. The institutional segregation of Muslims in turn 
contributed to what Crews calls the “confessionalization” of the empire (Crews 2006, 8) 
– citizenship within the vast Russian Empire based not on an all-Russian (rossiiskii) 
identity, but instead based on religious affiliation. This religious-based segregation gave 
Russia’s Muslims a certain degree of autonomy and room for negotiation in their 
                                                          
46 The Muslim Spiritual Board was relocated in the city of Orenburg (currently located in the Orenburg 
oblast of the Middle Volga region) in 1796, but returned to Ufa in 1802 (Azamatov and Usmanov 1999). 
47 Strictly speaking, Islam does not recognize an ecclesiastical hierarchy, although it is a common practice 
in many states. See Matsuzato and Sawae (2010) for a comparative historical study of Islamic ecclesiology 
in Russia, Turkey, and China. 
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relations with the state. While the relations between the empire and its Muslims, as 
institutionalized by the Spiritual Board, have been described as “confederative” (Norihiro 
2006, 102), they surely comprised a non-territorial confederation. 
The Bolsheviks, against the background of broader and more intense institutional 
atheism, retained the Spiritual Board as a means of controlling Soviet Muslims by 
molding an Islam that was “fundamentally loyal to the Soviet state and generally pliant” 
(Ro’i 2000, 155). With the creation of the Tatar ASSR and other ethnic homelands, 
however, the state provided a secular education for all of Russia’s Muslims and assumed 
jurisdiction over most other social functions formerly coordinated by the Muftiate. By the 
late 1920s the Spiritual Board was permitted to perform only narrowly defined religious 
rituals as the state began persecuting clergy (exiling them to labor camps or physically 
eliminating them) and destroying mosques. By the mid-1930s, deprived of a Mufti and its 
clergy and its network of temples decimated after a decade of militant atheism, the 
institution existed in name only (Usmanova et al. 2010, 40-43). 
The Spiritual Board received a new lease on life during World War II when Stalin 
revived the institution in a bid to foster state patriotism among the Volga Muslims and 
mobilize them in the military campaign. He also ordered the creation of three new 
Muftiates: the Muslim Spiritual Board of the North Caucasus, based in Buinaksk (later in 
Makhachkala); the Spiritual Board of Transcaucasia in Baku; and the Spiritual Board of 
Central Asia in Tashkent. Yemelianova explains that the new Muftiates “were designed 
to tighten state control over Soviet Muslims who were regarded by German commanders 
as a potential fifth column” (Yemelianova 2003b, 139-140). At the war’s conclusion the 
state returned to its antireligious policies, but all four Muftiates were nonetheless 
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retained. With the addition of the new Spiritual Boards in Central Asia, the North 
Caucasus, and Transcaucasia, the Ufa-based Muftiate was renamed the Muslim Spiritual 
Board of the European Part of the USSR and Siberia (Dukhovnoe Upravlenie Musul’man 
Evropeiskoi Chasti SSR i Siberi – DUMES). 
In the latter decades of the USSR’s existence, the activities of DUMES were 
severely limited and tightly controlled by Soviet authorities. Muftis were appointed by 
the government and consequently associated by parishioners with the atheist regime. 
Friday sermons at the few remaining official mosques, for example, had to be approved 
beforehand by representatives of the Council for Religious Affairs (CRA), a state organ 
that policed the Muftiate and often forced Muslim religious leaders “to instruct their 
communities in contradiction with their beliefs” (Matsuzato and Sawae 2010, 346). In 
order to serve in official mosques, imams and mullahs were required to receive state 
certification. The religious education required for state certification, however, was 
practically impossible to attain. All medresses in the Middle Volga region had been 
closed by Soviet authorities, and potential clergy from the Tatar ASSR could receive a 
higher Islamic education only in Bukhara, Uzbekistan, an option often complicated or 
deliberately blocked by state organs (Ro’i 2000, 239-253). By the perestroika era only 18 
mosques were officially operating (only one was open in all of Kazan), and only about 30 
registered Muslim clergy were active in the Tatar ASSR (Usmanova et al. 2010, 46). 
In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, DUMES remained in 
place as the sole Muftiate for all of the European part of Russia, Siberia, and the 
European CIS countries; DUMES retained its headquarters in Ufa, Bashkortostan. At the 
Spiritual Board’s head was Talgat Tadjutdin, who had held the post since 1980 and in 
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1990 was elected as Supreme Mufti for life (Garaeva 1994). Like his predecessors in the 
Tsarist Empire and the Soviet Union, Tadjutdin was a protector of a conservative 
“Orthodox” Islam. Moreover, Mufti Tadjutdin was a gosudarstvennik (in favor of a 
strong, unified Russia) who maintained his institutionalized position as “state Mufti” and, 
along with Patriarch Aleksei, was integrated into Yeltsin’s political establishment 
(Yemelianova 2003b, 146). Tadjutdin, although a Tatar himself, was unambiguously 
opposed to Kazan’s aspirations for greater territorial freedoms (Khairetdinov 1995). 
Thus, DUMES as it stood represented a road block for the Tatar national movement that, 
following Tatarstan’s August 30, 1990, sovereignty declaration, put forth two primary 
goals: strengthening the republic’s claim to independent statehood and redeveloping 
Tatar national culture. As part of the second goal the national movement was broadly 
united in its dedication to a modernizing “Tatar Islam,” understood then as a revived 
version of Jadidism, the indigenous liberal religious reform movement led by Tatar 
intellectuals in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (see generally D. 
Iskhakov 1992; Mukhametshin 1994). 
Early support for Jadidism came from the Tatar Public Center (Tatarskii 
Obschestvenyi Tsentr – TOTs), the republic’s most influential national organization in the 
late 1980s and into the latter part of 1990s and then closely aligned with the Tatar 
political leadership.48 In its 1991 platform TOTs claimed that the “great achievements of 
Tatar society connected with Jadidism were mostly lost” under the repressive Soviet 
                                                          
48 Two of the TOTs’ early leaders became part of President Mintimer Shaimiev’s immediate circle of 
advisors. Rafael Khakimov became his top political advisor and a key player in the 1994 bilateral treaty 
with Moscow. Damir Iskhakov became a top advisor to the Tatar president on ethno-national questions. 
Today they both are primarily associated with the Marjani History Institute of the Academy of Sciences of 
Tatarstan. Khakimov is its director, while Iskhakov is a senior researcher in the institute’s Department of 
Ethnology. Multiple interviews conducted by the author with both Khakimov and Iskhakov are integral to 
this chapter. 
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regime that had inflicted untold damage on Tatar national culture (TOTs 1991, 146). 
TOTs contended that a “revival of the noble traditions of Jadidism,” embracing ijtihad 
(independent interpretation of the Koran and Sunnah) and insisting on Islam’s 
compatibility with the conditions of modernity, would reorient the Tatar nation toward 
Europe and contribute to its socio-economic development. The liberalism of “Euro-
Islam,” as post-Soviet neo-Jadidism soon became known in popular parlance, would also 
insulate the Tatars from the “threat of Muslim fundamentalism, which is unacceptable for 
civilized life,” TOTs averred (Ibid.). The document suggested that Jadidism’s rebirth, and 
with it a revival of the Tatar nation, could not be achieved under the institutional 
jurisdiction of DUMES, which it characterized as an anti-democratic instrument of a 
Moscow-centered state striving to recreate a “unitary-totalitarian type of government” 
(Ibid., 134). 
In identifying DUMES with the Russian government, together set against 
democratic values and ultimately engendering religious fundamentalism, TOTs crafted an 
anti-imperial discourse that provided a base of justification for the creation of an 
independent Muslim Spiritual Board coterminous with Tatarstan’s political borders. The 
secession from the Russia-wide Islamic ecclesiastical structure, in turn, would bolster the 
republic’s claims to sovereignty. TOTs also ensured its involvement, along with that of 
other national organizations in Tatarstan, including the more radical Ittifak (“Alliance,” 
the self-described “Tatar Party of National Independence”) and Milli Mejlis (“National 
Congress”), in the Kazan-based Muftiate’s formation and development for much of the 
first post-Soviet decade. As Damir Iskhakov, a leading Tatar national ideologist and early 
TOTs member, said, “Although formally created as an autonomous Islamic organization, 
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the Spiritual Board [of Tatarstan] developed as a faction of the national movement in the 
1990s” (quoted in Galiamov 1998, 3). With this relationship established early on, 
changes to the Muslim Spiritual Board of Tatarstan and the character of Islamic identity 
would be intertwined with the changing fortunes of the Tatar national movement. Before 
turning to an examination of the foundation and subsequent changes to the republic’s 
Spiritual Board, along with its relationship to the Tatar national movement, it is necessary 
first to provide an overview of the trajectory of Tatarstan’s Islamic revival in the post-
Soviet era. 
The Changing Face of Islamic Revival in Post-Soviet Tatarstan 
By almost any account Tatarstan has undergone a far-reaching “re-Islamization” 
in recent decades. The religion’s forceful reemergence in the public sphere is vividly 
manifest in a proliferation of mosques throughout the region – if only 18 mosques were 
officially operating in the region in the mid-1980s, the number had risen to about 1,000 
by the close of the 1990s and today stands at about 1,300 (interview with Nabiev 2009). 
Most visible of the new temples is the Kul-Sharif Mosque, which, billed as largest 
mosque in Europe (Siraeva 2006), occupies a central position in the Kazan Kremlin and, 
since its official opening in 2005, has become the single most recognizable symbol of 
Tatarstan (more on the Kul-Sharif Mosque and the Kazan Kremlin in the following 
chapter). In tandem with the mushrooming number of mosques, the ranks of Muslim 
clergy, who today number about 3,000 and form a “special social layer” in the republic 
(Mukhametshin 2005, 122), have multiplied a hundredfold since the late perestroika era. 
Additionally, no fewer than a dozen professional Islamic education centers, including the 
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highly regarded Russian Islamic University in Kazan, have been established (Nabiev 
2006, 17). The spectacular growth in temples, clergy, and religious schools attests to a 
broader, more fundamental transformation of the social landscape. Yet the “re-
Islamization” of Muslim society in post-Soviet Tatarstan has not been a phenomenon 
uniform in process or dominant expression, but rather has proceeded in stages and has 
exhibited a shift toward more conservative manifestations in recent years, including 
certain developments that cause palpable anxiety among politicians, elite observers, and 
the general public. 
Emblematic of the early stages of the Tatars’ religious rebirth were mass public 
events, beginning in late 1989 with large celebrations held throughout the republic in 
honor of the 1,100-year anniversary of the official acceptance of Islam by the Tatars’ 
ancestors (the Volga Bolgars) and the bicentennial of the creation of the Muslim Spiritual 
Board in Ufa. Another notable event occurred in April 1991, when a public namaz 
(Muslim prayer) in honor of Uraza Bairam, a holiday celebrating the end of Ramadan, 
was held for the first time at the Siuiumbike Tower within the grounds of the Kazan 
Kremlin, an event that reportedly drew tens of thousands of participants (Musina 1997, 
213). These mass public events reflected a dramatic change in personal attitudes among 
Tatars toward Islam. Findings from survey data from the late 1960s and into the early 
1980s indicated that a majority of Tatars in villages (where religiosity is traditionally 
higher) self-identified as “atheists” or “indifferent” toward religion – less than 16 percent 
categorized themselves as “believers” in 1980 (see Table 2). A decade later, however, a 
clear majority of Tatars, both rural and urban, claimed to be “believers” or at least 
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“vacillating” in faith, and by 1994 a vast majority categorized themselves as more or less 
religious (see Table 3).  
 
 
 
 
While almost all Tatars of all social groups in the republic claimed some degree 
of religiosity by the mid-1990s, these survey data were far from unambiguous – Tatars 
were selective in which religious rites they chose to observe. Nikakh (traditional Muslim 
wedding) and sunnat (circumcision), for example, quickly became popular practices once 
again.49 Yet few Tatars exhibited active commitment to the central tenants of Islam. A 
1993 survey indicated that fully three-fourths of all Tatars who self-identified as 
“believers” had never attended a mosque, and most of those who had visited a mosque 
did so only on the occasion of a religious holiday or family celebration (Vorontsova and 
                                                          
49 Already by 1990 nikakh was practiced by more than 70 percent of marrying Tatars, while sunnat was 
chosen by more than 80 percent of Tatar parents of newborn sons (Musina 1997, 214). 
Attiude toward Religon 1967 1980 1989
Believer 17.9 15.7 43.4
Vacillating 19.7 14.9 19.1
Indifferent 46.6 59.1 12.3
Atheist 15.8 59.1 24.1
Urban Rural
Believer 66.6 86
Vacillating 12 9.8
Attitude toward Religion 1994
Table 2: Attitudes of Tatar villagers toward religion in the latter part of the Soviet era 
(source: Musina 1997). 
Table 3: Attitudes of Tatars, urban vs. rural, toward religion in 1994 (source: Musina 
2001). 
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Filitov 1993, 144). It is generally recognized that Islam does not demand mosque 
attendance (although communal prayer is considered more pleasing to Allah). Still, only 
about 8 percent of the Tatars of Tatarstan – and only 15 percent of those self-identifying 
as “believers” – surveyed at the height of the republic’s “Muslim renaissance” in the 
1990s practiced even home prayer (Musina 2000, 16-17), not to mention fulfilling any of 
the other five obligatory principles of Islam.50 
Within a matter of a few years, Tatarstan’s “Islamic revival” ceased to be a mass 
public phenomenon and the hundreds of newly built mosques were largely empty, aside 
from religious holidays or family events. Indeed, as several of my interview subjects 
attested, mosques remained empty for the duration of the 1990s, attended mainly by a 
small stream of elder Tatars.51 In light of these trends, Baltanova, writing at the end of 
the decade, pointed to the year 1994 as the beginning of a “crisis” or a “certain 
stabilization or possibly even a drop off in the growth of Islamic religiosity” in the 
republic (Baltanova 1997, 186).  
Other Kazan-based researchers, however, have challenged Baltanova’s 
foundational assumption that Tatarstan’s “Muslim renaissance” in late 1980s through the 
mid-1990s was a question of religiosity per se. As Khabutdinov has contended, the early 
mass public celebrations “were foremost understood as a measure of respect toward 
ancestors and their statehood” (Khabutdinov 2005). For her part, Musina has argued that 
                                                          
50 In addition to namaz (or salat, prayer), the five “pillars” of Islam include shahada (affirmation of faith), 
uraza (or sawm, fasting during Ramadan), zakat (almsgiving), and the hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca). 
51 Data presented by Musina provides support for this assertion. According to a 1999 survey of college-age 
Tatars in Tatarstan, i.e. representatives of a generation entering adulthood in an age of religious freedom 
and therefore, Musina posits, more likely to be actively religious, fully half had never been to a mosque for 
any reason, while 20 percent had been to a mosque for a religious holiday, and another 10 percent had been 
to a mosque for a family event (Musina 2001, 516). 
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the Tatars’ “re-Islamization” was a “manifestation not so much of religious sentiments as 
of ethnonational self-awareness, a distinctive ‘religious nationalism’” (Musina 2001, 516, 
emphasis added). As support, Musina proffered survey data illustrating that most Tatars 
in the 1990s viewed religious holidays foremost as national celebrations and that nearly 
80 percent of Tatars believed that “Islam contributes to the preservation of national 
culture and traditions” (Musina 2000, 17). In short, Tatarstan’s early period of “Islamic 
revivalism” was part and parcel of a broader national revival – to be Tatar once again 
meant being a Muslim, regardless of one’s actual observation of religious tenants. 
Considering the close relationship between national identity and Islam, Musina, 
writing in the latter part of the 1990s, was sanguine enough to assert that “the republic 
has few of the prerequisites for the development of religious extremism and 
fundamentalism” (Musina 1997, 216). Having evolved over several centuries in isolation 
from the broader Muslim world and having gone through a period of intense religious 
reform under the leadership of the Jadidists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, Musina contended, Tatar Islam is distinguished by its adherence “to secular 
norms, and one would not be mistaken in calling it ‘Euro-Islam’” (Ibid., 216-217, 
emphasis added). To be sure, for the duration of the 1990s, the “re-Islamization” of 
Tatarstan appeared to be more of a secular than a religious affair. No reports of religious-
based “radicalism” or “extremism” were registered. Although missionaries from Saudi 
Arabia and other Muslim countries had been active in the republic since the fall of the 
USSR, Tatarstan seemed to offer little or no fertile ground for their ideas, which were 
generally dismissed as “foreign” to the Tatars (Rorlich 1999, 394). 
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Over the past decade, however, a significant shift has occurred in the social 
expression of Islam in Tatarstan. Once-empty mosques are now active hubs of worship, 
some overflowing during Friday prayers.52 The upsurge is mostly accounted for by Tatars 
under 35, who today comprise a growing portion of all mosque-goers in Tatarstan 
(Suleimanov 2011b). With the upswing in mosque attendance, the primacy of secular-
minded Euro-Islam identified by Musina above has been challenged, and perhaps 
superseded, by more conservative, explicitly “Islamic” expressions of the faith. A visible 
indicator of this change is the growing popularity of the hijab, the traditional head 
covering worn by (some) Muslim women.53 For the duration of the 1990s this religious 
marker was largely unseen in urban environs, and the rare Tatar muhjibh54 who ventured 
into public “often drew attention and provoked incomprehension and aggression” 
(Kuznetsova-Morenko and Salakhatdinova 2006, 7). Present today in almost any public 
setting, the hijab has quickly become a normalized part of the social landscape (see 
Figures 7 and 8). As Dmitry Gorenburg, a noted specialist on culture and politics in 
Eurasia, noted in 2010,  
When I was last in Kazan two years ago, I was struck by the sheer number 
of young women wearing “Islamic” clothing … This was in stark contrast 
to previous visits, when everyone (and especially young people) wore 
European style clothing and hair styles. The number of people with such  
                                                          
52 I have encountered no survey data similar to those published by Musina and other Kazan-based 
sociologists in the 1990s. This assessment is based both on my participant observation and assertions made 
by other researchers (e.g. Khabutdinov 2005; Laurelle 2007; Ponarin 2008). 
53 Muslim women who wear the hijab clearly attribute diverse meanings to the head covering (Ruby 2006; 
Tarlo 2007). My purpose here is not to attribute any single signification of the hijab in Tatarstan, but rather 
simply to identify a general tendency, however varied internally.   
54 A woman who wears the hijab is called a muhajibh. 
126 
 
Figure 7: The hijab has become a normalized part of the social landscape in Tatarstan 
(photo by author). 
 
Islamic markers was also much higher in Kazan two years ago than in my 
visit to Baku last week (Gorenburg 2010).55 
The secular norms of the Tatars’ Euro-Islam are further undermined by 
widespread reports of a growing presence of religious fundamentalism, most generally 
attributed to Salafism or – as is most common in Russia – Wahhabism, versions of the 
faith considered by many in Tatarstan as too universalistic, too utopian, and wholly 
unsuited for the social conditions of a multi-confessional region (see e.g. Mukhametshin  
                                                          
55 Like Gorenburg, I too have observed this transformation. As late as 2003, when I first visited Kazan and 
other parts of Tatarstan, the rare muhajibh seen in public places was still subjected to stares that bespoke of 
social censure. By the time I returned to conduct fieldwork in 2008, the hijab had become a common 
presence that attracted little attention. For similar accounts by Kazan-based observers, see e.g. Khabutdinov 
(2005), Khakim (2010), and Amelina et al. (2010). 
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Figure 8: Shops have opened in Tatarstan to meet the demand for Islamic fashion 
(photo by author). 
 
2005; Laurelle 2007).56 Based on the results of fieldwork and interviews, surmising the 
number of adherents of this so-called “pure Islam” is difficult if not impossible, although 
Valiulla Iakupov, the first deputy Mufti of Tatarstan, estimated in my interview with him 
that a few thousand are probably active in Kazan alone. Furthermore, he said that the 
“majority of youth” who attend mosques in Tatarstan, along with a small but “significant 
part” of the republic’s clergy, are followers of Salafism (interview with Iakupov 2009). 
Other observers and key informants have contended that a widespread “Wahhabization” 
                                                          
56 A small sampling of newspaper headlines includes the following: “No to Wahhabism, Yes to Jadidism?” 
(Mirgazizov 2001); “Tatarstan in the Embrace of Wahhabism” (Postnova 2004); “The Threat of 
Fundamentalism in Tatarstan” (D. Iskhakov 2006); “Jihad in Tatarstan” (Amelina 2010a); and “Wahhabism 
in Tatarstan: An Attempt to Take Revenge?” (Suleimanov 2011b). 
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of the region’s umma is underway (e.g. interview with Salman 2009; see also Sosedov 
2010; Suleimanov 2011b). Fundamentalist understandings of Islam no doubt have grown 
in popularity in recent years, but most of my key informants, although disconcerted by 
the phenomenon, agreed that scenarios of Tatarstan’s full-scale “Wahhabization” are 
greatly exaggerated (e.g. interviews with Garipov 2009; Khakimov 2009; Zagidullin 
2009; Mukhametshin 2010; Shagaviev 2010). Nonetheless, officials in Kazan have taken 
a number of measures intended to stop the spread of Wahhabism, including banning the 
works of Muhammad Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab (considered the founder of Wahhabism) and a 
host of other Islamic literature deemed “extremist,” evicting foreign missionaries accused 
of propagating “dangerous” ideologies, and currently are considering legislation that 
would outlaw Wahhabism in Tatarstan altogether (Amelina 2010b).57 
Rafik Mukhametshin, a leading scholar on Islam in Tatarstan and the rector of the 
Russian Islamic University, has publicly made a distinction between “moderate” and 
“immoderate” Wahhabites, warning against the tendency to conflate fundamentalism 
with radicalism (interview in Minvaleev 2004, 6). His is a position that has been 
increasingly difficult to maintain, as adherents of “pure Islam” have been implicated in a 
number of extremist acts in Tatarstan in recent years. In 2003, for example, a group of 
young men alleged to be Salafists was accused of blowing up a natural gas pipeline 
running through republic. In 2004 and 2005 several dozen young Muslims accused of 
being members of Hizb ut-Tahrir (“The Islamic Party of Liberation”), banned as an 
“extremist” group in Russia for its goal of establishing an independent Islamic state 
(caliphate), were arrested in a string of sting operations in various cities of Tatarstan. 
                                                          
57 Laws banning “Wahhabism” already exist in Dagestan and Chechnya, although they have done little to 
stem the spread of religious fundamentalism in those republics. 
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Intelligence officers claim they uncovered and prevented a plot to commit terrorist acts in 
Kazan on the eve of the city’s millennium celebrations in August 2005 (Trofimov 2005). 
In November 2010 three men accused of being members of Hizb ut-Tahrir were killed in 
a firefight with Special Forces after planting a bomb that failed to explode at a regional 
division of the Center to Combat Extremism (Smirnov 2010). Following this most recent 
incident, which was the first example of bloodshed related to “Islamic extremism” in the 
region, a headline appearing in a Kazan-based newspaper announced “Jihad in Tatarstan” 
(Amelina 2010a, 3). 
The trajectory of the Islamic revival in post-Soviet Tatarstan, especially as it has 
played out in recent years, appears to provide support for theses of Islamic 
exceptionalism or globalization-fuelled fundamentalism (discussed in Chapter II). 
However, as examined in the following sections, the changing face of Islam in Tatarstan 
is better explained through an examination of how the political-territorial transformation 
of the Russian Federation has influenced the practices and representations of the Muslim 
Spiritual Board of Tatarstan. 
Forming an Independent Spiritual Board for a “Sovereign” Tatarstan 
The formation of the Muslim Spiritual Board of the Republic of Tatarstan 
(DUMRT) in 1992, along with its development for the remainder of the decade, was 
conditioned by two interrelated factors. First was the political-territorial decentralization 
of the Russian Federation – the twin processes of democratization and “sovereignization” 
– that followed in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse. Second was the response to 
those forces by the Tatar national movement, which, after Tatarstan’s sovereignty 
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declaration of August 30, 1990, viewed a Kazan-based Muftiate as an important 
institution for the redevelopment of Tatar national consciousness and a key attribute of 
independent statehood. At first, however, discussions were not about establishing an 
independent Muftiate, as seen in the 1991 platform of the Tatar Public Center (TOTs), 
then the republic’s “largest and most influential social-political formation” (D. Iskhakov 
1992, 5): 
TOTs offers to work in the future in close coordination with the Muslim 
Spiritual Board of the European part of the country and Siberia [DUMES]. 
However, in connection with the acceptance with the Declaration of State 
Sovereignty of the Tatar ASSR, in the opinion of TOTs, the organizational 
form of management of Muslims in the Republic of Tatarstan must be 
changed. TOTs considers it necessary to look at the question of 
transferring the Spiritual Board [from Ufa] to Kazan (TOTs 1991, 147-
148, emphasis added). 
In the event DUMES refused to transfer its headquarters to Kazan, TOTs reserved the 
right to form an independent Spiritual Board of Tatarstan, which would include Muslim 
Tatars from other regions who agree to the arrangement (Ibid.). 
 TOTs’ critique of the “organizational form of management” of DUMES was both 
cultural and political in nature. In supporting a “revival of the noble traditions of 
Jadidism” (Ibid., 146), TOTs argued that Tatar Islam must be thoroughly reformed and 
modernized (something akin to the Protestant Reformation), Islamic education must 
include the study of secular subjects, and the Ulema (Islamic scholars) must be comprised 
of only “the most educated scholars in the fields of Islam and Muslim culture,” meaning 
the inclusion, if not domination, of secular scholars, not just traditionalist imams and 
131 
 
mullahs (Ibid., 147). As the situation stood under DUMES’ purview, TOTs contended in 
its 1991 document that “the intellectual level of cadres of the Muslims working in Tatar 
society do not correspond to the demands of modernity” (Ibid.). TOTs’ support for a 
more intellectual form of Islam, its demand for secular-minded, Western-oriented 
Jadidism – or Euro-Islam, as it became known – was echoed by other nationalist 
organizations, including the more radical Ittifak (“Alliance”),58 which viewed a rejection 
of the traditionalist “orthodox” Islam propagated by DUMES as contributing to a broader 
modernization and advancement of the Tatar nation (Ittifak 1991). 
TOTs was not eager to break up the Spiritual Board because the vast majority of 
Muslims under the institution’s jurisdiction were Tatars. As Rafael Khakimov, an early 
TOTs leader and subsequently a top political adviser to Tatar President Mintimer 
Shaimiev, explained to me, 
We saw DUMES as a way to unite Tatars throughout Russia, a way to 
develop Tatar culture not only in Tatarstan. The network of mosques 
would be used not only as places of worship, but also as cultural centers 
where Tatars could study their own language, learn their own culture, even 
study secular subjects (interview with Khakimov 2009). 
Thus, transferring the headquarters of the DUMES from Ufa to Kazan, the nationalists 
believed, would allow the Tatar national organizations that had arisen as a force in 
Tatarstan to reform the Spiritual Board, implement their preferred understanding of 
                                                          
58 In the early 1990s, TOTs and Ittifak were essentially a single organization, the latter simply representing 
the more vociferous wing of the former. The majority, centrist TOTs was less confrontational in its 
relations with the official political authorities in pursuit of Tatarstan’s “sovereignty,” a term that was 
ambiguous from the time it was introduced to the political discourse of Tatarstan. Ittifak – the self-
described “Tatar Party of National Independence” – was (and remains) more confrontational with the 
political authorities, far less ambiguous in its goal of all-out “independence” and “national statehood” 
(Ittifak 1991, 223). 
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Islam, and consolidate the Tatar nation as it was dispersed throughout Russia (TOTs 
1991, 145). Making Kazan the Tatars’ spiritual capital would also add weight to the city’s 
pretensions as the political capital of the Tatars’ “sovereign” homeland, as it became 
understood following Tatarstan’s August 30, 1990, declaration. 
 In hindsight, the suggestion to transfer the headquarters of DUMES to Kazan, as 
Damir Iskhakov characterized the situation, was a nonstarter: 
[DUMES Mufti] Tadjutdin was unquestionably loyal to Moscow, for a 
Eurasian [evraziiskii] Islam,59 a Russian [rossiskii] Islam. In no way did 
he support Jadidism or reform Islam. Moreover, he was completely against 
to the sovereignty of Tatarstan. He understood that the transfer of DUMES 
to Kazan would strengthen our sovereignty. He was in favor of Russia as a 
united power [derzhava] (interview with D. Iskhakov 2009). 
As such, the course was set for the Tatar national movement to take the lead in forming 
an independent Muslim Spiritual Board of Tatarstan. Although the Tatar national revival 
would take place mostly through secular institutions in the 1990s (thereby assuring the 
secular character of the Tatars’ Islamic revival in that period), the development of the 
Muftiate of Tatarstan would proceed in tandem with the republic’s sovereignty campaign 
that was launched amid the decentralization of the Russian Federation. 
Seceding from the All-Russian Muslim Spiritual Board 
Concrete moves to secede from DUMES were not taken until the republic-wide 
referendum on Tatarstan’s sovereignty was passed in March 1992. Forming an 
independent Spiritual Board of Tatarstan before then would have potentially upset the 
                                                          
59 Khakimov also pointed out that Tadjutin was one of the founders, along with Alexander Dugin, of the 
Eurasian Party. 
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“parity nationalism” proclaimed by Shaimiev following the republic’s sovereignty 
declaration (D. Iskhakov 1997b), alienating a significant portion of the ethnic Russians in 
the republic whose votes were needed in order to pass the referendum. Before then the 
ground was laid by a boom in mosque construction throughout region. Of the 
approximately 1,000 mosques opened in the Tatarstan from 1989 until the end of the 
following decade, about 700 had been built or were in the process of being constructed by 
the close of 1992 (Mukhametshin 2006b, 30). This spectacular growth in mosques in a 
period of just a few years cannot be explained by new religious freedoms alone.60 To 
begin with a comparison, in neighboring Bashkortostan, which is home to more Muslims 
than Tatarstan, the number of mosques rose from 14 in 1981 to about 300 in 1994 
(Iunusova 1994, 109-114), meaning the number of mosques in Tatarstan grew at a rate 
greater than twice that of Bashkortostan.61 The early boom in the construction of 
mosques in Tatarstan also did not correspond to actual mosque attendance, as discussed 
in the previous section.  
The rapid growth in mosques in the early 1990s should be understood as part of a 
campaign by Kazan’s political and national leadership to Tatarize the republic’s 
landscape and thereby articulate more sharply the “symbolic shape” of territory (Passi 
1997).62 Direct state involvement is confirmed by Rafik Mukhametshin, a highly 
                                                          
60 Religious freedom was introduced to the USSR in 1990 with the passage of two laws, “On the Freedom 
of Conscience and Religious Organizations” and “On the Freedom of Worship” (Usmanova et al. 2010, 
50). 
61 For further comparison, in 1917 there were 1,152 mosques registered in the Kazan guberniia. In Russia 
as a whole, 189 mosques were registered in 1989; by 1994 there were 3,264 (Iunosova 1994, 114). In 
Kazakhstan, the number of mosques rose from 63 in 1989 to 200 in 1992; in Tajikistan from 4 (1989) to 83 
(1992); in Uzbekistan from 350 (1989) to 1,000 (1992) (Abazov 1995, 62). 
62 Multiple interview subjects, including those involved with the Tatarstan’s sovereignty project, indicated 
that the early, rapid construction of mosques was coordinated by the Tatar politicians with national leaders. 
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regarded scholar of Islam in Tatarstan,63 who informs that “almost all mosques in the 
republic, especially in villages, were built with significant support of the local authorities 
... The functioning of the mosques more or less depended on them” (Mukhametshin 1997, 
257; see also Matsuzato 2007, 788).64 Notably, by the early 1990s Tatar President 
Mintimer Shaimiev had already begun the practice of appointing heads of districts 
(raiony) and cities (Derrick 2009a, 54; see also D. Iskhakov 1997b, 126). The inordinate 
rise in the number of mosques within Tatarstan’s borders in the early 1990s thus had a 
twofold function. First, the large number of mosques enhanced justification to set up a 
Kazan-based Spiritual Board. Second, it established a chain of dependency (imams at the 
local level → heads of governments at the district level → the political leadership at the 
republic level) that helped make certain that most mosques in Tatarstan would transfer 
loyalties from DUMES to the republic’s newly created “sovereign” Muftiate. 
With this foundation laid, national and religious leaders from Tatarstan convened 
an extraordinary Muslim Congress in late August 1992, while Supreme Mufti Tadjutdin 
was abroad. A majority of delegates in attendance, led by representatives from Ittifak, 
voted to secede from DUMES and create the independent Muslim Spiritual Board of the 
Republic of Tatarstan (DUMRT) (Garaeva 1994, 198). Gabdullah Galiullin, one of the 
new generation of “young imams” and allied with TOTs and Ittifak (Malashenko 1992, 
3), was elected Supreme Mufti of DUMRT. In justifying Tatarstan’s secession from 
DUMES, Gailiullin said, 
                                                          
63 Rafik Mukhametshin is a senior researcher associated with Marjani History Institute of the Academy of 
Sciences of Tatarstan. He is also the rector of the Russian Islamic University (RIU) in Kazan. 
64 As further evidence, Damir Iskhakov, who helped develop the government’s ethno-national ideology, 
said in a 1998 interview that mullahs “need to work with the heads of the districts” on issues related to 
constructing mosques and salaries (quoted in Galiamov 1998, 3). 
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We want to address the problems not included in those dealt with by the 
Spiritual Board and its headquarters in Ufa. What we find acceptable is 
not often acceptable for the Spiritual Board operating in Russia (quoted in 
PostFaktum 1992, 1, emphasis added). 
In making a political-territorial distinction between Russia and Tatarstan, Galiullin also 
drew on the historical memory of the Kazan Khanate and the loss of Tatar statehood, 
echoing the political discourse underpinning Tatarstan’s sovereignty claim. He said, 
“They [i.e. Russians] have kept our ancestors and us down under their crosses since 
1552” (quoted in Galimov 1992, 1). He added that the creation of DUMRT will 
“strengthen the independence of the republic” (Ibid., emphasis added). DUMRT was 
registered by the Council for Religious Affairs in the Cabinet of Ministers of Tatarstan 
within two weeks (Tul’skii 2004a), an unusually speedy processing of papers indicating 
that the Kazan-based government likewise viewed the new Muftiate as important to its 
sovereignty campaign. 
While the new Mufti generated discursive borders that fostered an inside-outside 
dynamic in line with the nationalists’ understanding of Tatarstan as the Tatars’ sovereign 
homeland, the internal territorial arrangement of DUMRT was similarly patterned on the 
contours of the republic. DUMRT was headquartered in Kazan and subdivided into 
mukhtasibs (regional divisions) that were coterminous with the republic’s administrative 
districts (raiony). The Kazan-based government empowered district heads with the 
authority to register mahallas (Islamic communities, i.e. mosques), powers previously 
held only in Kazan by the Council for Religious Affairs of Tatarstan (Garaeva 1994, 
202). Devolving the registration of mosques to the districts expedited the transition of 
mahallas from DUMES to DUMRT and reinforced relationships between imams and 
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heads of districts forged earlier with the construction of mosques. In effect, the 
territoriality of DUMRT replicated, and to a degree even fused with, that of the republic. 
By 1994 DUMRT had secured the loyalties of more than half of all mosques in 
the republic, while DUMES claimed jurisdiction over the remainder.65 While Kazan was 
in negotiations with Moscow over its sovereignty, the situation of having dual Spiritual 
Boards was allowed to stand so as not to upset the policy of “parity nationalism” set by 
the Shaimiev government. As explained to me in an interview with Khakimov, securing a 
favorable agreement with Moscow to a significant degree was dependent on no overt 
showing of favoritism by Kazan for one religion or national group (interview with 
Khakimov 2009). However, the policy of “parity nationalism” in this period, after 
decades – even centuries – of Russification policies, led to state support for a blossoming 
of Tatar-language newspapers and magazines, a substantial growth in the time allotted to 
the broadcasting of programs in Tatar on the radio and television, and, perhaps most 
importantly, the establishment of Tatar-language courses in many kindergartens, 
elementary schools, and high schools (Malik 1994). In other words, the Tatar national 
revival was in full stride, proceeding through secular institutions, not necessarily in 
mosques. 
The First Unification of DUMRT after the 1994 Bilateral Treaty 
The signing of the 1994 bilateral treaty between Kazan and Moscow, after a tense 
period of negotiations, reactivated the Tatar national movement in its attentions to the 
Muslim Spiritual Board. In December of that year an open letter from the “Tatar 
                                                          
65 At the start of 1994, 418 mosques in Tatarstan were registered with DUMRT, while 316 mosques in 
Tatarstan were registered with DUMES (Garaeva 1994, 201-202). 
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intelligentsia,” a group including both the centrist and more radical wings of the 
nationalists, called on all “imams and the Muslim community of the republic” to unite 
behind DUMRT and Mufti Galiullin (Obraschenie 1994, 4). The motivation behind this 
entreaty was to end the situation of dual, competing Spiritual Boards in the region and 
create a single, independent Muftiate of Tatarstan, thereby delinking the republic’s umma 
and the republic itself from the Russia-wide DUMES that was unquestionably loyal to 
Moscow. The existence of DUMRT as Tatarstan’s sole centralized Islamic institution was 
viewed by the Tatar national movement and the Kazan-based government alike, 
according to Mukhametshin, as a “necessary attribute of state sovereignty” in the post-
treaty context (interview with Mukhametshin 2010). This idea was realized the following 
month in an extraordinary Muslim Congress, organized in Kazan by the national 
leadership, to which more than 80 percent of the Muslim communities (i.e. mosques) of 
the republic sent delegates – a turnout that, while not completely extinguishing DUMES’ 
presence in the republic, de facto represented the unification of the region’s umma around 
DUMRT (Ibid.). 
The Muslim Congress of January 1995 resulted in a series of concrete measures, 
including the formation of an Ulema Council (Council of Islamic Scholars) that consisted 
of academics, intelligentsia, and national leaders; traditionalist religious leaders, because 
of their perceived fealty to “Orthodox” Islam, were mostly excluded (interview with D. 
Iskhakov 2009). The Ulema vowed to take up the task of formulating a “conception for a 
national type of Muslim education” that would produce a new generation of clergy to 
serve in the burgeoning number of mosques in Tatarstan (Polozhenie 1995, emphasis 
added). According to Damir Iskhakov, who was a top advisor to Mufti Galiullin and 
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served as a bridge between DUMRT and state authorities, the Ulema were in agreement 
that “national type” decisively meant reformist, Western-oriented Jadidist Islam that 
embraced ijtihad (independent interpretation of the Koran and Sunnah) and secular 
learning (interview with D. Iskhakov 2009). It is notable that DUMRT’s inaugural 
charter, penned at the January 1995 Muslim Congress, while supporting the practice of 
ijtihad, makes no reference to – not to mention support for – any specific madhhab 
(school of Islamic jurisprudence) (Ustav 1995, 64-65). As Iskhakov told me, DUMRT’s 
charter reflected the institution’s early dedication to adapting Tatar Islam to the 
conditions of modernity, crafting an “intellectual Islam” to serve the development of the 
Tatar nation and Tatar state, and its openness to theological pluralism. 
The national orientation of the “intellectual Islam” identified by Iskhakov, 
however, was distinguished not so much by its ostensible Western orientation, but by its 
anti-colonialism. This dynamic was evidenced in Rashad Amirkhanov’s take on the 
Jadidists’ legacy of religious reform. He wrote that their “Islamic teachings, which 
stimulated a progressive reformation of the Muslim’s life” a century earlier, were needed 
be Tatars today 
to fill the ideological vacuum, formed as a result of the crisis of a 
totalitarian ideology, and return to the people [narod] its faith in spiritual 
values. Islam is to educate a generation of thinkers and believers on the 
basis of humanistic principles. The fate of our people is largely determined 
by the ability of the new generation to use this historical chance given to 
us by the crisis of an imperial state and follow the struggle for national 
sovereignty through to the end (Amirkhanov 1996, 28). 
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As had been the case since TOTs first introduced Jadidism to the social-political 
discourse in 1991, Amirkhanov maintained that the “function” of Islam foremost was to 
serve the Tatar nation and the nascent Tatar state against a revanchist, innately imperialist 
power opposed to a people’s right to self-determination (Ibid.). Neo-Jadidist Islam, 
although grounded in universal “humanistic principles” – not religious dogma – was 
defined foremost against the colonial Russian Other.66 
The national movement may have spoken in a single voice for the unification of 
Tatarstan’s umma around DUMRT and Mufti Galiullin, but the divide between the 
moderate and more radical wings hardened and deepened over the terms of the 1994 
treaty, which acknowledged Tatarstan as a “State …united with the Russian Federation” 
(Treaty 1994, preamble, emphasis added). This division, based on the treaty’s glaring 
elision of the question of sovereignty, in turn affected the character of DUMRT. The 
centrist leadership of TOTs put its weight behind Shaimiev’s policy of “gradualism” 
(Malik 1994), understanding that the case for Tatarstan’s sovereignty would be built 
methodically over time through institutions, notably among them DUMRT. Viewing the 
Muftiate as part of a long-term nation- and state-building project that was based on the 
bilateral treaty, TOTs declared that “the Islamic community and the Spiritual Board of 
Tatarstan, not yielding to the influence of any political party, organization, or group, must 
serve the entire nation and the state” (TOTs 1996, 1). 
                                                          
66 For similar handlings of Jadidism in this period, see Amirkhanov (1994), Safin (1996a), and Safin 
(1996b). The first serious, in-depth analysis of the legacy of Jadidism appeared in 1997 with the publication 
of Iskhakov’s Fenomen Tatarskogo Dzhadidisma (The Phenomenon of Tatar Jadidism), a socio-historical 
analysis of the Tatars’ religious reform movement (D. Iskhakov 1997a). In recent years scholars at the 
Marjani History Institute in Kazan have been compiling and translating into Russian (originals were 
generally written in a variant of the Arabic script that was used for the Tatar language until 1928) the works 
of leading Tatar Jadidists in the latter part of the nineteenth century and into the first decades of the 
twentieth century. This is an important project that will contribute to broader and deeper academic 
exploration of the Tatar Jadidists’ legacy. 
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Mufti Galiullin, however, became more associated with the more radical Ittifak, 
whose leader, Fauiziia Bairamova, decried the 1994 treaty because, as she contended, it 
“took everything from us, most of all our national aspirations, our aspirations for 
independence” (interview with Bairamova 2009). Allied with Ittifak, Mufti Galiullin 
nurtured a confrontational relationship with the political establishment of Tatarstan 
(Khabibullin 2008, 80-81), echoing the radicals’ criticism of Shaimiev for betraying the 
cause of the Tatars’ independent statehood in favor of melding a state-defined national 
polity – a multiethnic “Tatarstani people” (tatarstanskii narod) – in the wake of the 1994 
treaty (D. Iskhakov 1997, 127-135). Thus, with conflicts arising over diverging 
understandings of homeland, Galiullin opposing the political elite, and a number of 
imams and parishioners following his lead, DUMRT enjoyed no regular financial support 
from the government (Iakupov 2005, 76-78). This stunted the development of a Jadidist-
inspired Islamic education system. 
The future shape of DUMRT and the position of its Mufti were decisively thrown 
into question again in late 1996, when Galiullin’s allies in Ittifak took part in the 
formation of a new political party called Muslims of Tatarstan (Mukhametshin 2005, 
176). The party’s creation coincided with a distinct shift in the character of Islam 
propagated by the radicals. Bairamova abruptly abandoned her previous support for 
Jadidism, claiming that the Tatars’ religious reform had “destroyed Islam from within.” 
She wrote, 
If the essence of Jadidism (reformism) is reduced to the renewal of 
religion under the guise of progress, pushing the nation toward infidels 
and battling against fundamental Islam, then the absolute unbelief of the 
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Tatar people can be viewed as a telling result of Jadidism (Bairamova 
1997, 22 emphasis added). 
Central to Bairamova’s rejection of Jadidism in favor of “fundamental Islam,” a concept 
she left undefined, was her concern for the fate of the Tatar nation, which, under 
Shaimiev’s propagation of a “Tatarstani people,” she saw as threatened by its admixture 
with “infidels.” As such, her criticism was not of Jadidism per se, but more immediately 
of the moderate nationalists. In supporting the post-treaty policy of “gradualism,” she 
argued, TOTs unduly embraced “alien” notions of progress and Western democratic 
ideals, stopping short of its original demand of constructing Tatarstan as the Tatars’ 
sovereign homeland: 
The Tatar intelligentsia, unable to fight for the independence of their own 
state, saw the path of the nation’s survival in progress, in the acceptance of 
the principles of an alien civilization. If Jadidism had not destroyed the 
bases of Islam, if it had created a Tatar national science,67 we would not 
be against the movement. But Jadidism has damaged true Islam (Ibid., 23, 
emphasis added). 
 Bairamova’s repudiation of Jadidism, along with the explicit politicization of 
Islam that came with her participation in the party Muslims of Tatarstan, represented a 
decisive split in the Tatar national movement. Whereas the national movement 
theretofore collectively supported the nationalization and modernization of Islam under 
the banner of Jadidism, or Euro-Islam, Ittifak now called for the Islamization of the Tatar 
nation, a return to explicit faith based on the Koran, not universal “humanistic values.” 
The radicals’ shifting register that incorporated an ambiguous “fundamental” or “true” 
                                                          
67 Bairamova here referred to the Tatar intelligentsia’s plans – never realized – to create a Tatar university 
independent of the Russia’s university system. 
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Islam, however, was not based on any theological argumentation; rather, it was driven by 
territorial grievances coming out of the 1994 treaty.68 While Mufti Galiullin publicly 
maintained his adherence to the principles of Jadidism and also worked with the 
moderates from TOTs who largely comprised the Ulema Council (Interfaks 1996), his 
alliance with Ittifak not only brought him into opposition with the political authorities, 
but also contributed to a renewed division in Tatarstan’s umma, reflective of the hardened 
split in the national movement. 
Protecting the Territorial Status Quo: The Second Unification of DUMRT 
For most of the 1990s, Shaimiev remained behind the scenes in his involvement 
with DUMRT, allowing the national leadership to guide the Muftiate’s development. 
However, by the latter part of the decade the Tatar national movement and its 
involvement in Spiritual Board had become a liability to the republic’s sovereignty 
project, which, since the signing of the 1994 treaty, was dependent on cultivating state 
nationalism (interviews with D. Iskhakov 2009; Khakimov 2009). With its Mufti allied 
with nationalists who maintained a vision of Tatarstan as the Tatars’ independent 
homeland, DUMRT in essence had become an oppositional organization rather than an 
institution that fulfilled its envisaged purpose of contributing to Tatarstan’s regime of 
territorial legitimation (Murphy 2005). Complicating matters was the fact that DUMES, 
                                                          
68 Bairamova’s grievances – accounting for her rejection of Jadidism in late 1996 – were undoubtedly 
compounded by the example of Chechnya, which had recently come out victorious in its war with Russia. 
In April of that year, as the battle for Grozny reached its pitch, Bairamova announced at a press conference 
that she awaited a phone call from the Chechen leader Dzhokar Dudaev. As Vecherniaia Kazan’ (Evening 
Kazan) reported, “An interesting situation has arisen. Now two people in Tatarstan – the president and the 
leader of the national opposition – are ready to talk directly with the Chechen general. Mintimer Shaimiev 
will recommend the ‘Model of Tatarstan’ to Chechnya – negotiations with the federal authorities, a treaty 
with Moscow, and a special status. Bairamova, on the other hand, wants to say that the ‘Tatarstani Model’ 
is in no way appropriate, that the Chechens have the right to independence, for which they paid with in 
blood” (Chernobrovkina 1996, 1). 
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as of late 1997 still claiming jurisdiction over approximately 10 percent of the mosques in 
Tatarstan,69 stood in opposition both to the political establishment – fundamentally set 
against its pretensions to sovereignty – and the leadership of DUMRT.70 
  Facing these challenges to the post-treaty territorial status quo, Shaimiev decreed 
that a “unifying” election would be held at the Muslim Congress of Tatarstan scheduled 
for February 1998, meaning that afterward all mosques in Tatarstan would be placed 
under the jurisdiction of a single Spiritual Board (Shaimiev 1998, 3). In so doing, he put 
forth a favored candidate, Gusman Iskhakov, a more pliant imam and a conservative 
traditionalist who had developed good relations with Tatarstan’s political elite. To ensure 
his candidate’s victory, Shaimiev, first, reactivated the established relationships between 
district heads and imams at local mosques, the former influencing the vote of the latter.71 
Second, a significant number of delegates who were unquestionably loyal to Mufti 
Galiullin (members of Ittifak in particular) were excluded from the Congress (Todres 
1998, 3). Third, the president also promised material incentives for a loyal DUMRT 
(Shaimiev 1998), including a new headquarters in central Kazan and greater financial 
support for Islamic education –items that had not been provided under the confrontational 
leadership of Mufti Galiullin. 
                                                          
69 According to the Council for Religious Affairs of Tatarstan, in December 1997, of the 769 registered 
Muslim communities (makhallas), 599 were affiliated with DUMRT, 60 sided with DUMES, and 110 were 
unaffiliated (cited in Adrakhmanov and Mavrina 1999, 85-87). 
70 Muftis Galiullin and Tadjutdin, since DUMRT’s 1992 secession from DUMES, maintained a highly 
antagonistic, even slanderous, relationship that was in no way hidden from the public. 
71 This is supported by several newspaper reports (e.g. Todres 1998; Sanin 1998; Vetlugin 1998) and 
interview subjects. As one observer attested, “The heads of local administrations explained to the congress 
deputies (brought to Kazan in buses hired by the republic’s administration) that they should vote for 
Gusman Iskhakov” (Tul’skii 2004b). As Mukhametshin added, some 200 mosques were under construction 
in the republic at the time – none wanting to risk the revocation of their funding (Mukhametshin 2005, 
145). 
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 Gusman Iskhakov’s victory at the February 1998 Muslim Congress was a 
foregone conclusion, as Damir Iskhakov, who since 1995 had served as a bridge between 
DUMRT and Shaimiev, made clear in a surprisingly frank newspaper interview on the 
eve of the election. In the interview he identified three reasons why Tatarstan needed a 
single Spiritual Board under the leadership of a Mufti loyal to the state: 
First, if all [mosques] are brought under the roof of a unified Spiritual 
Board of Tatarstan, quite a solid organization will be created that would 
include 700 [Muslim] communities. Practically every village has a 
mosque. Second, the republic somehow needs to reach out to Islamic 
countries. We work in Iraq, Iran, and in many instances the pioneers of 
those contacts are Muslim leaders. Throughout the world cultural 
expansion is connected with economics. But for that, as you understand, 
we need a capable organization. Third, there exists a direct interest in the 
realm of politics. For example, elections for the presidents of Russia and 
Tatarstan are right around the corner (interview in Galiamov 1998, 3). 
Thus, the Shaimiev government came to view DUMRT as a state institution of great 
importance, foremost for the performance of Tatarstan’s sovereignty, not necessarily the 
development of Tatar culture. Controlling all mosques in the region, the Spiritual Board 
could serve as the diplomatic vanguard in Tatarstan’s state-to-state relations with Muslim 
countries and, perhaps even more importantly, would help ensure Kazan’s status as the 
capital of a quasi-state within the Russian Federation. 
After the Muslim Congress, Shaimiev admitted that his hand had been 
“particularly visible” in engineering the election of his favored candidate.72 The Tatar 
                                                          
72 Twelve candidates competed for the votes of the 718 delegates in attendance. Iskhakov won 430 votes 
(60 percent), while Galiullin received 111 votes (15 percent) (DUMRT 1999, 29).  
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president, however, was less brazen in justifying his actions, claiming social – not state – 
interests were at stake: 
Although separate from state, religion is not separate from society. 
Therefore the state recognizes the necessity of constructive cooperation 
with religion in solving many socially important problems. Foremost that 
means the consolidation of society (Shaimiev 1998, 3, emphasis added). 
Prefiguring Putin’s discourse on the konsolidatsiia of a “multinational Russian people,” 
Shaimiev viewed Islam as an independent political force – as it had become under the 
influence of the Tatar national movement – as a threat to his consolidation of a 
“multinational Tatarstani people.” This message was repeated by the government’s 
mouthpiece newspaper, Respublika Tatarstan (The Republic of Tatarstan), which 
claimed that Shaimiev “in his interactions with religious confessions proceeds from the 
principles of serving the people … state organs and the Muftiate of Tatarstan will 
promote the unity of the people, the preservation of stability and peace in society” (Tatar-
Inform 1998, 1). With the state and the new Mufti together claiming to serve the unity of 
the people – the “multinational Tatarstani people,” not the Tatar nation – the unified 
Muftiate abandoned its previous dedication to religious reform and Western-oriented 
modernization, and officially rededicated itself to the promotion of a so-called 
“traditional” Tatar Islam based on fealty “to the religious school (madhhab) of Imam Abu 
Hanifa” (Ustav 1998, 38-39).  
 The next section of this chapter examines how this “traditional” Islam is 
represented by DUMRT and how it has been influenced by Russia’s political-territorial 
transformation brought about under Putin’s watch. Prior to engaging in this discussion, 
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however, it is important to underline that the 1998 reformation of the Muftiate signaled 
an end to the direct influence of the Tatar national movement in the institution’s 
development. That the Kazan-based government was able to engineer these changes to 
DUMRT without a significant backlash is indicative of both the national movement’s 
success and its declining importance. The creation of DUMRT was only one part of a 
much larger program spearheaded by TOTs, Ittifak, and other organizations to redevelop 
Tatar national culture and to bolster Tatarstan’s sovereignty claim. Although the latter of 
these twin goals was only nebulously formalized in the 1994 bilateral treaty, Tatarstan, 
nonetheless, in many ways operated as an independent state in the latter part of the 1990s. 
As for the former, the Tatar language was taught universally in the republic’s schools as a 
required course, and Tatarstan appeared to be on the way to accomplishing the state goal 
of functional bilingualism (Davis et al. 2000; Cashaback 2008). In short, although 
mosques had multiplied throughout the region, the Tatar national revival proceeded apace 
through a variety of secular institutions. With its primary goals seemingly having been 
met, the influence of the Tatar national movement was already in sharp decline by the 
latter part of the 1990s (D. Iskhakov 1997, 105-118). 
 Nonetheless, in the wake of the DUMRT’s 1998 unification, TOTs, although still 
loyal to Shaimiev’s policy of “gradualism,” issued a guarded warning about the 
consequences of trying to divorce Islam from politics and the Tatar national movement: 
The history of Tatar culture … is in the closest way connected with Islam. 
Therefore Islam cannot be cut off from national politics, from the national 
movement. Islam is tightly intertwined and must be involved with them 
[i.e. national politics and the national movement]. What’s more, pure 
Islam itself may even move the national movement forward. Whatever 
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happens, pure Islam must fight for the national and state independence of 
the Tatar people (TOTs 1998, 94, emphasis added). 
Although TOTs, like Bairamova earlier, offered no explanation of the concept of “pure 
Islam,” the implication here was that, in the event that the Tatars were deprived of their 
aspirations of a nation-state, an Islam of a much different character than reformist 
Jadidism, or notions of Euro-Islam, would come to the fore of the national movement. As 
will be seen in the following section, this was a prescient warning. 
DUMRT and the Borders of Faith in a Period of Recentralization 
The 1998 unification of DUMRT signified the institution’s definitive break with 
the Tatar national movement that spearheaded its formation earlier in the decade. Since 
its unification the Spiritual Board has firmly dedicated itself to propagating a so-called 
“traditional” Tatar Islam based on strict adherence to the Hanafi madhhab, the school of 
Islamic jurisprudence followed by the Tatars’ ancestors since the religion was introduced 
in the region in the tenth century and the type of Islam the original Jadidists, along with 
the neo-Jadidists in the 1990s, sought to reform and modernize (D. Iskhakov 1997a). 
Under a law titled “On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations,” passed 
by Tatarstan’s parliament in June 1999, DUMRT was designated as the “single 
centralized religious organization” for all of the republic’s Muslim communities (Zakon 
1999, Article 10, Point 5). Consequently, Tatar traditionalism as supported by the 
conservative Hanafi theologians of DUMRT has become the sole “official” Islam in 
Tatarstan (Makarov and Mukhametshin 2003), communicated and reinforced via a 
vertically integrated network that encompasses all mosques and Islamic education centers 
in the republic. The Spiritual Board’s support for neo-traditionalism was established just 
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before the renewal of warfare in Chechnya, which heralded a sharp reversal in the 
political-territorial context that, in turn, has fundamentally shaped the meaning of 
“official” Islam in Tatarstan today. 
DUMRT and the Borders of “Official” Islam 
Unlike the neo-Jadidism inchoately formulated by the national intelligentsia for 
much of the 1990s, “traditional” Tatar Islam as advocated by DUMRT today demands 
active observance and practice of prescribed religious principles and rituals. Yet the 
religious requirements of “official” Islam do not detract from its national orientation. If 
reform-minded Jadidism was cast foremost as an attribute of national culture by the 
TOTs leadership and first Ulema Council, the post-1998 Spiritual Board represents Islam 
as the very core of the Tatar nation. Supreme Mufti Gusman Iskhakov made this point 
clear following his election in February 1998: “Islam, tightly interwoven with our 
customs and the moral codes of our people, defines our national identity” (G. Iskhakov 
1998, 27). In this understanding, religion and national identity cannot be separated – 
Islam is the very foundation of Tatar national identity, not simply a cultural attribute of 
the nation. “Traditional” Tatar Islam, as denoted in its very name, is an ethnic religion. 
The national movement of the 1990s hailed Jadidism for its ostensible 
modernizing qualities, which they associated with Europe, their geo-civilizational 
orientation and model for Tatarstan. In contrast, the unified Spiritual Board emphasizes 
the Tatars’ specific local and regional geo-history, which its leaders claim has formed a 
distinctive Tatar Islam over the centuries. Following his election, Mufti Iskhakov stressed 
that Tatars have developed as a unique Muslim people, their identity and religion 
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fundamentally having been shaped by their relative isolation from the broader Islamic 
world and their adaptation over the centuries to living within a non-Muslim state (G. 
Iskhakov 1998, 26). Because the Hanafi madhhab is distinguished by its “especial 
tolerance toward other religions and the capacity to coexist with culturally dissimilar 
peoples,” the Mufti contended, traditional Tatar Islam is “suited to our local conditions” 
(Ibid., 27, emphasis added). The Tatars’ ancestors could recognize the authority of a 
Christian ruler and dwell among Orthodox Russians, he said, but only their strict 
observance of long-established religious traditions saved them from total assimilation by 
a “culturally dissimilar people.” 
The new Mufti’s emphasis on the tolerant nature of Tatar traditionalism was 
codified in DUMRT’s 1998 charter. A primary goal of the organization was “preserving 
inter-confessional and inter-national [i.e. interethnic] peace and accord in society” (Ustav 
1998, 38). This aim was calibrated to complement Shaimiev’s concept of a “multinational 
Tatarstani people” (Derrick 2008, 81-83), thereby enhancing the legitimacy of 
“sovereign” Tatarstan and contributing to the maintenance of the territorial status quo 
formalized in the 1994 treaty with Moscow. Whereas the Tatar president formerly 
discussed mutual tolerance as expressed between the Tatar and Russian “peoples” 
[narody] in the republic, following DUMRT’s unification, he shifted focus to the 
tolerance he insisted exists between Islam and Orthodoxy in the region, claiming that “the 
kind of inter-confessional relations that have formed in Tatarstan are a model for the rest 
of Russia” (quoted in Zargishiev 1999, 4). Thus, the Spiritual Board and state 
synchronized discursive borders of inclusion/exclusion, framing social relations within 
the republic as qualitatively different (better) than outside in the rest of Russia, 
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reinforcing notions of a certain tolerance arising from a centuries-long shared history and 
geography between Muslim Tatars and Orthodox Russians within Tatarstan. 
DUMRT’s communication of tolerant traditionalism was originally intended to 
counter previously institutionalized representations of Tatar Islam defined against an 
innately imperial Russian Other and thereby assist the political leadership in cultivating a 
state nationalism that would contribute to Tatarstan’s pretensions to sovereign statehood. 
With the political-territorial recentralization of the Russian Federation effected under 
Putin’s watch, however, the Spiritual Board’s message of simple tolerance has shifted to 
one of mutual respect and even a significant degree of similarity between the two main 
religions traditionally practiced in the Middle Volga region. In my interview with first 
deputy Mufti Valiulla Iakupov, for instance, he discussed the “experience of peaceful 
coexistence of the two traditional religions” – Russian Orthodoxy and what he called 
“Orthodox Islam” (ortodoksal’nyi Islam) – as being characterized by 
not mere tolerance, but in fact deep respect for each other. The two 
religions cooperate in Tatarstan, complement each other. Tatars and 
Russians have lived side by side in the Volga area for centuries, our 
religions have evolved in a close dialogue with each other. And therefore 
our faiths actually have a lot in common (interview with Iakupov 2009).73  
A short distance separated the discursive konsolidatsiia of a “multinational Tatarstani 
people” shaped by Shaimiev after the 1994 treaty and Putin’s discourse of the 
konsolidatsiia of a “multinational Russian people” who are united by the fate of sharing 
“religions traditional to Russia” (Putin 2002). In short, “official” Islam in Tatarstan 
                                                          
73 This message was repeated in several interviews with Tatar imams at mosques. For his part, Iakupov has 
gone so far to identify “theological reasons for the compatibility of Islam and Orthodoxy in Tatarstan” 
(Iakupov 2006, 433-435). 
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today, by the deputy Mufti’s own accord, is in essence a rescaled version of the 
“Orthodox” Islam promoted by the Spiritual Board in Tsarist and Soviet Russia. 
DUMRT and the Exclusionary Borders of “Unofficial” Islam 
Considering that DUMRT is legally recognized as the “single centralized 
religious organization” in Tatarstan and the institution supports only Tatar Islam based on 
the Hanafi madhhab, all other Islamic movements in the republic are de facto understood 
as “unofficial.” However, the most important target of the Spiritual Board’s censure is 
what most often is referred to as “Wahhabism.” DUMRT representatives decry 
Wahhabism as an aggressive “sect” that, in its pretensions to universalism, poses a 
distinct threat to the inter-confessional harmony in Tatarstan and, moreover, to Tatar 
culture itself. As Iakupov, who has been most public in making the case for neo-
traditionalism, asserts, 
Wahhabites do not simply consider themselves the most perfect exponents 
of the Muslim religious idea, but they also aspire to make all other 
Muslims like themselves. If certain Muslims do not wish to become like 
them, then they at least attempt to make sure that Muslim Spiritual Boards 
are managed by their allies. This aggressive intra-confessional proselytism 
is opposed by the scattered masses of traditional Muslims. Tatar culture is 
connected with a specific form of spiritual life – Hanafi Islam. If our Islam 
is destroyed, then our culture itself is destroyed (Iakupov 2006, 367). 
During an interview, Iakupov discussed how “Wahhabites” and “Salafists” (he used the 
two terms interchangeably) have criticized as bid’ah (heretical innovation) religious 
practices long held by Tatars, such as the (informal) institution of female clergy; the 
tradition of praying and reading the Koran at the graves of relatives on the third, seventh, 
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and fortieth days after the death of a loved one; and the annual pilgrimage, popularly 
called a “little hajj,” to the historical ruins of the city of Bolgar, where the Tatars’ 
ancestors first officially accepted Islam in the tenth century (interview with Iakupov 
2009). 
Iakupov went on to blame the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Moscow for drawing on 
its considerable resources to finance the spread of their Wahhabi ideology among the 
umma of Tatarstan. He cited the presence of Saudi-backed “extremist” literature that, in 
spite of its illegal status in Russia, is easily obtainable throughout Tatarstan. The Mufti 
also condemned Saudi Arabia and a host of other Arab countries for their “foreign 
inference” in the lives of the republic’s umma, employing methods such as sending young 
Tatar Muslims abroad to receive an Islamic education;74 upon their return home, he 
contended, these young men sow seeds of discord in mosques in villages and cities 
throughout the republic by “forcing a foreign religious ideology” on Tatars accustomed to 
their own Islamic traditions (interview with Iakupov 2009). 
Although Wahhabism receives the lion’s share of DUMRT’s censure, the 
institution’s leaders also denounce a host of other “unofficial” Islamic “sects,” including 
the Tablighi Jamaat,75 the Nursi movement,76 Hizb ut-Tahrir (“The Islamic Party of 
                                                          
74 According to the Council of Religious Affairs of Tatarstan, in the 1990s about 200 Muslims from 
Tatarstan received a religious education abroad (Nabiev 2006, 17). In 2001, 60 Muslims from Tatarstan 
were studying theology abroad in the following countries: Egypt (37 students), Saudi Arabia (16), Syria 
(4), Turkey (2), Tunisia (2), Yemen (2), Malaysia (1), Sudan (1), and Libya (1) (Nabiev 2002, 198). 
75 Originally started in India in the 1920s, the Tablighi Jamaat is an Islamic missionary and revival 
movement that seeks to bring a spiritual awakening among Muslims throughout the world. It is banned in 
Russia as an “extremist group.” 
76 The Nursi movement, started by Said Nursi in post-World War II Turkey and updated today by Fethullah 
Gülen, who lives in the US, seeks the modernization of Islam. With the fall of the Soviet Union, its leaders 
set as a primary goal the re-Islamization of their “Turkic brothers” in Central Asia and Russia. The 
movement, along with the works of Nursi, is banned in Russia as “extremist.” 
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Liberation”),77 and numerous others.78 However, one “unofficial” Islamic movement in 
particular in Tatarstan has been the target of highly personal attacks: neo-Jadidism or, as 
it is alternately known, Euro-Islam – the same type of Islam that was favored by DUMRT 
from its formation in 1992 until the institution’s 1998 unification. In a pamphlet issued 
by DUMRT in 2003, Iakupov denounced the Tatar “Islamic reformists” for their 
uncritical faith in “progress” and unwarranted embrace of Western ideas. He 
characterized their promotion of ijtihad as a “battle against religion” because the 
independent interpretation of the Koran and Sunnah, in essence, absolves Tatars of their 
traditional spiritual commitments and active observation (Iakupov 2003, 29). Elsewhere, 
Iakupov has implicated Rafael Khakimov, who popularized the idea of Euro-Islam while 
serving as Shaimiev’s top political adviser in the 1990s, in the spread of Islamic 
fundamentalism in Tatarstan, writing, “Let’s not forget that Wahhabites also reject the 
madhhabs” (Iakupov 2006, 39). 
Keeping the Mosque Clean for “Official” Islam 
“Official” Islam is today defined primarily against Wahhabism and other foreign 
“sects.” However, nowhere in materials from the 1998 Muslim Congress were concerns 
for “nonnative” Islam or “extremism” mentioned (DUMRT 1999). Neo-traditionalism 
was defined foremost against previous representations generated by the national 
movement, not against “alien” religious dogma. Muslim missionaries (and others) from 
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and other Muslim countries had been present in the republic for 
                                                          
77 Founded in Jerusalem in the 1950s, Hizb ut-Tahrir is a Sunni Muslim political party that seeks to restore 
the caliphate through nonviolent means. It is banned as an “extremist group” in Russia. 
78 DUMRT issued a pamphlet in 2003 titled “Unofficial Islam in Tatarstan” that lists 14 “sects” it considers 
“unofficial” (Iakupov 2003). 
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much of the previous decade.79 Yet their activities attracted little or no censure. In fact, 
their presence was generally viewed positively, as evidence of the Tatars “restoring lost 
cultural and economic ties with countries of the East” (Musina 1997, 217). In the 1990s 
the appellations “extremist” and “nonnative” were applied mainly to neo-Protestant 
“sects” to which increasing numbers of “genetic Muslims” were drawn (Baltanova 1997, 
192-193). This is not to say that Tatarstan was free of Wahhabism or other forms of 
Islamic fundamentalism. In fact, by the latter half of the 1990s, according to 
Mukhametshin, “You could meet adherents of that doctrine among religious figures, 
teachers, and students in medresses” (interview with Mukhametshin 2009).80 
Nonetheless, Islamic fundamentalism appeared to be of no concern to state authorities or 
DUMRT.81 
Wahhabism became a salient feature of social and political discourse in Tatarstan 
only in August 1999, when then-Prime Minister Putin launched the second Chechen war. 
The presence of some foreign militants, including Arab mujahideen, fighting against 
                                                          
79 The presence of missionaries in part was a byproduct of Kazan’s sovereignty project. The republic drew 
on its Islamic identity, according to Sharafutdinova, to “develop special relations with Turkey, Egypt, the 
UAE and Jordan” (Sharafutdinova 2003, 618). She identifies “cultural, religious and political factors as 
driving forces behind these contacts” (Ibid.), since Turkey, Egypt, and other Muslim states, out of cultural 
and religious affinity, took Tatarstan’s claims to statehood more seriously than non-Muslim countries. 
Diplomacy with Muslim countries included cultural exchanges bringing foreign missionaries to the 
republic and allowing Muslims from Tatarstan to pursue Islamic education abroad. 
80 Followers of more literalist versions of Islam were active – and open in their activity – in Tatarstan by 
the late perestroika era. For example, a group of Muslims calling itself Saf Islam – “Pure Islam” – was 
public about its fundamentalist beliefs. The group’s publications from the early 1990s contained assertions 
such as “the only true path on Earth is the path of the Koran. That path has been revealed by the ‘Creator’ 
himself, and those who do not follow it are ‘lost people’” (quoted in D. Iskhakov 1992, 40). Saf Islam 
insisted that the Koran could be interpreted by any educated Muslim; madhhabs were unnecessary. The 
group’s concrete goals were essentially democratic, including the election of Muftis by all Muslims in the 
republic, not appointed by the state, and the election of imams by members of each mosque, not appointed 
by the Muftiate, as was the Soviet convention (Ibid., 40-41). Freely propagating its beliefs in the early 
1990s, Saf Islam attracted few followers and, as records indicate, no public reprobation (Mukhametshin 
1994, 112-113). 
81 This assertion is based on my broad reading of Kazan-based press and other secondary materials, along 
with interviews with key informants. 
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Russian troops allowed Moscow to frame the conflict as a campaign to liberate Chechens 
from the clutch of international Islamic extremism and thereby restore the country’s 
territorial integrity (see generally Ware 2005). The proliferation of Wahhabism in the 
North Caucasus, along with the justifications proffered by Moscow in its bombardment 
of Grozny, served as a clarion warning to DUMRT and the political establishment of 
“sovereign” Tatarstan to cleanse the republic’s Muslim communities of, as Mufti 
Iskhakov put it weeks after the renewed warfare in Chechnya, “alien, nonnative 
doctrines” that have the potential of “destroying society’s traditional soil” (G. Iskhakov 
1999, 18). Since the start of the second Chechen war, accusations of Wahhabism have 
become a political weapon of sorts, deployed first by opponents of DUMRT outside of 
Tatarstan82 and eventually by different factions within Tatarstan’s Muslim community 
itself.83 Anxieties of “Chechenization” and the political power in allegations of being 
friendly to religious fundamentalism endure as drivers behind DUMRT’s policing of the 
republic’s mosques. 
DUMRT’s campaign to keep “nonnative” versions of Islam out of mosques under 
its purview, however, is not simply a prophylactic measure. With the Putin-era political-
territorial recentralization having denuded the republic of much of its formal autonomy, 
                                                          
82 For instance, just weeks after renewed warfare in Chechnya, Farid Salman, a high-ranking imam 
associated with DUMES who was pushed out of Tatarstan following the unification of DUMRT, sent a 
letter to Rossiiskaiia Gazeta (The Russian Gazette), the official newspaper of the Russian parliament in 
which he accused DUMRT of “sowing Wahhabism under the guise of ‘traditional Islam’” (Salman 1999). 
Tatar nationalism, he charged, was fusing with radical Islamism. Salman blamed these and multiple other 
allegations on Mufti Iskhakov, whom he characterized as a Saudi agent. He painted Kazan-based 
politicians as collaborators, since, having recently passed legislation making DUMRT the sole centralized 
Islamic organization of Tatarstan, they gave Iskhakov and his foreign sponsors free range to spread their 
“alien” ideologies. As an opponent to Tatarstan’s pretensions to sovereign statehood, Salman found a 
willing audience in Moscow – and a press eager to publish his allegations – and has repeated accusations of 
Tatarstan’s “Wahhabization” in a number of forums, including in my interview with him in 2009. 
83 High profile proponents of neo-Jadidism, or Euro-Islam, have targeted various high-ranking clergy and 
leaders of DUMRT’s central apparatus with accusations of Wahhabism over the past decade.   
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the temple is seen today as one of the last bastions of the revival of Tatar culture. The 
leadership of the Spiritual Board is insistent that Tatar remain the language of “official” 
Islam in the mosques of Tatarstan (interviews with Iakupov 2009; G. Iskhakov 2009),84 
as has historically been the case in the region. All medresses in Tatarstan, in addition to 
providing a religious education, also require shakirds85 to take courses on the history of 
the Tatar people, Tatar language, and Tatar literature (Khabutdinov 2005). Additionally, 
many mosques now offer similar courses for non-shakirds. Because the number of Tatar-
language schools has precipitously dropped, as has the number of hours devoted to the 
Tatar language in mixed schools in the republic,86 “traditional” Tatar Islam is once again 
said to “fulfill the task of preserving the Tatar nation” from all-out assimilation (Iakupov 
2006, 25), much as the religion did in the Tsarist era. 
The Spiritual Board’s campaign against “unofficial” Islam also aids in fulfilling a 
highly important political function by ensuring that Tatarstan, although disabused of its 
pretensions to sovereign statehood, retains a significant degree of informal autonomy in 
its relations with the Moscow.  Since DUMRT seceded from DUMES in 1992, more than 
40 Muslim Spiritual Boards have been formed in Russia, which can be divided into two 
categories: regional and all-Russian. DUMRT is the only regional Spiritual Board – its 
territoriality replicating that of the republic – not subject to one of the two main all-
                                                          
84 As a number of observers have contended, the language of “unofficial” versions of Islam in Tatarstan 
(and other parts of Russia) most often is Russian (interviews with Garipov 2009; Zagidullin 2009; 
Mukhametshin 2010; see also Arkhangel’sakia 2003 for an extended discussion on the topic). My 
observations provide some confirmation for this assertion. In the two (of more than 50) mosques in Kazan 
where the primary language is Russian, Friday prayers and lectures were generally led by Arabs, clearly not 
versed in “traditional” Tatar Islam. Although missionaries from Saudi Arabia and other Muslim countries 
are essentially banned from Tatarstan, a number of religiously trained Arabs study in universities in Kazan 
or have married locally. 
85 A shakird is a student of a medressah. 
86 Additionally, the Tatar language is being squeezed out of state-sponsored broadcast media. 
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Russian Muftiates. Controlling some 1,250 mosques – more than one-quarter of all 
Muslim communities in Russia – DUMRT is the largest Spiritual Board in Russia 
(Silant’ev 2008, 217). Thus, unquestionably loyal to the Kazan-based government, 
DUMRT, in cultivating a tolerant “traditional” Tatar Islam, contributes to a relationship 
between Russia and Tatarstan that can be described as a “confessional confederation” 
that, unlike in the Tsarist era, today is surely territorial. While no longer the capital of 
“sovereign” Tatarstan, Kazan can rightly claim the title of Russia’s “Muslim capital” 
(Garaev 2009), ensuring itself a significant role in the country’s push to expand 
diplomatic and economic relations with Muslim countries.87 
To ensure that mosques remain spaces where “official” Islam is followed, 
DUMRT relies on a number of reinforcement mechanisms. First, since its 1998 
reformation the Spiritual Board maintains a close relationship with the Council for 
Religious Affairs (Nabiev 2002), a state agency that, much as was the case in the Soviet 
era, is associated with internal security and intelligence forces and retains its duties in 
monitoring mosques in the republic. Second, the territorial-administrative arrangement of 
the Spiritual Board aids in reinforcing the dictates of the institution’s central apparatus. 
As discussed earlier in the chapter, each of the republic’s mosques is arranged within one 
of 45 regional subdivisions (mukhtasibaty), each of which is headed by an imam-
mukhsatibat. Each of the 45 regional subdivisions is in turn arranged within one of nine 
                                                          
87 A notable example is the role played by Kazan in seeking Russia’s membership in the Organization of 
Islamic Congress (OIC). According to Khakimov, he and Shaimiev had worked with Putin to arrange the 
Russian president’s attendance at OIC 2003 summit, at which Russia was admitted as an observer status. 
Tatars from Kazan accompanied Putin in the visit. OIC representatives since have made numerous visits to 
Kazan. 
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meso-scale regions (khaziiats),88 each headed by an imam-khaziiat who reports directly 
to the Supreme Mufti of the central apparatus (DUMRT 2011). Third, DUMRT 
reinforces “official” Islam through accreditation and licensing procedures. Since 2000 all 
religious schools in the region have been subject to the centralized institution 
(Mukhametshin 2005), which has implemented a standardized educational program that 
produces imams and mullahs exclusively trained in the traditions of the Hanafi madhhab. 
Although each Islamic community has the right to select its own clergy, each imam and 
mullah must first be approved by the central apparatus of DUMRT (interview with 
Iakupov 2009). In addition to policing, administrative, and accrediting oversight, the 
Spiritual Board also produces an array of Islamic literature that helps communicate and 
reinforce preferred religious expressions and practices. 
The Moderate Face of Fundamentalism 
The unification of DUMRT and its subsequent promotion of “official” Islam have 
been accompanied by a noticeable upswing in mosque attendance. A significant portion 
of Tatar society is being re-traditionalized (or a new conservative identity is being 
created). Yet in being “openly at war with local Salafist movements” (Laurelle 2007, 26), 
the leaders of the Spiritual Board, along with the authorities who support them, not only 
close the Tatar umma to new and potentially innovative ideas, but their marginalization of 
“unofficial” forms of the faith may be short-sighted and potentially even dangerous. I 
                                                          
88 The meso-scale regions were created after the 1998 reformation. Originally numbering seven, the 
khaziiaty recently were rearranged and increased in number to nine. This most recent reorganization 
appears to be a connected to the April 2011 election of the new Supreme Mufti, Il’dus Faizov, who rose to 
DUMRT’s top post promising a complete “de-Wahhabization” of Tatarstan’s umma (Suleimanov 2011). 
The election of Faizov set off separatist sentiment among Islamic communities in the Al’met’evsk region, 
leading to the imam-mukhsatib and imam-khaziiat overseeing the region to be accused of fostering 
“Wahhabism” and, subsequently, being replaced by the new Supreme Mufti with new, loyal imams. 
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spent several months attending Friday sermons and lectures led by a Jordanian national 
named Kamal Al Zandt,89 a Salafist whose speaking engagements in Kazan draw large 
crowds.90 Nothing in his sermons or lectures could be construed as “radical,” “extremist,” 
or even overtly political.91 However, in the atmosphere created by DUMRT today, his 
popularity, based on the simple – what to the uninitiated would seem innocuous – 
message of Islam’s universalism, is perceived as a threat.92 His invocation of the popular 
hadith about the umma being divided into 73 sects, but only one of them being true is 
anathema to the Muftiate and its propagation of an ethnic Islam. The notion, as Al Zandt 
communicated to me, that “it is necessary to Islamize the nation, not nationalize Islam” 
puts him in opposition, even without advocating any form of proselytism, to the 
authorities (interview with Al Zandt 2009) – a position unnecessarily imposed on him, 
along with his followers, in the current environment. 
During my fieldwork, young Salafist men with whom I developed close 
acquaintanceships complained of harassment by local authorities, most often consisting 
                                                          
89 Al Zandt moved to Kazan in the early 1990s to study medicine and, after marrying locally, has lived 
there since, practicing medicine, in addition to giving sermons and lectures. He and other Arab students 
began holding prayers at the historical Burnai Mosque in central Kazan, which had been used as a music 
school under the Soviet authorities. Today the Burnai Mosque is the only mosque in Kazan where Russian 
language dominates and followers of “unofficial” Islam freely gather. When Al Zandt delivers Friday 
sermons, it is not uncommon that people flow out into the streets. 
90 He is said to be the most popular speaker on Islam in Kazan, although he is not a formal clergy member. 
91 In addition to attending his lectures and sermons in person, I have read a collection of his writings and 
watched a number of video recordings (which sell well at the small bookstore located on the grounds of the 
Burnai Mosque). Again, I have detected nothing “extremist,” “radical,” or even overtly political. 
92 During my fieldwork, Al Zandt regularly gave religious-based lectures at the Eniler Mosque, associated 
with the Russian Islamic University (RIU) in Kazan. As was the case with his sermons at the Burnai 
Mosque, his lectures at the Eniler Mosque attracted capacity-level crowds. His popularity, especially at a 
mosque associated with RIU, drew criticism from the authorities. Since my departure from Kazan, I have 
been informed, Al Zandt has been barred from giving lectures at the mosque. 
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of being stopped and aggressively questioned by police for no apparent reason.93 While 
undoubtedly strident in their religious convictions, these young men contended that it was 
the authorities who politicize Islam, not followers of “unofficial” Islam. As Abdullah,94 
an ethnic Russian convert in his mid-twenties, complained, “Our Muftis and most of the 
clergy are more concerned with politics than with Islam.” His criticism of DUMRT’s 
leaders for being “corrupt” and their close association with the government was echoed 
by a number of my other acquaintances who could be classified as Salafists.95 Contrary to 
assertions made by the authorities, these young men did not advocate the politicization of 
Islam, but instead wished for its de-politicization in Tatarstan. 
Islam and the Changing Nationalist Discourse 
For the nationalist organizations Ittifak and TOTs, which led the formation of 
DUMRT in 1992, the political-territorial transformation that has been effected over the 
past decade has served to intensify the Islamist register to which they had begun shifting 
by the latter part of the 1990s. In my interview with Fauiziia Bairamova, who remains the 
highly outspoken leader of Ittifak, she claimed that 
Allah is punishing the Tatars for our lack of faith, for not being good 
Muslims. We did not fight for our independence. Instead we believed in a 
treaty, we believed in Euro-Islam, not in pure Islam [chistyi Islam], not in 
the Koran. And what did sovereignty give us? Absolutely nothing … For 
                                                          
93 This is especially true of those with large beards and other markers that are associated with Wahhabism 
in Russia, as I have witnessed in my walks with such men in Kazan. 
94 This is a pseudonym. However, it should be noted that most ethnic Russians take a “Muslim” names 
following their conversion. For more on ethnic Russian converts to Islam in Tatarstan, see Derrick (2009b). 
95 It should be stated that Muslims, at least in the context of contemporary Tatarstan, who generally would 
be classified by others as “Salafists” or “Wahhabites” are unlikely to classify themselves as such. Rather, 
they are more likely to call themselves simply “Muslims,” without any qualification. This is at least in part 
due to the official censure of “unofficial” Islam. 
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Russians, Russia must be an Orthodox power [pravoslavnaia derzhava]. 
Islam has no place in Russia … If we Tatars want independence, we must 
be true Muslims and fight for our freedom, for our statehood (interview 
with Bairamova 2009). 
In Bairamova’s formulation, only a deep spiritual renewal of Tatars – turning to “pure 
Islam” and acting as “true Muslims” – will result in their own statehood. She insisted 
that, under the current DUMRT, Tatars cannot be “true Muslims” because the Spiritual 
Board’s leaders are “agents of the empire … calling Muslims to reconcile themselves to 
living peacefully under the rule of infidels [kafirs] when they should be calling us to 
struggle against them.”96 
 Bairamova’s transformation from a “radical nationalist” to a “radical Islamist” 
was already well underway before the unification of DUMRT and the subsequent 
recentralization of Russia, reflective of her grievances over the terms of the 1994 bilateral 
treaty. TOTs, which had supported Shaimiev’s policy of “gradualism,” shifted to more of 
an Islamist register only after the federal center had unambiguously launched its 
campaign against Tatarstan’s claim to sovereignty. This change is witnessed in a 
resolution accepted at the organization’s seventh Congress of 2002. In stating that 
“religion and the national movement are elements of a single social system, tightly 
intertwined, and complement each other,” TOTs repeated earlier assertions, but the 
declaration went on to urge Muslims 
                                                          
96 In my interview with Bairamova, she used the Russian words bor’ba (“fight” or “struggle”) and borot’sia 
(“to fight” or “to struggle”), but never mentioned Jihad as she had in some of her writings (in Tatar) earlier 
in the decade. While she has mainly used Jihad in its “greater” meaning (i.e. an internal struggle), she has 
also used the term in its “lesser” meaning: “To defend oneself, and especially for Muslims mired in a 
difficult plight, Allah permits the use of physical force, even views it as pleasing and a required act for 
Muslims. A Muslim must always be ready for Jihad, especially when Muslims live among infidels. We 
Tatars, having fallen into slavery more than 500 years ago, in order to free ourselves from that slavery, 
must fight, conduct Jihad, in order to achieve freedom” (quoted in D. Iskhakov 2002, 125). 
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to fight actively for freedom and independence of peoples and nations in 
this world, not in the life hereafter. Those believers who fall for the false 
exhortations of the allies of colonial policies commit a great sin, 
attempting to maintain neutrality, not differentiating good from evil, just 
preparing themselves for the next life. … [A]ccording to the canons of 
Islam, only the Muslim who in this life actively fights for his rights and 
the rights of his people for freedom and independence will be permitted 
entrance through the heavenly gates. … The fight for national and state 
sovereignty of the Tatar people and the Republic of Tatarstan is the sacred 
duty of the Muslim in this life, prescribed to him by the Koran (TOTs 
2002, 24). 
 TOTs offered a thinly veiled denunciation of DUMRT’s leaders for being “allies 
of colonialism” who maintain “neutrality” in the face of perceived injustice, an 
accusation repeated in a more recent declaration in which the nationalist organization 
paints the Muftiate as an imperial instrument “for the control of Muslim clergy and the 
brainwashing of Muslims” (TOTs 2011). Like Bairamova and others in Ittifak, TOTs has 
moved to a position in which negotiations with the “colonial rulers” are now viewed as 
futile. Only an active fight “in this life” will secure Tatarstan as the Tatars’ namesake 
nation-state; to fight for independence is a “sacred duty” laid out in the Koran. While this 
argument was framed in a larger struggle going on in the Muslim world, TOTs 
understands the umma as fundamentally divided into distinct peoples and nations, each 
with a right to its own sovereign homeland. Thus, TOTs’ shift to an Islamist register, like 
Bairamova’s, is the result of unfulfilled territorial demands. 
 While nationalist organizations such as Ittifak and TOTs retain only a small 
fraction of the public support they enjoyed in the early years of Tatarstan’s sovereignty 
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campaign, there is evidence that their changing discourse is indicative of a broader shift 
in the character of Islam among certain segments of society in the republic. The cities of 
Naberezhnye Chelny and Al’met’evsk, along with the surrounding areas, were places 
where the Tatar national movement had its greatest following in the 1990s97 – today they 
are recognized by many observers as Tatarstan’s most notorious hotbeds of 
“Wahhabism” (interviews with D. Iskhakov 2009; Garipov 2009; Mukhametshin 2009; 
see also Suleimanov 2011b). 
Concluding Remarks 
 As seen through this examination and analysis of the Muslim Spiritual Board of 
Tatarstan, the political-territorial transformation of post-Soviet Russia has influenced the 
changing character of the Islamic revival in Tatarstan. The creation of DUMRT as an 
independent institution in the early 1990s was spearheaded by the Tatar national 
movement in an effort to redevelop Tatar national culture and strengthen Tatarstan’s 
claims to independent statehood. While the redevelopment of Tatar national culture 
proceeded through secular institutions, the Spiritual Board played a nominal role in 
society and politics. The Tatars’ Islamic revival assumed a distinctly secular character. 
However, a divide in the national movement over perceptions of Kazan’s 1994 bilateral 
treaty with Moscow led to the politicization of Islam and DUMRT, ultimately leading to 
the government’s intervention in order to maintain the territorial status quo established by 
                                                          
97 The support for nationalism in these areas to a significant degree can be explained by the cities’ recent 
histories. They are among Tatarstan’s newest cities, the result of rapid industrialization in the mid-twentieth 
century (Naberezhny Chelny, now Tatarstan’s second-biggest city with a population of about 500,000, was 
formed around the Kamaz truck factory – at one time the largest in the world – that opened in 1976; 
Al’met’evsk, with a population today of about 150,000, was founded only in 1953 as an oil-processing city 
that brought together Tatars mostly from surrounding villages and Russians from other parts of the country, 
each group with no previous experience living together. 
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the treaty. Maintaining the political-territorial status quo became dependent, to a 
significant degree, on the Muftiate stressing the tolerant nature of “traditional” Tatar 
Islam and thereby reversing previous representations of Tatar Islam defined in opposition 
to an inherently colonial Russian Other. 
 With the recentralization of the Russian Federation that has deprived Tatarstan of 
much of its formal autonomy, representations by DUMRT of the tolerant nature of neo-
traditionalism have shifted to emphasize the harmony and even commonality between 
Tatar Islam and Russian Orthodoxy. The Spiritual Board’s communication and 
reinforcement of “official” Islam, defined primarily against Islamic fundamentalism, has 
assumed greater importance as the institution has taken on an increasingly important role 
in the revival of Tatar national culture and assists the Kazan-based government in 
maintaining a significant degree of informal autonomy vis-à-vis Moscow, a certain 
territorial “confessional confederation.” Although the Islamic revival in Tatarstan has 
assumed a more conservative character in recent years, various phenomena are at play. 
On the one hand, DUMRT’s promotion of neo-traditional Islam, which demands active 
observance of religious rituals, is now part and parcel of the preservation and 
redevelopment of Tatar national culture in Russia. On the other hand, Islamic 
fundamentalism has become not simply a question of religious belief held by Wahhabites 
or Salafists insistent on the religion’s ostensible universalism – it has become integral to 
the Tatar nationalist register in which political-territorial grievances are expressed. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
THE TENSION OF MEMORY: 
RECLAIMING THE KAZAN KREMLIN 
 
Prologue: “Day of Memory,” October 2009 
On a Sunday morning in mid-October of 2009, a few hundred Tatar national 
activists converge on Kazan to take part in the twentieth annual “Day of Memory” in 
honor of their ancestors who perished while defending the city in their ultimate defeat by 
the Muscovite troops of Ivan IV (“Terrible”) in 1552. As in years past, the public 
spectacle begins on Liberty Square with a namaz led by an imam. The opening prayer is 
followed by fiery speeches delivered, in Tatar, by nationalist leaders who address a 
crowd brandishing a motley array of flags, among them republic’s official green-white-
red tricolor, the Tatarstani flag with a white crescent and star superimposed, and the solid 
greed banner of Islam. Many of those gathered clutch placards bearing slogans such as “I 
Remember 1552” (see Figure 9), “Tatars Return to Your Homeland,” and “Holocaust of 
the Tatar People – 1552.” The speeches are followed by a recitation, now in Russian, of 
this year’s “Day of Memory” declaration, decrying centuries of “uninterrupted 
166 
 
Russification and Christianization” that 
continues today with federal laws rolling 
back and revoking freedoms previously 
granted to Russia’s ethnic republics such 
as Tatarstan (quoted in Amelina 2009, 3). 
The document also includes a laundry list 
of demands, including two that have 
appeared in almost every declaration of 
the past twenty years: the erection of a 
monument to the Tatars’ ancestors who 
died defending Kazan in 1552 and 
Moscow’s recognition of Tatarstan as a 
the Tatars’ sovereign homeland (Ibid.). 
With the 2009 declaration 
unanimously agreed, the activists unfurl a banner proclaiming, in Tatar, “Our Goal is 
Independence!” (see Figure 10). A phalanx of mostly young men carries the banner while 
the flag carriers, placard bearers, and other participants file in behind. They commence a 
boisterous march through the city center, first heading south down Pushkin Street. A 
veteran national activist wields a megaphone and leads the marchers in shouts of Azatlyk 
(“Freedom”). The chants increase in intensity as the crowd turns right and snakes its way 
westward down Kremlin Street, a stretch of little more than a kilometer that leads them to 
a team of Muslim clergy. The imams greet the marchers outside the thick white walls of 
the Kazan Kremlin. One of the robed clergy members commandeers the megaphone,  
Figure 9: “I Remember 1552” (photo by 
author). 
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starts up an incantation of Allahu Akbar (“Allah is Great”), and leads the group through 
the gates of Spasskaya Tower and into the confines of the fortress, site to what the 
national activists term “the tragic events of 1552.” We are now on hallowed ground, I am 
told, this kremlin built atop the ruins of what once was an Islamic citadel, the seat of the 
vanquished Kazan Khanate, the enduring symbol of the Tatars’ lost statehood. 
The throngs of flags and placards, mixed with loosely coordinated cries of Allahu 
Akbar and Azatlyk, startle tourists who have arrived to experience firsthand the landscape 
they’ve seen numerous times in ubiquitous panoramic representations – in regional and 
local newscasts, on souvenirs and miscellany bric-a-brac, in magazines and newspapers, 
in advertisements of virtually anything connected to Kazan and Tatarstan – that 
prominently feature the signature onion domes of the sixteenth-century Annunciation 
Figure 10: Activists unfurl a banner proclaiming, in Tatar, “Our Goal is 
Independence!” before marching on the Kazan Kremlin (photo by author). 
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Figure 11: The landscape of the Kazan Kremlin as it is today. Far left is the 
Annuncation Cathedral. Far right is the Kul-Sharif Mosque. The Siuiumbike Tower 
stands between them (photo by author). 
Cathedral and the minarets of the grand Kul-Sharif Mosque, officially opened in 2005 
after a decade of planning and construction. These two monuments stand side by side 
within the grounds of the Kazan Kremlin, their proximity most often narrated as a symbol 
of the harmony between Islam and Orthodox Christianity, Russia’s two main religions, 
and material evidence of the peaceful relations between the Sunni Muslim Tatars and 
Orthodox Christian Russians who inhabit the city and region in roughly equal numbers 
(see Figure 11). Today, however, the intended harmony of the landscape is pierced, 
disrupted by the national activists who stream past the tourists and move decisively 
toward the fortress’ westernmost reaches on their way to the seven-tiered Siuiumbike 
Tower, standing 58 meters tall and crowned with the golden crescent of Islam. The 
imams assume central positions at the base of the tower as the crowd forms a semicircle 
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Figure 12: “Day of Memory” concludes with a public namaz in honor of the Tatars’ 
ancestors who died while defending the Kazan Kremlin against Muscovite troops in 
October 1552 (photo by author). 
around them. This year’s “Day of Memory,” as has been done at this same place on a 
Sunday morning every mid-October since 1989, culminates with a public namaz in 
remembrance of the Tatars’ ancestors who perished while defending these grounds in 
1552 (see Figure 12).  
The landscape of the Kazan Kremlin presents a compelling case study because, in 
piquing questions of historical memory, it reflects how ideas about religious and national 
identity have shifted along with changing notions of homeland in post-socialist Tatarstan. 
Although the current dominant meaning of the Kazan Kremlin, with its skyline today 
graced in tandem by the onion domes of the Annunciation Cathedral and the minarets of 
the recently constructed Kul-Sharif Mosque, is one of interfaith harmony, this landscape 
as it has developed in the post-Soviet period in fact is a product of tension between 
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competing political-territorial visions. Specifically, this landscape is a result of the 
tension between how the national activists who organize and partake in the annual “Day 
of Memory” understand what Tatarstan should be as a political-territorial space and how 
those who hold power view the region and its place within the Russian Federation. This 
central tension has shaped the meaning of the Kazan Kremlin and how the relationship 
between religion and national identity is encoded in the landscape. This tension is far 
from static. Indeed, as examined in this chapter, the dominant meaning of the Kazan 
Kremlin has changed dramatically over the past two decades.  
Because of their brute materiality, landscapes such as the Kazan Kremlin may 
appear as fixed, objective reflections of collective memory and social relations. Yet, as 
geographers have shown, landscapes are active participants in the structuring of social 
relations, vessels that communicate and reinforce notions of “ideal community.” As 
Daniels writes, 
Landscapes, whether focusing on single monuments or framing sketches 
of scenery, provide visible shape; they picture the nation [although] there 
is seldom a secure or enduring consensus as to which, or rather whose, 
legends and landscapes epitomize the nation (Daniels 1993, 5, emphasis 
added).  
For Daniels (1993) and Cosgrove (1998), landscape is a historically contingent “way of 
seeing,” a “representation” that structures society in a manner that legitimates the state 
and reifies images of the nation. Duncan and Duncan liken landscape to a “text” that 
“transforms ideologies into concrete form,” reflecting and reproducing group identity 
(Duncan and Duncan 1988, 117). Landscape as “text” or “discourse” is read and 
internalized, thereby naturalizing dominant ideas of national community. While 
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representational and textual approaches have been criticized for neglecting the materiality 
of landscape (e.g. Mitchell 1993; Mitchell 2003) and the realm of practice (e.g. Cresswell 
2003; Lorimer 2005), contemporary studies continue to investigate landscape as a 
transmitter of national ideology (e.g. Shein 1997; Olwig 2002; Mills 2010). Common to 
these studies is the understanding that landscape “encapsulates a dominant image of how 
elites view ‘a nation,’ and perhaps even how ‘a people’ see themselves” (Till 2008, 350). 
Informed by this scholarly tradition, this chapter examines how dominant views 
of “ideal community” are reflected and reproduced in the landscape of the Kazan 
Kremlin and how those dominant understandings have changed under the influence of the 
political-territorial restructurating of Russia. As illustrated in this chapter, when Tatarstan 
was pursuing its sovereignty campaign in the 1990s, the “re-Islamization” of the Kazan 
Kremlin, most vividly embodied by the construction of the Kul-Sharif Mosque that began 
in the latter part of the decade, was discursively framed foremost as a symbol of the 
Tatars’ resurrected statehood; indeed, the republic’s sovereignty drive was largely 
justified by the memory of 1552 as revived and nurtured by the national activists taking 
part in the “Day of Memory” spectacle. However, by the time construction on the 
behemoth mosque was completed in 2005, as shown in this chapter, the new political-
territorial context of a recentralized Russian Federation had altered the dominant meaning 
of the Kazan Kremlin. Kul-Sharif, once its doors officially opened, was no longer framed 
by political elites as a symbol of the Tatars’ revived statehood. Instead, its relative 
proximity to the Annunciation Cathedral became more emphasized, its dominant 
meaning shifting foremost to one of tolerance and even commonality between Islam and 
Orthodoxy, between Tatars and Russians, in the Middle Volga. This more recent 
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narration of the Kazan Kremlin is in line with a larger Russia-wide nation-building that 
stresses the harmony between the now unified country’s “traditional” religions. Yet the 
much-trumpeted interfaith accord discursively embedded in the landscape belies the 
tension upon which the Kazan Kremlin is founded. 
Background: 1552 and the Landscape of Colonization 
While the Russian word kreml’ (“kremlin”) denotes a fortress,98 historical-cultural 
connotations of the word run much deeper than the defensive function served by a stone-
walled fortification. Kremlins have historically hosted the seat of regional political power 
– the Russian prince or, later, the Moscow-appointed governor – and the city’s main 
monastery and cathedrals (Aidarova 2007). Thus, a kremlin both embodies and protects, 
literally and figuratively, the concept of simfoniia (“symphony”) between the Russian 
state and the Orthodox church, the corporal and heavenly powers complementing each 
another in ruling the people of Rus’. In light of the historical-cultural attachments to the 
word kreml’, the Kazan Kremlin as it has been transformed over the past two decades, 
today housing what is touted as Europe’s largest mosque (Siraeva 2006) and a crescent-
topped tower that shadows over a Russian Orthodox cathedral, radically challenges the 
very core of a centuries-old national-architectural trope. Subsequent sections of this 
chapter examine the changes to the Kazan Kremlin in the post-Soviet era, showing how 
the “Islamization” of this highly symbolic landscape was posited on a critical 
reexamination of Russia’s imperial legacy and potentially puts forth a new formulation of 
the concept of simfoniia – one that emphasizes the symphony between peoples and faiths 
                                                          
98 Most people association the word “kremlin” with the Kremlin in Moscow, but many historic Russian 
cities were – and still are – site to such fortresses. 
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within a shared homeland, not the domination of a single state-backed religion over 
others. However, first it is necessary briefly to explore the context under which this 
landscape first came to be a kremlin. 
Until the mid-sixteenth century, the space currently occupied by the Kazan 
Kremlin was an Islamic citadel, seat of the Kazan Khanate, the most powerful of the 
khanates that emerged a century earlier following the dissolution of the Golden Horde. 
The transformation of the citadel into a kremlin began immediately after October 15, 
1552 (new calendar), when, following a two-month siege, Muscovite troops captured 
Kazan. Leading the battle against the Russians, according to legend, were Kazan’s top 
imam, Said Kul-Sharif, and his shakirds, who were among the last to die – “with a prayer 
on their lips” – defending the city (Sorokin 1998, 5). After Moscow’s victory, all non-
combatant Muslims were driven from the citadel far out into the countryside (Faller 
2002) and, on the orders of Tsar Ivan, the first steps of the new Russian administration 
were taken toward remaking the landscape into a kremlin. Mosques, palaces, and all other 
structures of the khanate were razed, and the city was cleansed and resacralized by an 
Orthodox prayer procession (Aidarova 1996). In the first days after the capture of Kazan, 
temporary wooden churches were erected. However, by 1562, construction of the 
Annunciation Cathedral (see Figure 13) – the first stone church to appear in the Middle 
Volga region – was completed, built atop the foundation of what was formerly Kazan’s 
main mosque, known as the Kul-Sharif Mosque.99 Also, a governor’s palace was built in  
                                                          
99 In 1928-29, archeologists discovered that parts of the foundation of the Annunciation Cathedral consisted 
of gravestones bearing the Arabic script that was used by the Tatars’ ancestors (Aidarova 2007, 48). The 
destruction or usurpation of mosques, synagogues, or churches and their subsequent replacement by or 
conversion to the conquerors’ holy building is a highly symbolic act that signifies the complete subjection, 
and even literal extermination, of the enemy group. This is a practice with a long tradition. Early Christian 
rulers appropriated Greek and Roman pagan temples and turned them into churches; the Parthenon is a 
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the place of what previously were the khan’s quarters, nestled next to the Annunciation 
Cathedral, the two structures embodying the Russian concept of simfoniia in what was 
now a kreml’. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
famous example. Hindu temples in Pakistan and India were commonly demolished by Muslim conquerors 
and overlaid with mosques. Soviet authorities, of course, employed this tradition, reinscribing traditional 
holy sites with their own quasi-religious ideology (Sidorov 2000). No faith was spared in the communist 
regime’s drive to stamp out traditional religion and reinscribe the landscape with their totalitarian 
ideology. 
Figure 13: The Annunciation Cathedral was built atop the 
Kul-Sharif Mosque following Kazan’s defeat at the hand of 
Muscovite troops in 1552 (photo by author). 
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 The significance of the events of October 1552, along with the subsequent 
transformation of Kazan from an Islamic citadel to a Russian Orthodox kremlin, cannot 
be underestimated. Whereas previously Muscovy was a princedom that exclusively ruled 
over Orthodox Christian Slavs, the conquest of Kazan of represented the very beginning 
of Russia as a multiethnic, poly-confessional empire (Kappler 2001, 14). Muscovy’s 
conquest of Kazan also “signaled the beginning of the Russian reconquista” aimed at 
liberating Christian lands, including Jerusalem and Constantinople, from Muslims (Fr ank 
and Wixman 1996, 140). The single most recognizable and enduring symbol of Russia, 
St. Basil’s Cathedral, was built (by the decree of Ivan IV) in honor of the Moscow’s 
victory over Kazan.100 For the Tatars, however, their ancestors’ defeat on October 15, 
1552, was followed by waves of forced Christianization and, for much of the twentieth 
century, forced atheism (Derrick 2010). The Kazan Kremlin had been denuded of 
virtually any visible trace of a Muslim historical-cultural legacy. With the Annunciation 
Cathedral standing as an enduring reminder of Orthodoxy’s victory (literally) over Islam, 
the fortress was “perceived by many Tatars as a symbol of colonization” (Kinossian 
2008, 194). This was a landscape of alienation, at least until the democratization and 
liberalization of the perestroika era opened a space for the national movement to renew 
the Tatars’ claim to the landscape – and, eventually, statehood. 
  
                                                          
100 It is instructive that, while the Soviets destroyed thousands of holy Christian sites, including the 
largest and third-largest cathedrals in Moscow and Irkutsk respectively, they left the Annunciation 
Cathedral in Kazan and St. Basil’s Cathedral in Moscow intact. These symbols of the Russians’ defeat 
of the Tatars in the mid-sixteenth century, an event that heralded the onslaught of empire, were 
deemed untouchable by the Soviet authorities. 
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Repossessing and Transforming the Kazan Kremlin  
The first instance of the Tatars re-staking a claim to the Kazan Kremlin occurred 
on October 15, 1989, when a modest-sized crowd of national activists101 gathered 
beneath the Siuiumbike Tower for a public namaz in observance of the first-ever “Day of 
Memory” (Iakupova 2001). They rallied around the tower because it was the only 
element on the landscape that could reasonably be claimed as Tatar. While most of the 
structure uncontestably had been built in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries – and 
many argue that the entire structure was built by Russians – enough archeological 
evidence (and legend)102 existed to suggest that at least the first level, in some form, had 
existed before the mid-sixteenth century, forming the entrance to the khan’s palace 
(Akhmetzianov 2002).103 The activists at the first annual “Day of Memory” were the first 
to demand the construction of a monument that would “perpetuate memories of the 
defenders of Kazan who fell in 1552” (Sanachin 1990, 2). They saw this request as just, 
considering that the remains of the Muscovite soldiers who died in the same battle were 
honorably housed in a pyramid-like memorial church located on an islet at the confluence 
of the Kazanka and Volga rivers, in clear sight from the kremlin’s southwestern walls 
(see Figure 14). A local planner presented the idea to the authorities (Ibid.). At the time,  
                                                          
101 It is reported that more KGB agents were in attendance at the first “Day of Memory” than actual 
participants (Iakupova 2001, 28). 
102 The tower is named in honor of the last Tatar princess who, according to legend, preferred to die by her 
own hands rather than be carried off to Moscow to marry a Russian nobleman. Beneath the tower, some 
archeologists believe, was the burial site of khans. Iakupova says that Tatars had surreptitiously prayed for 
their ancestors at the tower for centuries (Iakupova 2001, 28). 
103 The origins of the Siuiumbike Tower are subject to an inordinate amount of scholarly debate. Some 
researchers (mainly Russian) argue that no tower existed before the mid-sixteenth century, i.e. it was fully 
constructed under Russian rule, while others (mainly Tatar) argue that a tower existed at the same site 
during the Kazan Khanate. See, for example, Khanzafarov (2001), Khalit (2006), Sitdikov (2006), Sitdikov 
and Khuzin (2009), Habiullin (2007), and Khuzin and Sitdikov (2011). 
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however, with Tatarstan negotiating an elevation of its status within the USSR and the 
political leadership wanting to avoid conflict with Moscow, the idea of constructing a 
monument to the defenders of Kazan gained no traction. 
 Following Kazan’s sovereignty declaration, the “Day of Memory” spectacle 
began attracting thousands of Tatars to the grounds of the Kazan Kremlin to reclaim, if 
only through an hours-long performance, the landscape as Muslim Tatar. 104 The annual 
event decisively transcended ancestor worship, assuming an explicitly political character 
that linked this landscape to the memory of 1552 and Tatarstan’s elevated territorial 
                                                          
104 The organizers of “Day of Memory” also played a key role in organizing the April 1991 public namaz in 
honor of Uraza Bairam, a holiday celebrating the end of Ramadan, that was held for the first time at the 
Siuiumbike Tower within the grounds of the Kazan Kremlin. Tens of thousands of participants were 
reported to have been in attendance (Musina 1997, 213). 
Figure 14: Memorial church in honor of the Muscovite troops who 
perished in 1552 during the conquest of Kazan (photo by author). 
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aspirations. At the 1992 “Day of Memory,” for example, Marat Muliukov, the director of 
TOTs, proclaimed, “This date for us is not only a day of mourning, today we avow our 
decisiveness to fight for the full independence of our republic” (quoted in Batyrshin 
1992, 2). Placards bearing slogans such as “Judge and Disassociate Yourself from Ivan 
IV and His Executioners like the Germans Did with Hitler” and “Give Milli Mejlis105 
Power in the Fight to Get Rid of the Colonial Yoke” were marched into the kremlin and 
paraded at the base of the Siuiubike Tower (Izvestiia Tatarstana 1992, 1). Following that 
year’s “Day of Memory,” leaders of the national movement issued a public letter 
addressed to Shaimiev reminding him that the churches in the Kazan Kremlin had been 
“built on top of the graves of Tatars and their mosques” and demanding the city be given 
a “national face” by constructing mosques within the grounds of the fortress; in other 
words, nationalizing the landscape was equated with its “re-Islamization.” They also 
repeated the demand for a monument to their ancestors who died defending the Kazan 
Kremlin in 1552 (TOTs 1992, 1).  
The early “Day of Memory” performances framed the primary justification 
discourse employed by the Tatar political elite in defending the republic’s sovereignty 
claim. The year 1552 marked the loss of Tatar statehood and the subsequent 
transformation of the Muslim citadel into an Orthodox Russian kremlin that symbolized 
centuries of policies resulting in the decimation of Tatar culture. The return of Tatar 
statehood, embedded in the promise of sovereignty, meant the repossession of the Kazan 
Kremlin. Nonetheless, Shaimiev was hesitant in responding to the nationalists’ demands. 
Although the memory of 1552 had become central to Kazan’s discourse justifying its 
                                                          
105 Milli Mejlis was an umbrella group for the various Tatar national organizations that claimed it would 
take responsibility for achieving Tatarstan’s independence if the Shaimiev-led government failed to do so. 
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claim to sovereignty (Derrick 2008), the political elite did not want to risk inflaming local 
Russian sentiment by erecting a monument to the defenders of the Kazan Kremlin; 
maintaining interethnic peace was of paramount importance while engaged with Moscow 
in negotiations over Tatarstan’s status within the Russian Federation. However, the 
national activists had succeeded in pointing out to the Tatar president the symbolic 
importance of the Kazan Kremlin. While discussions of undertaking any major changes 
to the landscape would have to be tabled until after the 1994 treaty was secured, 
Shaimiev in the meantime ordered that a golden crescent be placed atop of Siuiumbike 
Tower in time to serve as a minaret for 1993’s “Day of Memory” (Iskhakov 1997, 102) – 
the first material evidence of the “re-Islamization” of the Kazan Kremlin (see Figure 15).  
Having secured the bilateral treaty with Moscow, the political elite of Tatarstan 
committed itself to a fundamental transformation of the Kazan Kremlin with the explicit 
goal of shaping a landscape deserving of – and serving – a new sovereign state. In August 
1994, Shaimiev decreed the “museumification” of the entire landscape with the stated 
goal of “preserving” and “restoring” the “ensemble of the Kazan Kremlin” 
(Postanovlenie 1994). The decree immediately brought to the fore the tension laden in the 
memory of 1552. What parts of the ensemble should be preserved? What should be 
restored? On the one hand, the kremlin had traditionally been considered a Russian 
landscape, its architectural elements of various epochs – those lost and those remaining – 
unified by the Orthodox idea. On the other hand, beyond the basic footprint of the Kazan 
Khanate, not a single trace of the citadel’s Muslim architectural legacy remained; no 
material existed to preserve or restore. From this situation, deputy director of the Kazan 
Kremlin Niiaz Khalit explained, two ideas clashed: “‘Russian’ restoration and ‘Tatar’  
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Figure 15: The golden crescent atop the Siuiumbike Tower, set 
in 1993, was the first example of the “re-Islamization” of the 
Kazan Kremlin (photo by author). 
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reconstruction” (Khalit 1997, 236). According to the first, restoring the landscape meant 
rebuilding the churches and monasteries that were destroyed in the Soviet era.106 This 
approach, Khalit insisted, was unacceptable on political and moral grounds because the 
restoration of Orthodox churches in the Kazan Kremlin would represent “monuments to 
the barbaric destruction of the parts of Kazan that are holy to the Muslim segments of 
Kazan: mosques, tombs of khans and saints” (Ibid., 237). 
After a year of reconceptualizing the kremlin’s transformation, Shaimiev issued a 
second decree in November 1995 titled “On the concept of the preservation, 
development, and use of the ensemble of the Kazan Kremlin” (Ukaz 1995). The use of 
the words “preservation” and “development” were carefully chosen. The former meant 
the “preservation” of cultural legacy, not simply the protection and restoration of existing 
elements on the landscape, while “development” implied newness, a wholesale rethinking 
of the meaning of the word kreml’. Seemingly in line with the Tatar president’s post-
treaty propagation of state nationalism, the envisioned overhaul of the Kazan Kremlin 
included the preservation of both Tatar and Russian cultural legacies. This included the 
complete “restoration and reconstruction” of the Annunciation Cathedral and the promise 
“to reconstruct the Kul-Sharif Mosque” for the purpose of “preserving historical 
succession” (Ukaz 1995, Points 1 and 4). While the decree appeared to be calibrated to 
complement Shaimiev’s propagation of state nationalism in the post-1994 treaty context, 
the resurrection of the Kul-Sharif Mosque, named after the legendary imam who died 
alongside his shakirds defending Kazan for the purpose of “preserving historical 
                                                          
106 For instance, one Russian architect publicly posed the question, “if the mosque is being constructed 
while the only thing known about it is the number of minarets, why not restore the ancient sixteenth-
century Saviour Transfiguration Cathedral, which has a perfectly preserved basement as well as a necessary 
archival data? (Zhuravskii 1995, 2). 
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succession,” was a direct allusion to 1552 – drawing on the grievances first expressed by 
the “Day of Memory” activists and thereby affirming the primacy of the Tatars’ claims to 
the landscape. In an official document issued alongside Shaimiev’s 1995 decree, the 
resurrection of the Kul-Sharif Mosque would be a “symbol of the statehood” of the 
Republic of Tatarstan (Osnovnye 1995). 
Subsequent decisions on the location and design of the Kul-Sharif Mosque, along 
with the political discourse surrounding its resurrection, provided further indication that 
the temple was expressly intended as a symbol of the Tatars’ revived statehood. 
Dismissing out of hand the demands of some of the more vociferous nationalists to 
resurrect Kul-Sharif on its original foundation (interview with Khakimov 2009) – 
meaning the destruction of the Annunciation Cathedral – a commission formed by 
Shaimiev to oversee the transformation of the kremlin chose a space occupied the Tsarist-
era military barracks along the fortress’ southern wall. This location was formally 
justified on two accounts. First, the military quarters were viewed as an especially 
grievous symbol of colonialism and the Tatars’ alienation from the kremlin; and, second, 
only that space, it was contended, was geologically sound enough to support a large 
structure (Latypov 2005). While these justifications indeed may have been factors, above 
all the space was chosen because of its central, dominating position that overlooked the 
city and could be seen far out in the Volga River. Kul-Sharif was to be the unquestioned 
central element of the ensemble of the Kazan Kremlin, the symbol of Kazan and 
Tatarstan, the symbol of the Tatar nation. 
Discussions about the design of the mosque provide more insight into the function 
Kul-Sharif was intended to fulfill. An important and highly revealing article authored by 
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Niiaz Khalit, the deputy director of the Kazan Kremlin who was at the forefront of the 
project, provides illustration. In discussing the future shape of the temple, Khalit said the 
mosque must incorporate semantic elements of Tatar culture, such as the tulip (a symbol 
traditionally associated with Tatar culture), and reference the few known architectural 
features of the original Kul-Sharif (e.g. eight minarets) and other ancient temples 
belonging to the Tatars’ ancestors. However, because the mosque would embody the 
Tatars’ cultural revival and the rebirth of their statehood, it therefore must represent a 
fundamental break with the colonial past: 
The idea of resurrecting a mosque in the kremlin has signified a 
fundamental break in the consciousness of our people, who bore the heavy 
cross of 450 years of a slave’s existence in an Orthodox empire. Almost 
half a century after the fall of the Kazan Khanate, which fought to the 
death with the Moscow predator for its freedom, the ancient citadel of 
Kazan has become the center of a reviving state … And, as if visibly 
marking this historical event, [the kremlin’s] architecture, tightly bound in 
our consciousness with the Russian colonial and ecclesiastical 
administration, once again is obtaining a Tatar image. As such, Kul-Sharif 
is not just a mosque and not even the main mosque of Kazan and the state. 
It is the main center for the entire Tatar diaspora. It is a vector from the 
past that passes through today to tomorrow (Khalit 1997, 242-243). 
The Shaimiev-appointed Khalit, as seen in this passage, internalized the discourse 
initiated by the “Day of Memory” activists. He made clear the understanding that the 
principle of “balancing cultures” in the makeover of the Kazan Kremlin was trumped by 
the idea of Tatar statehood. The mosque, to occupy a dominating central position in the 
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fortress, was to be the symbol of a sovereign state that is understood foremost as the 
Tatars’ historical homeland. 
 The balance of cultures idea embedded in the landscape, however, was not only 
distantly secondary to the idea of a resurrected Tatar state to be reflected in the Kul-
Sharif Mosque. The image of a brilliant mosque in close proximity to a Christian church 
was intended to bolster Tatarstan’s image on the international arena. The international 
arena, the Tatar political elite clearly understood as it crafted its “sovereignty project” 
(Graney 2009), was where the question of independent statehood is ultimately decided: 
The mosque will represent us before world civilization. Tatarstan today is 
not a backwater province of Russia, where a fading culture trickles 
through the marshy mouth of a filthy stream. A new state is being born, by 
the intellect of its people providing a positive example in resolving the 
most complex of political problems – international [i.e. interethnic]. 
Today, as wars rage in Bosnia and Chechnya, Eretria and Somalia, 
conflicts simmer in Quebec and the Basque Country, the “Tatarstani 
Model” of political-cultural development puts us in a company of nations 
that, by their intellectual level, are advanced (Khalit 1997, 247). 
The “advanced nation,” the “people of intellect” – the “us” – discussed here is not the 
“multinational people of Tatarstan.” The mosque’s relative location to the church would 
provide material evidence of the religious tolerance of the Tatars, a powerful counter 
example to other territorial conflicts involving Muslim peoples, a counter example that 
would positively influence the opinion of the international sovereignty regime. Indeed, 
with the beginning of construction on the Kul-Sharif Mosque, Kazan began lobbying 
UNESCO for the inclusion of the Kazan Kremlin in its list of World Heritage sites, the 
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close proximity of temples of two different religions serving as proof of the historical 
exchange of cultural values between the Tatars and the Russians (Demina 2000).107 
 For the remainder of the decade, as the Kul-Sharif Mosque began to take shape, 
the transformation of the Kazan Kremlin was discursively linked to Tatarstan’s 
aspirations to statehood. A 1998 article appearing in Respublic Tatarstan (Republic of 
Tatarstan), the official newspaper of the Kazan-based government, discussed the “radical 
reconstruction” of the kremlin as a project of “state significance” (Sorokin 1998, 5): “The 
kremlin has always been the center of state power, the resident of the Bolgar prince, the 
Tatar khan, the Kazan governor, and now the president of sovereign Tatarstan” (Ibid.). 
However, by the latter part of the 1990s, as seen in this article’s discussion of the 
historical significance of the Kul-Sharif Mosque, the political elite had toned down its 
anticolonial rhetoric: 
The Kul-Sharif Mosque, now being resurrected, is the main object of the 
kremlin’s reconstruction. The exact place of its location has not been 
determined by archeologists. Kul-Sharif, imam of the city’s main mosque, 
was a leading political figure. In the name of the Kazan Khanate he 
conducted persistent negotiations with Moscow, traveling several times 
with a delegation to the capital of Muscovy. But Tsar Ivan the Terrible and 
those around him, having long before set the goal of expanding the 
borders of Rus’ to Siberia and the Far East, did not want to hear about 
peace (Ibid.). 
This passage, in explaining the significance of the new mosque arising in the Kazan 
Kremlin, refocuses attention away from Kul-Sharif as the legendary warrior who was 
                                                          
107 After several years of lobbying by Kazan, UNESCO officially recognized the Kazan Kremlin as a 
World Heritage site in December 2000. 
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killed by Muscovite troops and directs it instead to Kul-Sharif the diplomat whose 
message of peace the Tsar refused to hear. On one level, the change of rhetoric evident in 
the biographical sketch, coming as the carcass of the new mosque was approaching 
completion, was an attempt to counter the previous anticolonial discourse associated with 
the kremlin’s “re-Islamization.” On another level, it was reflective of Kazan’s 
relationship with Moscow at the time. Like Kul-Sharif, the author implied, the current 
political elites of Tatarstan were in favor of negotiations and peaceful relations. 
 While the Kazan Kremlin in its entirety remained a symbol Tatarstan’s 
sovereignty, in addition to the “embodiment of peace and tolerance of different religions” 
(Sorkokin 1998, 5), by the latter part of the decade the Kul-Sharif Mosque was no longer 
publicly cast as a symbol of statehood. The mosque’s more narrowly cultural-religious 
purposes became emphasized, as seen in an article claiming that Kul-Sharif was destined 
to be the “unifying, main mosque … not only for the residents of Tatarstan, but also for 
Tatars of the whole world” (Valeeva 1999, 5). The discursive shift in the way the Kazan 
Kremlin, along with the Kul-Sharif Mosque, was framed coincided with Shaimiev’s more 
intense propagation of state nationalism. It is notable, however, that even with Shaimiev 
retreating from the Tatar national movement, the annual “Day of Memory” in the final 
years of the decade was attended only by a handful of the more radical nationalists and no 
longer attracted any significant press coverage. 
The Post-Sovereign Landscape of the Kazan Kremlin 
 By the close of the 1990s, the landscape of the Kazan Kremlin in its entirety – the 
Annunciation Cathedral and the resurrecting Kul-Sharif Mosque together – had become 
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the symbol of Tatarstani statehood. The meaning of the under-construction mosque, 
earlier conceived as a symbol of Tatar statehood, had been eclipsed by the directive to 
cultivate state nationalism. Nonetheless, while Tatarstan still maintained its claim to 
sovereignty, amid Moscow’s weakened position, the tension of the historical memory of 
1552 that existed between the two temples came to be subsumed by the idea of a greater 
inter-confessional harmony, and the annual “Day of Memory” spectacle ceased to attract 
any significant attention. The tension in the landscape, however, flared up suddenly when 
Putin ascended to the Moscow Kremlin, reversed the previous decade’s process of 
political-territorial decentralization, and began aggressively recentralizing the Russian 
Federation anew. 
 Already by the fall of 2000, Moscow had made clear its intention to mold a 
“united political space” out of a legally and culturally disunited Russia, meaning an end 
to the ethnic republics’ pretensions to sovereignty. As a response to Moscow’s campaign 
to bring all regional legislation into line with federal law, the “Day of Memory” was 
suddenly revived as a mass public protest. Whereas only a handful of activists took part 
in the previous years’ events, the 2000 “Day of Memory” was reported to have drawn 
more than a thousand participants (Zvezda Povolzh’ia 2000) and even more each of the 
following two years (Bilalov 2001; Akhmetov 2002), when attacks on Tatarstan’s 
sovereignty became more explicit. The tension of the landscape of the Kazan Kremlin 
came into the open when the “Day of Memory” protestors, after the concluding namaz at 
the Siuiumbike Tower in 2000, addressed their grievances directly at the Annunciation 
Cathedral that stood next to the tower. As reported in one newspaper, “It was announced 
[among the “Day of Memory” activists] that the Annunciation Cathedral used to be a 
188 
 
mosque and it is once again necessary to demand that the Orthodox clergy return the 
mosque to Muslims” (Zvezda Povolzh’ia 2000, 2). Thus, the protest was not only against 
central attacks on Tatarstan’s sovereignty; it also targeted Shaimiev’s promotion of state 
nationalism that was being inscribed in the landscape of the Kazan Kremlin. The “Day of 
Memory” activists were demanding that the “national face” of the fortress be remade into 
a solely Tatar landscape, returned to its pre-1552 form, corresponding to their demands 
for the republic’s unambiguous independence. 
 The political authorities gave symbolic support to the revival of the “Day of 
Memory” spectacle, at least while the potential of preserving Tatarstan’s sovereignty 
seemed to exist. At the 2001 event, Shaimiev’s handpicked Supreme Mufti, Gusman 
Iskhakov, accompanied the marchers into the kremlin and led the ritual namaz at the 
tower. The Mufti explained his participation: 
This has already become a tradition. On the “Day of Memory” believers 
gather in the kremlin to pray for the souls of those who gave their lives to 
preserve our religion, our statehood. A variety of people came to honor 
the memory of the defenders of Kazan … but a deep honor and 
gratefulness to the national heroes unified everybody in prayer (quoted in 
Bilalov 2001, 2, emphasis added). 
Although Mufti Iskhakov discussed past “national heroes” who died in the defense of 
“our religion, our statehood,” his message was coordinated to support the primary 
demand of the “Day of Memory” activists that Moscow “stop its revisions of the 
Constitution and laws of Tatarstan” (Ibid.). Two other demands put forth by the national 
activists, and the response of the political elite, were notable. As in every year past, the 
protesters demanded the erection of a monument to the defenders of the Kazan Kremlin;  
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they also demanded that October 15 be officially recognized as an annual “Day of 
Mourning” in recognition of the events of 1552 (Obrashenie 2001, 2). 
 The activists’ demands were taken under consideration. In 2001 Shaimiev 
declared that the government would indeed erect a monument to the defenders of the 
Kazan Kremlin (Grigorenko 2001). However, he made it clear that the monument would 
not appear within the grounds of the Kazan Kremlin, which would have disrupted his 
ideology of simfoniia between the confessions that was expressed in the landscape of the 
Kazan Kremlin. Instead, a white stone was laid on a square at the base of the kremlin’s 
external southern wall, marking the spot where a future monument to the defenders of the 
Kazan Kremlin would be placed (see Figure 16). The Tatarstani parliament also took 
under consideration legislation that would officially recognize October 15 as a “Day of 
Memory of Those Who Fell in the Conquest of Kazan in 1552” (Rakipov 2002). These 
Figure 16: A stone marking the future monument to the 
defenders of Kazan was laid outside the southern wall of the 
Kazan Kremlin (photo by author). 
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overtures, made at the peak of Putin’s campaign against Tatarstan’s pretensions sovereign 
statehood, amounted to a temporary tactic intended, first, to appease the “Day of 
Memory” protesters and, second, to display resistance as a warning to Moscow. Although 
the stone would rest outside the southern wall of the kremlin for the next decade108 and 
the government held a contest for the design of the monument, a memorial to the 
defenders of the Kazan Kremlin has never materialized. Draft legislation that would have 
made October 15 an annual “day of mourning” was removed soon after it was introduced 
(Respublika Tatarstan 2002). As in the past at critical moments in Russia’s political-
territorial transformation, the Kazan-based government was once again negotiating its 
post-sovereign status and did not want to run the risk up upsetting either the local Russian 
population or Moscow. 
 By the fall of 2002 it had become clear to Tatar political elites that they had little 
power to reverse the formal revocation of Tatarstan’s sovereignty and have since 
dedicated themselves to retaining the republic’s status as a powerful region informally. 
The campaign to retain a significant amount of informal autonomy, as Rafael Khakimov, 
formerly the top political adviser to Shaimiev, told me (with no small hint of irony), has 
meant being the “good Muslims of Russia” – a counterexample to the quagmire of 
Chechnya and the surrounding regions of the North Caucasus (interview with Khakimov 
2009). The landscape of the Kazan Kremlin has reflected and served as a stage for this 
new, post-sovereign relationship. Being the “good Muslims” in first order has meant that, 
beginning with the 2002 “Day of Memory,” the “authorities [have] completely distanced 
themselves from the march and [have] even attempted to ban the meeting” (Akhmetov  
                                                          
108 I have been told that the stone was unceremoniously removed before after the 2010 “Day of Memory” 
protest. 
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2002, 1).109 Although the 2002 meeting managed to attract an estimated 1,500 activists 
(Ibid.), the number of attendees has dropped off to only a few hundred each year and only 
“dissident imams” lead the participants in prayers at the Siuiumbike Tower. 
Second, instead of erecting a monument to the defenders of the Kazan Kremlin, 
with the Kul-Sharif Mosque still under construction, Shaimiev unveiled a new monument 
                                                          
109 The Kazan-based government, in spite of warnings, has not attempted to make an all-out ban on the 
“Day of Memory.” However, as news reports indicate (e.g. Grigorenko 2002; Minvaleev 2004; Akhmetov 
2005) and interview subjects have told me, police have stopped buses carrying national activists from 
Naberezhnye Chelny (traditionally a stronghold of Tatar nationalism) and other cities from entering Kazan 
on the appointed “Day of Memory.” 
Figure 17: The Architects of the Kazan Kremlin was unveiled in November 
2003 (photo by author). 
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titled The Architects of the Kazan Kremlin in November 2003 (see Figure 17). The 
sculpture composition depicts two anonymous sixteenth-century architects, a standing 
Tatar and a seated Russian, each grasping in his hands blueprints of the Kazan Kremlin. 
The would-be builders gaze out at the crescent moons that rest atop the minarets of the 
Kul-Sharif Mosque, which, at that point, had become visible from most any point in the 
city center. And to their right, perched atop the blue and gold onion domes of the 
Annunciation Cathedral, arise Orthodox crosses. The Tatar president elucidated the 
imagery for whomever the message was not evident:  
This monument embodies the unification of the aspirations and cultures of 
the Tatar and Russian peoples. The Annunciation Cathedral and the Kul-
Sharif Mosque are now being revived. And is this not our position and 
homage to the long and strong friendship of the two peoples? This 
monument brings us closer to creative and spiritual unification 
(Arsent’eva 2003, 1). 
Erecting The Architects of the Kazan Kremlin was an effort to diffuse the tension that had 
arisen between the mosque and the church with the recentralization of the Russian 
Federation. The bronze side-by-side Tatar and Russian architects, an attempt to humanize 
the space and neutralize the renewed antagonism, tied together the two temples. Yet, with 
Tatarstan’s claim to statehood by that point having been dismantled, this monument 
could only tenuously be viewed as a representation of a “multinational Tatarstani people” 
– it now had become Kazan’s contribution to Putin’s conceptualization of a 
“multinational Rossiiskii people” (Putin 2003). 
 
193 
 
 
  
Figure 18: The Kul-Sharif Mosque was officially opened in June 2005, after a 
decade of planning and construction (photo by author). 
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The official opening of Kul-Sharif Mosque in June 2005 (see Figure 18) revealed 
the change in meaning of the Kazan Kremlin and pointed out the function the landscape 
has played since. In his speech at the ceremonial opening of the mosque, Shaimiev said 
the new temple represented the restoration of “historical justice and harmony between 
religions” (Shaimiev 2005). The Tatar president did not articulate exactly what injustice 
was being rectified with the resurrection of Kul-Sharif; he did not mention the year 1552. 
The mosque had become a “new symbol of Kazan and Tatarstan” and an “attractive 
center for the entire Tatar world,” neither a symbol of the Tatar nation nor a symbol of 
statehood. However, Shaimiev pointed out the role the mosque plays in challenging the 
historical meaning of the word kreml’: 
With its appearance this building has changing not only the city-planning 
composition of the kremlin and the artistic image of the entire center of 
Kazan, but it represents a change in the consciousness of the residents of 
Tatarstan. The appearance of this structure, unique in its meaning, allows 
us to focus on our history in a new way, to more thoughtfully look at our 
history, our spiritual and material legacy (Ibid.). 
Whereas Kul-Sharif, in itself, earlier had been intended to represent a change in the 
consciousness of the Tatar people, the appearance of a mosque in the context of a kremlin 
now represented a change in thinking for all people of Tatarstan. The republic had 
become an example for the rest of Russia, its primary symbol – the kremlin in its entirety 
– “a symbol of the mutual understanding of the two main confessions of the country.” 
That the Kul-Sharif Mosque stands close to the Annunciation Cathedral, according to 
Shaimiev, “does not only show the history of Islam in the republic, but [shows] its 
peaceful, tolerant character” (Ibid.). 
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 Since the opening of the Kul-Sharif Mosque, the landscape of the Kazan Kremlin 
has safeguarded Kazan’s place as Russia’s “Muslim capital” (Garaev 2009). The mosque, 
standing next to the cathedral, ensures that Tatarstan plays an important role in 
developing and strengthening Russia’s diplomatic and economic ties with Muslim 
countries. It is notable that the head of the Organization for the Islamic Conference – a 
club in which Russia had become an observing member in 2003 in no small part thanks to 
Kazan’s assistance (interview with Khakimov 2009) – was in attendance at the opening 
of Kul-Sharif, as were top diplomats from Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and other 
Muslim countries (Siraeva 2006). As Khakimov points out,  
Tatarstan, which is seen as a Muslim republic, has become an intermediary 
in Russia’s international politics. The advantage of Tatarstan is that 
Muslims and Christians live peacefully together here (Khakimov 2008, 
emphasis in original). 
During my fieldwork, Kazan welcomed high-profile guests, including Mahmoud Abbas 
of Palestine, delegations from Iran and Malaysia, among others, before they visited 
Moscow. The Kazan Kremlin was central in staging these visits, with Shaimiev providing 
his guests a tour, first, of the Kul-Sharif Mosque and then the Annunciation Cathedral. 
But the Kazan Kremlin is not only staging grounds for Russia’s relations with the Muslim 
world. In October 2009 Kazan received its highest profile guest, US Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton, who went through the same paces as Abbas and other representatives of 
the Muslim world, first visiting Kul-Sharif Mosque and then the Annunciation 
Catherdral. Afterwards Clinton praised Tatarstan for “foster[ing] religious tolerance” 
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(quoted in RT 2009). Thus, Tatarstan, as expressed in the landscape of the Kazan 
Kremlin, now positions itself as a bridge between the East and West.  
Epilogue: The Missing Monument 
 The Kazan Kremlin has undergone a dramatic transformation in its morphology 
and meaning over the past twenty years. The appearance of the Kul-Sharif Mosque 
represents a significant repossession by the Tatars of a landscape that for centuries 
represented their colonial condition within an Orthodox – and then atheist – empire and 
challenged long-held notions of what a kreml’ means. The mosque was originally 
intended as a symbol of the revival of Tatar statehood, and then the Kazan Kremlin in its 
entirety – with Kul-Sharif standing in close proximity to the Annunciation Cathedral – 
was cast as the symbol of Tatarstani statehood. Today the Kazan Kremlin stands as a 
symbol of the harmony between Islam and Orthodoxy in the Middle Volga and, more 
broadly, Russia. As expressed by Khakimov, the Kazan Kremlin is a symbol of Russia’s 
“good Muslims,” tolerant and peaceful, a counterexample to the example of Chechnya.   
The inter-confessional harmony communicated and reinforced by the Kazan 
Kremlin, however, belies a tension that is brought to the surface at least once a year with 
the “Day of Memory” spectacle. It is notable that the sole demand issued by the activists 
who organized the first “Day of Memory” more than two decades ago was the erection of 
a monument to their ancestors who died defending Kazan in 1552, a monument that 
would recognize that the beginning of the Orthodox Russian Empire began with the 
defeat of the Tatars’ ancestors. The activists of the 2009 “Day of Memory” unveiled a  
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 model of a monument to Kul-Sharif and his shakirds who died “with a prayer on the 
lips” (see Figure 19). Unlike the legendary imam’s namesake mosque within the Kazan 
Kremlin, the monument is not a symbol of harmony – the activist’s monument 
communicates resistance. The activists proclaim their goal is independence, but their 
most immediate, most concrete expressed grievances concerned the right to study Tatar 
in schools of Tatarstan, a right previously enjoyed but one that has been steadily rolled 
Figure 19: A model of a monument to Kul-Sharif and his 
shakirds was unveiled by “Day of Memory” activists (photo 
by author). 
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back under legislation that has been introduced long with the recentralization of the 
Russian Federation. In the model monument presented by the activists, Kul-Sharif 
expresses his resistance with a Koran in his grasp. Like this image, many of the activists 
– now led by a new, younger generation – now express their grievances in quasi-Islamist 
terms. Newspapers remark on the “Islamicized youth” (Amelina 2009) wearing green 
headbands, whereas reports in the 1990s exclusively discussed the “Day of Memory” 
activists as “Tatar nationalists.” 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
EPILOGUE: 
FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Review of Findings 
As demonstrated in this study, a significant factor conditioning the character of 
the post-Soviet Islamic revival in Tatarstan has been the political-territorial restructuring 
of the Russian Federation. Amid the democratization and decentralization of the country 
in the early part of the 1990s, when the Kazan-based government pursued its sovereignty 
campaign, the Tatars’ “Islamic renaissance” (Baltanova 1994) was part and parcel of a 
broader revival of national culture. Neo-Jadidism was propagated by the national and 
political elite, which envisioned Tatarstan as the Tatars’ sovereign homeland. Neo-
Jadidism was an anti-colonial discourse in which the borders of reformist, Western-
oriented Euro-Islam were defined foremost against what was framed as an 
antidemocratic, innately imperial Russian Other. By the latter part of the decade, to 
protect the territorial status quo enshrined in the 1994 bilateral treaty, dominant 
representations of Tatar Islam shifted to emphasize what were cast as traditionally 
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harmonious relations between the republic’s two main religions, Islam and Orthodoxy, as 
they have developed over the centuries in the region. Simultaneously, certain segments of 
the Tatar national movement, interpreting the 1994 pact as “betraying the cause of 
independence” (Slocum 1999, 56), denounced secular-minded neo-Jadidism and shifted 
their support to “pure Islam” in response to the more inclusive bordering processes 
associated with the putative tolerance of neo-traditionalism. Nonetheless, while the 
republic enjoyed an unprecedented degree of autonomy, Tatar national culture was 
primarily redeveloped through secular institutions and the Islamic revival of Tatarstan 
was distinguished by its adherence to “secular norms” (Musina 1997, 216) for the 
remainder of the 1990s. 
Over the past decade, as the Putin era of aggressive political-territorial 
recentralization has decisively disabused Tatarstan of its pretenses to sovereign 
statehood, the primacy of secular Islam has been challenged by more conservative 
religious expressions. “Traditional” Tatar Islam, based on fealty to the Hanafi madhhab 
as practiced for centuries by the Tatars’ ancestors, is now recognized and enforced as the 
sole “official” Islam in Tatarstan. The borders of neo-traditionalism are defined, first, by 
the ostensible mutual respect and harmony that exist between Islam and Orthodoxy – 
between Tatars and Russians – and, second, against religious fundamentalism – generally 
ascribed to Wahhabism or Salafism – which is considered “alien” and wholly unsuitable 
to the social conditions of a multiethnic, poly-confessional Russia. Thus, dominant 
representations of Tatar Islam that were cultivated to correspond to the propagation of 
state nationalism – the “multinational Tatarstani people” – in the late 1990s have shifted 
and been recalibrated to correspond to Putin’s attempts to cultivate a “multinational 
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Russian people” (Putin 2002). In parallel, an expanding segment of the Tatar national 
movement has embraced a more explicitly Islamist register in the face of the federal 
center’s attacks on the republic’s previously enjoyed political-territorial freedoms. 
“Official” Islam is communicated and reinforced institutionally (as examined in 
Chapter IV) via the Muslim Spiritual Board of Tatarstan (DUMRT), which is charged 
with overseeing the activities of all mosques in the republic, and symbolically (as 
explored in Chapter V) in the landscape of the Kazan Kremlin, which fundamentally 
challenges and reinterprets an age-old “picture [of] the nation” (Daniels 1993, 5). Taken 
together, the institutional and symbolic production and reproduction of “official” Islam 
compensate for some of Tatarstan’s lost sovereignty. In replicating the internal and 
external boundaries of the republic and closely policing Islamic expressions and practices 
in some 1,250 mosques, DUMRT, in its loyalty to the Kazan-based authorities, 
contributes to Tatarstan being able to maintain a significant degree of informal autonomy 
in its relations with Moscow. This arrangement is evocative of the “confessional 
confederation” (Norihiro 2006) of the Tsarist period, but an important difference 
distinguishes the current context from that of a century ago: The quasi-confederative 
relations, primarily based on religious identity, are now territorialized.  
The landscape of the Kazan Kremlin, where the Kul-Sharif Mosque stands in 
close proximity to the Annunciation Cathedral, further strengthens Tatarstan’s hand vis-
à-vis Moscow. Today narrated as a symbol of the particularly tolerant type of Islam 
traditionally practiced by the Tatars, the grand mosque helps secure the republic an 
integral place in the country’s diplomatic and economic relations with the Muslim World. 
In transforming the dominant discursive meaning of this landscape from one in which the 
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“tragic events of 1552” have been eclipsed by the message of interfaith harmony, the 
Kazan-based political elite simultaneously demands that the Tatars’ contribution to the 
country’s historical legacy be critically reexamined and puts forth a new vision of what 
might constitute national community in contemporary Russia. 
Implications for Tatarstan 
In light of the forgoing, a few preliminary implications can be identified. First, as 
the continuing recentralization of Russia further curtails the redevelopment of Tatar 
ethno-national culture in public schools and other secular institutions, it is likely that 
religion will assume even greater weight in the balance of group identity. The mosque, 
with the republic having lost much of its formal autonomy, plays a cultural 
“preservation” role much as it did in the Tsarist period (Iakupov 2006). While the social 
expression of Islam may continue to take an increasingly conservative, more explicit turn, 
this development should not be conflated with or mistaken for religious fundamentalism. 
As discussed in Chapter IV, a significant portion of Tatar society is being re-
traditionalized – to be Tatar today for growing numbers once again means to be an 
observant Muslim. 
Second, with “official” Islam closely associated with and “freely manipulate[d]” 
by the state (Malashenko 2008, 2) – regional and federal authorities now speaking in a 
single voice – one might reasonably expect those formerly described as “radical 
nationalists” to assume an increasingly Islamist register in expressing their grievances 
and resisting the region’s loss of autonomy. This dynamic was already evident by the 
latter half of 1990s with Ittifak’s embrace of “pure” or “fundamental” Islam, a stance that 
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has only intensified over the past decade, and is becoming more detectable among the 
younger generation who participates in the annual “Day of Memory” spectacle and other 
nationalist protests (Suleimanov 2011a). While these voices today represent a small 
minority (compared to the numbers of Tatars who willingly adhere to “official” Islam), 
they previously formed the vanguard of Tatarstan’s sovereignty drive – many calling for 
all-out independence – that was launched in the late perestroika era. If Russia were to 
suffer another political-territorial rupture, the more vociferous nationalists, this time 
cloaking their demands and grievances more heavily in religious terms, could potentially 
resurface as a major social-political force. 
Third, in defining all forms of Islam except Tatar neo-traditionalism as 
“unofficial,” political and religious authorities unnecessarily marginalize sectors of the 
population while closing Tatarstan’s umma from new and potentially innovative ideas. 
This policy may be short-sighted and potentially even dangerous. As seen in parts of the 
North Caucasus, the state’s harassment (and in many cases persecution) of Muslims who 
follow more fundamentalist or literalist understandings of religion has resulted in a 
violent backlash (Fedynsky 2010). While it is difficult to surmise whether the state’s 
harassment has contributed to the isolated acts of extremism that have taken place in 
Tatarstan,110 it is instructive that, for the duration of the 1990s, no acts of Islamic 
“extremism” or “radicalism” were registered in the republic, even though “alien” 
religious ideas were more or less freely propagated. 
 
                                                          
110 However, evidence exists that state harassment has contributed to extremism. Last November, as 
mentioned in Chapter IV, three young men accused of being members of Hizb ut-Tahrir were alleged to 
have planted a bomb (that failed to explode) a regional division of the Center to Combat Extremism, a state 
organ charged with monitoring and controlling “unofficial” Islam in Russia. 
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Implications for Russia 
State patronage of “traditional” Islam in Tatarstan, although initiated before the 
aggressive political-territorial recentralization of the Russian Federation, has been part of 
a countrywide effort in state- and nation-(re)building that began with the renewed 
conflagration in Chechnya. Under Putin’s watch the state has supported versions of Islam 
deemed “traditional” to Russia in almost every Muslim-majority region of the federation, 
with “traditional” being defined foremost by perceived loyalty to the state, while 
simultaneously “categorically reject[ing] the legal existence of Islamic opposition and 
mercilessly suppress[ing] any appearance of political protest in religious form” 
(Malashenko 2008, 2). This approach has strong parallels to the way the empire, 
beginning with Catherine II and continuing through the Soviet era, dealt with Islam.  
My examination of the trajectory of the Islamic revival in Tatarstan, first, points 
out the need for additional in-depth scholarly investigations into how “traditional” Islam 
is represented, produced, reproduced, and contested via institutions and symbols in other 
Muslim-majority regions of Russia. Each of the country’s Muslim regions is unique in its 
ethnic makeup and historical experience with the empire. Therefore, empirically rich 
comparative studies could particularly enhance our understanding of the changing place 
of Islam in contemporary Russia, a federation that in many respects appears to be well on 
its way to becoming a unitary state (Oversloot 2009). 
Second, this study, when considered in the context of a broader state support for 
neo-traditionalist Islams, piques the question of to which state is the local “traditional” 
version of the religion loyal? Tatarstan no longer positions itself as a sovereign state, yet 
DUMRT, although declaring its fealty to Russia, is foremost loyal to the Kazan-based 
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government. The regional and federal authorities appear to speak in a unified voice, but, 
again, with another political-territorial rupture of Russia, the Spiritual Board could prove 
a powerful institution for mobilizing Tatarstan’s umma. Ramzan Kadyrov, the president 
of Chechnya, where the institutionalization of “traditional” Islam in no small measure 
was based on the Tatarstani model (interview with Mukhametshin 2010), has already 
been accused of leveraging the centralized institutions of “traditional” Chechen Islam to 
return his republic on the path “towards autonomy” (Ferris-Rotman 2010). Each Muslim-
majority region of Russia now has its own Spiritual Board (although DUMRT is the only 
independent regional Muftiate, i.e. not aligned with one of the all-Russian Spiritual 
Boards), which raises similar issues in each of them. 
Third, and perhaps most fundamentally, this dissertation indicates that Suny’s 
assessment, issued more than a decade ago, of Russia’s “chronic failure to construct an 
identity” (Suny 1999, 141) largely remains true today. The “multinational Russian 
people” propagated by Putin by definition would be grounded in a civic identity, 
implying the existence of a vibrant civil society. The mosque, synagogue, and church are 
among the foundation stones of civil society. The state’s management of the mosque, as 
seen in the case of Tatarstan, is indeed symptomatic of post-Soviet Russia’s “chronic 
failure” to cultivate a post-imperial, civically defined national identity. 
Implications for the Social Scientific Study of Islam 
There exists a strong tendency to view Islam as a thing unto itself, an all-
embracing, monolithic religion-as-culture that defines the Muslim’s politics, economics, 
and so on. Yet Islamic identity, like any other religious identity, is conditioned by a 
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particular matrix of cultural, historical, geographical, economic, and other factors. The 
trajectory of the post-Soviet Islamic revival in Tatarstan has been shaped by the Tatars’ 
identity as a specific Sunni Muslim Turkic people, their geographical location at the far 
northern periphery of the Muslim world, and their centuries-long history of living within 
an Orthodox Christian – and then atheist – empire. The precursors to the two main Tatar 
Islamic movements that have been revived in the past two decades – Jadidism and 
traditionalism – were themselves influenced by these same basic factors, as discussed in 
Chapter III. The traditionalist Muslims in the Middle Volga were appreciative of the 
tolerance ensured by the Tsars and Tsarinas (after Catherine II “legalized” Islam in 
Russia), yet were anxious that any significant integration into Russian culture would 
weaken their faith and, ultimately, their separate identity. The original Jadidists were 
religious reformers/modernizers around the same time Al-Afghani was spreading his 
gospel of Islamic reform/modernization. However, unlike the latter, whose religious 
reform movement arose as a reaction against the British Empire, the Tatar Jadidists 
sought greater participation and representation within the Russian Empire. Their drive to 
modernize Islam was foremost a program to develop the Tatar nation, not an effort to 
adapt modernity to the nation of Islam. 
While Islamic revivals today may be conditioned by sectarian differences, 
language, geography, history, socio-economic development, and other factors, all cases 
of Islamic revival take place within a modern political-territorial order that assumes states 
represent a defined “people,” understood as a nation. Two prevalent paradigms in the 
social scientific interrogation of Islam, however, preclude a serious consideration of the 
role territory plays in shaping Islamic identity (as discussed in Chapter II). The first 
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paradigm, common in the academic International Relations community, may be termed 
“Islamic exceptionalism,” which views Islam as fundamentally incompatible with the 
modern political-territorial order. IR neorealism à la Huntington is most notorious for 
asserting the umma’s innate aversion to its territorial division, but advocates of IR’s 
cultural turn, although more sympathetic to Islam, similarly argue that Muslims are 
averse to Western notions of national community (e.g. Pasha 2003; Mandaville 2011). A 
second paradigm, termed the “comparative fundamentalisms” model, views the current 
upswing in Islamic fundamentalism as part of a global shift toward stricter forms of faith 
that is witnessed among all major world religions as a result of the “crisis of the nation-
state” brought about by globalization (Castells 2010, 21). 
As this study has shown, neither of these paradigms, in positing Islam’s innate 
aversion to the nation-state or a globalization-fuelled crisis of the nation-state giving rise 
to Islamic fundamentalism, would likely provide a plausible account of the Tatars’ post-
Soviet Islamic revival. From the beginning, the Tatars’ religious renaissance was tightly 
connected with the revival of national culture and the pursuit of sovereign statehood. It is 
virtually impossible to separate Islam from Tatar national identity – the question is the 
relative weight religion assumes in the balance of Tatar national identity, depending on 
the political-territorial circumstances (see Chapters III, IV, and V). The “pure Islam” 
espoused by the more radical Tatar nationalists was not a result of globalization, but 
came in tandem with intensified grievances and territorial demands. Neither paradigm 
would be able to differentiate expressions of the revival of Tatar traditionalism from 
expressions of Salafism in Tatarstan, as both phenomena would be grouped together 
under a single heading: Islamic Fundamentalism. For those seeking to understand the 
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nature and significance of Islam as a social and political force in the contemporary world, 
the task at hand is to go beyond the perception that Islamic identities and practices are 
somehow incompatible with the nation-state and interrogate the ideas and ideologies 
underpinning the modern political-territorial order that condition Islam’s social and 
political expression. 
 Directions for Future Research in the Post-Soviet Realm 
The increasing politicization of Islam and the shift toward more conservative 
forms of religious expression that have been observed in Tatarstan in recent years have 
been similarly noted in many other parts of the post-Soviet realm. This is the case not 
only in Chechnya and the broader North Caucasus, where Islamist-inspired violence 
threatens regional stability, but also – in varying intensities – in the newly independent 
states of Central Asia and the Caucasus. A notable example is Uzbekistan, where, as 
Rashid (2002) explores, the militant Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) espouses a 
Jihadist ideology that is evocative of the Taliban.111 The specter of religious 
fundamentalism has also arisen in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where, as research by 
Karagiannis (2005; 2007) indicates, Hizb-ut-Tahrir has gained a foothold and its call for 
the reestablishment of an Islamic caliphate is said to be growing in popularity. Even 
Azerbaijan, which can “rightly claim to be among the most progressive and secular 
Islamic societies,” according to Cornell, has witnessed a “rise in radical Islamic groups” 
in recent years (Cornell 2006, 8). 
                                                          
111 Members of the IMU were caught fighting alongside the Taliban against US forces in the early stages of 
the military action that was launched in late 2001. 
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As noted at the beginning of this thesis, examinations of Islam in the post-Soviet 
space often explain the upswing in “fundamentalism” or “extremism” as a local 
expression of a global social movement (e.g. Karagiannis 2010) or as being “guided by 
external influences” (Cornell 2006, 8). Yet the findings of this dissertation lend support 
to Khalid’s assertion, made in his discussion of Islam in contemporary Uzbekistan, that 
much of the literature “suffers from a serious lack of comparative and historical 
perspective [and] underestimates the strength of Soviet-era nation- and state-building” 
(Khalid 2003, 573-574). Indeed, all Muslims in the post-Soviet realm are united in the 
fact that their group identities were first territorialized with the creation of Autonomous 
Soviet Socialist Republics or Union Republics. Institutions were organized within the 
spatial extent of these new territorial entities and employed to modernize Soviet Muslims 
through their nationalization/secularization. These territorialized institutions subsequently 
were used, as seen in Chapter III, to denationalize the same populations with the goal of 
ultimately creating a homo soveticus consisting of peoples “national in form, socialist in 
content” (Stalin 1934, 158). Thus, Muslim identities in places as diverse as 
Turkmenistan, Karbardino-Balkaria, and Tajikistan have been fundamentally shaped by 
common political-territorial processes, carried out through a common set of institutions 
and occurring at roughly the same time over a period of seven decades. 
This commonality of experience in the USSR forcefully points to the need for 
comparative studies of post-Soviet Islamic revivals. The findings from this dissertation 
suggest that a starting point would be a comparison of how “traditional” Islam is 
represented by political elites in various parts of the former Soviet Union. “Traditional” 
religious practices, as discussed earlier in this chapter, are today supported by state 
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authorities in all of Russia’s Muslim-majority regions in a campaign to foster a common 
multiethnic national identity. The relevant academic literature indicates that “traditional” 
understandings of Islam are similarly propagated by political elites in many of the newly 
independent states of Central Asia and the Caucasus as part of broader nation- and state-
building processes in each of those countries (e.g. Akbarzadeh 1996a; 1996b; Tohidi 
1997; Motika 2001; Kuru 2002; Kaiser 2003; Khalid 2003; Peyrouse 2007).112 This 
commonly shared concern for cultivating “official” Islam – although defined differently 
in each newly independent state – would suggest that the legacy of Soviet-era nation- and 
state-building continues to exert a strong influence on the character of religious 
expression across the now sovereign borders of the post-Soviet realm. Comparative 
investigations into how the inclusive and exclusive borders of neo-traditionalisms are 
represented by political elites in different parts of the post-Soviet realm would potentially 
yield greater insight into dynamics shaping Islamic expression in Russia, Central Asia, 
and the Caucasus. 
This study models two methodological approaches for comparative studies of the 
changing nature of Islamic revival. First is the importance of studying the practices and 
representations of key institutions such as the Muslim Spiritual Board of Tatarstan (see 
Chapter IV). The collapse of the Soviet Union was followed by the disintegration of all 
the three Muftiates – covering Central Asia, Transcaucasia, and the North Caucasus – 
created by Stalin during World War II. However, each of the five newly independent 
states of Central Asia, along with Azerbaijan, promptly recreated new Spiritual Boards 
                                                          
112 Examinations of the relationship between Islam and nation- and state-building in the post-Soviet space 
have almost exclusively focused on single-country case studies. A notable exception is an article by Hann 
and Pelkman (2009) in which “traditional” Islam and nation-building in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan are 
compared. 
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coterminous with their political boundaries. Much as the Kazan-based Muftiate today 
promotes an “official” Islam (and combats “unofficial” versions of the faith) that is loyal 
to the state and is intended to contribute to the construction of a multiethnic national 
identity in Russia, the Spiritual Boards of the newly sovereign states of Central Asia and 
Caucasus encourage Islamic expressions deemed “traditional” as a way to bolster the 
nation-building efforts in those countries. Comparative studies could constructively 
investigate how preferred understandings of the faith are communicated and reinforced 
by the newly independent Spiritual Boards and how neo-traditionalists ideas are 
reproduced, or resisted, by rank-and-file clergy and “common” believers. 
My reading of the changing morphology and meaning of the Kazan Kremlin in 
Chapter V represents a second useful methodological approach. The construction of the 
behemoth Kul-Sharif Mosque is exceptional only in its relative location inside a kremlin, 
next to an Orthodox cathedral. Grandiose mosques and other religiously themed 
monuments have been erected throughout the post-Soviet realm as vessels to 
communicate and reinforce notions of “ideal community.” For instance, as if to outdo 
Tatarstan, a mosque even larger than Kul-Sharif was opened in the center of Grozny in 
2008 after only three years of construction (Reuters 2008). The temple’s name – “The 
Heart of Chechnya” – makes it clear that the bulky structure is presented as a vivid 
“picture [of] the nation” (Daniels 1993, 5).113 In another example, Kazakhstani President 
Nursultan Nazerbaev moved his country’s capital from Almaty to Astana (previously 
little more than a village) in 1997 as part of his nation- and state-building efforts (Schatz 
2003); in doing so, he decreed the construction of what is said to be Central Asia’s 
                                                          
113 Construction for the “Heart of Chechnya” was financed by Moscow. 
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biggest mosque, officially opened in 2005, as a centerpiece of the city’s architectural 
ensemble. These and other grand new temples, much like the monumental Stalin-era 
architecture in Moscow (Adams 2008), reflect a regime’s ideology and beckon 
geographers to unravel and interpret their meaning.114 However, preferred understandings 
of Islam and national community are embedded less spectacularly in multiple other 
“unofficially sacred” (Kong 2005) sites and landscapes in the post-Soviet realm. Future 
studies could draw on the case study of the Kazan Kremlin presented here and examine 
the politics underpinning the siting, design, and use of a number of such symbolic 
landscapes. 
At a cursory glance, the upswing in Islamic conservatism in various parts of the 
post-Soviet realm gives some credence to notions of Islamic exceptionalism or theses of 
transnational fundamentalist networks arising as a result of a “crisis of the nation-state” 
(Castells 2010, 21). Yet as I have shown in this dissertation, the growing conservatism in 
religious practices and expressions in Tatarstan (and probably other Muslim-majority 
regions of the country) that has been observed in recent years relates more to the process 
of nation- and state-(re)building that has accompanied the Putin-era political-territorial 
recentralization of the Russian Federation. Islamic revivals in the newly independent 
states of Central Asia and the Caucasus have also been intertwined with nation- and state-
building initiatives that have taken place in the past 20 years, as illustrated in other 
                                                          
114 If oversized new mosques in Kazan, Grozny, Astana, and other temples in post-Soviet capitals are 
reminiscent of Stalinist architecture, reflecting the communist ideology, monuments to Niiaz Turkmenbashi 
(“Father of the Turkmens”) in Turkmenistan can be considered updated versions of monuments to Lenin. 
Monuments to the now-deceased first president of Turkmenistan mix Islamic imagery with his cult of 
personality, casting the ruler as a “new prophet” while communicating the “state-imposed version of Islam” 
(Hann and Pelkmans 2009, 1532). 
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research. Underpinning these various religious rebirths is the shared experience of 
powerful nation- and state-building in the twentieth century.  
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